concurring in part and concurring in result.
While I concur with the principal opinion’s conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on Carman L. Deck in this case was neither excessive nor disproportionate, I do not agree that the proportionality review under section 565.035, RSMo 2000, only requires review of factually similar cases that resulted in a death sentence. The legislature’s directive in section 565.035.6 that records be compiled of “all cases in which the sentence of death or life imprisonment without probation or parole was imposed” clearly communicates its intent that factually similar cases with *554sentences of life imprisonment be considered in the proportionality review. The fact that the legislature granted this Court discretion to determine what information from those two types of cases is relevant to conducting the mandated proportionality review does not indicate its intent that the Court should limit the review to only death-penalty-imposed cases. I believe that, as a matter of law, this Court does not have the discretion to eliminate from the proportionality review all cases in which the jury imposes the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole.
The principal opinion states that the holding in State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. banc 1993), that proportionality review only requires review of similar cases that resulted in a death sentence, was unanimous and has gone unquestioned by any member of this Court for 17 years. While the Ramsey decision was unanimous, it is noteworthy that the Court overturned prior case law sub silentio and adopted its new standard of proportionality review without any analysis or discussion of the language of section 565.035. See, e.g., State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 542-43 (Mo. banc 1987) (“The issue when determining the proportionality of a death sentence is not whether any similar case can be found in which the jury imposed a life sentence, but rather whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate in light of ‘similar cases’ as a whole.”). I also am not persuaded that the legislature’s failure to respond to the Ramsey decision should be interpreted as its approval of that decision. This Court recently has questioned such a conclusion: “An incorrect judicial interpretation of a statute may also stand simply because the legislature has paid no attention to it. Thus, it is speculative to infer legislative approval from legislative inaction.” Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156 S.W.3d 333, 334 (Mo. banc 2005).
I am committed firmly to the principle of stare decisis but, where the issue being addressed is life or death, it is more important to correct a prior erroneous decision of the Court and to undertake the proportionality review as it is intended by the legislature.
I write separately from Judge Stith because of her additional criticism of the principal opinion’s statement that the proportionality review in section 565.035.3 is intended for this Court to consider only whether the imposition of the death penalty was a “freakish or wanton application of the death penalty.” She notes that the language “freakish or wanton” came from Ramsey and not from the statute. While such language is not found in section 565.035, I think the principal opinion is correct that the language of section 565.035.3 supports the conclusion that proportionality review is intended for this Court to identify and correct only the imposition of aberrant death sentences. I do not read the statute as requiring that the Court act as a super-juror by substituting its judgment of the appropriate punishment for that of the jury and the trial court. While the principal opinion would be served by better utilizing the statute’s terms when discussing its review, its use of the language “freakish or wanton” does not indicate the Court is applying an incorrect standard or not undertaking the review required by section 565.035.3.
Although the principal opinion applied an erroneous standard in conducting its proportionality review, a review including similar cases where the jury imposed the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole does not change this Court’s conclusion that Mr. Deck is not entitled to relief. As Judge Stith demonstrates in her opinion concurring in result, the consideration of cases where a sentence of life imprisonment was *555imposed would not change the finding that Mr. Deck’s sentence was not disproportionate or excessive to the sentences imposed in similar cases. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the principal opinion in its proportionality review and concur in the remainder of the opinion.