dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with the majority members of the panel, I record my respectful dissent. I would sustain appellant’s point of error seven and reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant’s conviction had its inception in an armed robbery which occurred at an Oshman’s wholesale outlet in Houston, Texas at approximately 7:30 p.m. on December 7, 1984. The complainant and principal witness, Gayle Jarmon, was the Osh-man’s employee who was robbed when a man walked into the store, selected a pair of sunglasses, got in line at Jarmon’s cash register, produced a gun and instructed Jarmon to put all her money on the counter. Jarmon complied, emptying her cash register. Officer Luna responded to the robbery report and obtained from Jarmon a description that the robber was a white male, between the age of 38 to 41, standing 5'8" to 6', weighing between 175 and 185 pounds, short brown hair with a mustache. On January 10, 1985, Jarmon picked appellant out from a five picture photo array.
Jarmon was the State’s sole identifying witness at trial. The record reveals defense counsel aggressively impeached Jar-mon’s testimony on the issue of identification and also discredited the reliability of the photospread from which Jarmon identified appellant. The State concedes that Jarmon’s testimony on the issue of appellant’s identity was aggressively undermined by defense counsel's cross-examination. As a consequence, the State was permitted to introduce evidence of other similar crimes where the victims had identified appellant as the perpetrator.
During his case-in-chief, appellant asserted the defense of mistaken identity. In support of his theory, appellant introduced evidence that the FBI had been looking for a suspect in a Dallas, Texas bank robbery similar in appearance to him. Peggy Ballard, appellant’s girlfriend, testified that appellant regularly left Houston and traveled to Tyler, Texas to spend the weekends with her. On December 13, 1984, six FBI agents pulled Ballard off the road in Tyler. The agents then staked out Ballard’s apartment for three consecutive days believing appellant would arrive there. The agents told Ballard they were going to arrest appellant for the Dallas robbery. Agents George Kieny and Steve Thompson showed Ballard six photographs taken from two separate Dallas bank robberies, requesting her to identify the person in the photographs. She testified the person depicted in the photographs looked very much like appellant but was not he. In preparation for appellant’s trial, Ballard phoned agent Kieny to ask him for the six photographs, but she was told that another agent in Dallas had the photographs; Ballard made subsequent attempts to obtain the photographs from the FBI but was told the Dallas office was disorganized.
*803Lois Anderson, an acquaintance of appellant, was present when the FBI was conducting their surveillance of Ballard’s apartment. She, too, was shown pictures of the Dallas robbery suspect and testified that the suspect looked similar to, but was not, appellant.
In his seventh point of error, appellant complains the trial court committed reversible error in overruling his objection to the State’s argument at the guilt or innocence phase of the trial that appellant did not look like the suspect the FBI were looking for, where the name and description of the suspect was never placed in evidence. The trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection.
Appellant’s complaint arises from the exchange which occurred between the prosecutor and Officer Alsbrooks during the defense’s case-in-chief. Throughout the case, defense counsel referred to a suspect whom the FBI was allegedly investigating in connection with several Dallas bank robberies. Appellant contended that this suspect resembled appellant in appearance and that this other suspect was the perpetrator of the Oshman’s robbery for which appellant was on trial. Alsbrooks was a police officer involved in the investigation of the Oshman’s robbery. The questions posed by the prosecutor on re-cross examination contained information concerning a man named Kenneth Wayne Holmes. The exchange reads as follows:
PROSECUTOR: Are you aware that Kenneth Wayne Holmes pled guilty to bank robbery in Dallas that Mr. Leidtke [Defense Counsel] talked about?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR: Aware that Mr. Homes is six feet tall, two hundred pounds and has gray and black hair?
A: No, I didn’t know that either.
PROSECUTOR: Are you also aware he gave a confession stating he has never been in Houston?
A: No, I am not aware of that.
Alsbrooks responded clearly and unequivocally in the negative to the description of Kenneth Wayne Holmes provided by the prosecutor. Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record concerning the identifying features of Kenneth Wayne Holmes.
Permissible jury argument falls within one of four general areas: 1) summation of the evidence; 2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; 3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and 4) plea for law enforcement. Albiar v. State, 739 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Even if argument exceeds the bounds of proper jury argument, it is not reversible error unless, in light of the record as a whole, the argument is extreme, manifestly improper, vio-lative of a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings. Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 239, 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986).
In jury argument during the guilt/innocence phase, both defense counsel and the prosecutor referred to certain identifying features of Kenneth Wayne Holmes. The State claims that its own recitations of specific identifying features of Kenneth Wayne Holmes were in response to the same information originating from the defense. The record reveals otherwise.
During the guilt/innocence phase, defense counsel and the prosecutor argued in pertinent part as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Ask yourself why is she doing that. Ms. Derbyshire (Prosecutor) even knows the individual that we tried to bring before you. She provided the name. We were so convinced that this would be a plausible theory if we just got the information from the FBI agents that we could put it before you. Ms. Derbyshire provided the name. Ms. Derbyshire tells you, yes, there is a Kenneth Wayne Holmes, and Ms. Derbyshire then says that he is the guy who has charcoal gray hair and is six feet two. Well, if Ms. Derbyshire is so convinced that we are so wet and our theory so implausible, then why didn’t she bring him to you? How does she have the audacity to stand before you objecting to relevance of our investiga*804tion and during the course of that objection she tells you he has charcoal gray hair? Well, heck, why don’t you just give us a picture? That is all we are saying, that there was a woman who thought it was Christopher Parker. There were agents trained, thought it was Christopher Parker.
PROSECUTOR: Objection. That is outside the record.
COURT: Sustained.
* * * * * *
PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT
PROSECUTOR: ... Now this is another interesting thing. This man wants you to believe something about these lookalike robberies. Kenneth Wayne Homes is six two with gray hair. Look at Christopher Parker. Is he anywhere near that description?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: She is arguing outside the record.
COURT: Overruled.
⅝ * * * # jjc
PROSECUTOR: Peggy Ballard tells you how she met these FBI agents. Tells you how these pictures resemble Christopher Parker. Well, we know that is not true. Christopher Parker is five-seven to five-eight with blonde, brown hair. Kenneth Holmes is 6'2" with gray hair.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. Outside the record. She trying to get her identification of Kenneth Wayne Holmes even if he is the same guy in. It’s unfair and we object.
THE COURT: Overruled.
The actual argument originating from defense counsel was that the State did not subpoena FBI agents to refute the testimony of defense witness, Peggy Ballard. Ballard testified the FBI was investigating appellant in connection with armed robberies of Dallas banks. Ballard further testified that the FBI provided her with six photographs which depicted the robbery suspect who looked very similar to but was not appellant.
Defense counsel was not acknowledging the description of Kenneth Wayne Holmes provided by the State. Quite the reverse. Defense counsel was commenting on the obvious incongruity of, on the one hand, the State’s objection to defense counsel’s reference to the FBI investigation and, on the other hand, the State’s description of the robbery suspect ultimately apprehended in connection with that very same FBI investigation.
Viewed in the context of defense counsel’s actual argument, the State’s description of Holmes was not responsive to defense counsel’s comment on the State’s failure to subpoena the FBI pictures shown to Peggy Ballard. Nor does the State’s argument fall within the remaining areas of permissible jury argument, that is, summation of or reasonable deductions from evidence or a plea for law enforcement. Todd v. State, 598 at 297; McKay v. State, 707 at 38.
There was no evidence in the record that Holmes was 6'2" weighing 200 pounds and sporting charcoal gray hair. Defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s descriptions as being outside the record was valid. Even the State conceded to this Court, at oral argument, that the prosecutor’s descriptions of Holmes were outside the record. When it overruled defense counsel’s objection, the trial court placed its seal of approval on the identifying features of Holmes improperly placed before the jury.
Error exists when facts not supported by the record are interjected in argument, but such error is not reversible unless there is a reasonable possibility that the argument complained of might have contributed to the conviction or the punishment assessed. Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) stay denied - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 835, 102 L.Ed.2d 968 and — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1176, 103 L.Ed.2d 238; Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2).
I have analyzed the court’s error to determine whether or not it was harmful pursuant to Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) and I have applied the standards for evaluation of harm enunciated in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). I am not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to appellant’s *805conviction or punishment. The impropriety of the prosecutor’s specific description of Holmes and its attendant harm to appellant are manifest. The State virtually telegraphed to the jury: (1) that the prosecutor had inside information as to the identity of Kenneth Wayne Holmes, the robbery suspect ultimately apprehended by the FBI’s investigation; and (2) Kenneth Wayne Holmes did not remotely resemble appellant in appearance.
In summary, Peggy Ballard and Lois Anderson testified that the Dallas robbery suspect, depicted in the six FBI photographs, looked very similar to, but was not, appellant. The State then asserted as a fact that the Dallas robbery suspect did not even come close to fitting appellant’s description. The State effectively sabotaged appellant’s defense of mistaken identity based upon information totally outside the record. In light of the record as a whole, the prosecutor’s description of Holmes was manifestly improper and injected new facts harmful to appellant in the trial below.
It is further noted that the single piece of direct evidence connecting appellant to the Oshman's robbery was Gayle Jarmon’s testimony which was successfully impeached at trial. The jury subsequently assessed appellant’s punishment for the Oshman’s robbery at confinement for ninety-nine years. These facts, coupled with my review of the entire record, do not persuade me beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to appellant’s conviction or punishment. Tex.R. App.P. 81(b)(2).
I would sustain appellant’s seventh point of error and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.