concurring in the result.
I concur in the result of the principal opinion but respectfully disagree with that portion of the opinion holding that proportionality review under section 565.035.3 RSMo 2000 requires this Court to review only other cases in which the death penalty was imposed under similar facts. Section 565.035 requires consideration of all “other similar cases,” which includes those in which a life sentence resulted, in determining whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate in light of the crime, the defendant and the strength of the evidence. To the extent that this Court’s cases decided between 1994 and the present suggest otherwise, they are contrary to the statute and to cases decided under it from 1979 until 1993 and no longer should be followed.
/. HISTORY OF PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN MISSOURI
A. Until 199k, Review Was of Both Death and Life Imprisonment Cases
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-199, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty is constitutional if not imposed arbitrarily and if procedural safeguards against improper imposition of the death penalty were followed. The Supreme Court noted that the Georgia death penalty procedures analyzed in Gregg met these requirements because, among other things, they compared “each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate.” Id. at 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909.
In reliance on Gregg, Missouri’s legislature re-enacted the death penalty in 1977. § 565.001 et seq., RSMo Supp.1977. Section 565.008.1 made persons convicted of capital murder eligible for one of two possible sentences — either death or life in prison without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. Section 565.014 also noted a right of direct appeal to this Court in all cases in which the death penalty was imposed and required that in all such cases:
3. With regard to the sentence, the supreme court shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance ...
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
§ 565.014.3, RSMo Supp.1977 (emphasis added).
Missouri’s legislature also required that, in conducting this proportionality analysis, “the supreme court shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration.” § 565.014.5, RSMo 1977 (emphasis added). It provided this Court with an attorney assistant to accumulate “the records of all capital cases in which sentence was imposed after May 26, 1977, or such earlier date as the court may deem appropriate.” § 565.014.6 (emphasis added). This assistant was directed to “provide the court with whatever extracted information the court desires with respect thereto.” Id.
*556The first capital murder case in which this Court applied the proportionality analysis required by the Missouri legislature was State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1981). The Court was clear at that time that the duty imposed on it by these provisions to review similar cases in deciding proportionality meant it was required to review all cases in which the death penalty was submitted, whether the sentence actually imposed was life imprisonment or death, stating:
The records of all capital cases in which sentence was imposed after the effective date, accumulated pursuant to § 565.014.6, have been reviewed. Those cases in which both death and life imprisonment were submitted to the jury, and which have been affirmed on appeal are considered as similar cases, [section] 565.014.5.
Mercer, 618 S.W.2d at 11 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the only controversy at that time was whether the Court also should consider cases in which the death penalty was not sought but in which it might have been sought, with Judge Seiler arguing in dissent that:
I do not agree that we discharge our duty under section 565.014.2(3) to determine “(w)hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases” by restricting our consideration to cases in which both death and life imprisonment were submitted to the jury and which have been affirmed on appeal. This is too limited in scope. It eliminates from consideration all cases in which the state waived the death penalty, all cases in which life imprisonment was given and no appeal taken, all capital cases pending before us [but not as of that time affirmed] in which life imprisonment was given, and all cases in which capital murder was charged but the jury found defendant guilty of a lesser crime than capital murder.... The purpose of appellate review of the death penalty is to serve “as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). It is our solemn duty, in my opinion, to guarantee that similar aggravating and mitigating circumstances do not bring about a death sentence in one case and life imprisonment in another.
Mercer, 618 S.W.2d at 20-21 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
The next year, this Court reaffirmed in State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. banc 1982), that “similar cases” included all cases in which the fact-finder was required to choose between death or life imprisonment, stating:
Relevant cases for a review of the appropriateness of the sentence are those in which the judge or jury first found the defendant guilty of capital murder and thereafter chose between death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for at least fifty years.
Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
In 1983, the legislature modified the proportionality review statute to add the requirement that this Court consider “the strength of the evidence” in addition to the crime and the defendant as a part of its proportionality review. § 565.035.3, RSMo Supp.1983. And, importantly here, it revised section 565.035.6 so that instead of stating that the Court’s assistant should accumulate the records of “all capital cases,” the statute expressly required that records of both death and life imprisonment cases be accumulated for comparison purposes in determining what are similar cases, stating:
The court shall accumulate the records of all cases in which the sentence of death or life imprisonment without probation or parole was imposed after [the *557reinstitution of the death penalty on] May 26,1977, or such earlier date as the court may deem appropriate.
§ 565.035.6, RSMo Supp.1983 (emphasis added).
The proportionality review statute has remained essentially unchanged in relevant respects since that time.1 So too did this Court’s approach to the proportionality analysis for the next decade. In case after case, this Court considered other cases with similar facts, regardless of whether the penalty imposed was death or life imprisonment.
For instance, State v. Lashley, 667 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. banc 1984), found that the imposition of the death penalty was not arbitrary in light of the entire record, after comparing the case to other “lying in wait” cases in which the choice of life imprisonment or the death penalty was submitted. Id. at 716. Lashley cited to State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. banc 1983), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Barton, 936 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. banc 1996), which had approved the death penalty in a “lying in wait” case after taking into account both the crime and the defendant, stating, “In arriving at this conclusion we have reviewed the cases decided since the enactment of our current capital murder statute ... where the death sentences were affirmed, one case which reversed the death sentence because of its dispro-portionality, and capital cases in which the choice of death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole for fifty years was submitted to the jury.” McDonald, 661 S.W.2d at 507.
Similarly, in State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Mo. banc 1987), this Court compared the defendant, his crime and the strength of the evidence to that in other cases in which life imprisonment had been imposed, as well as those in which death had been imposed, in finding that the death sentence was not disproportionate.2
Again, in State v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 169 (Mo. banc 1991), this Court held that “for purposes of § 565.035.3(3), this Court has examined those capital murder and first degree murder cases in which death and the alternative sentence of life imprisonment have been submitted to the jury and the sentence has been affirmed on appeal.”
B. Beginning with Ramsey, this Court Strayed From a Proper Application of the Proportionality Review Required by Section 565.035
Despite this long-settled interpretation of what constituted similar cases under section 565.035, in State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. banc 1993), this Court began undertaking a different — and much more limited — proportionality review. Ramsey correctly noted that the United States Supreme Court had held, “Proportionality review is not constitutionally required. It is designed by the legislature as an additional safeguard against arbitrary and capricious sentencing and to promote the evenhanded, rational and consistent imposition of death sentences.” Id. at 328, citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984).
Pulley held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require that a court undertake a proportionality review. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50-*55851, 104 S.Ct. 871. It did not address, however, the kind of analysis that is required under Missouri’s proportionality review statute. Nonetheless, without distinguishing or overruling any of this Court’s many cases (including those noted above) stating that proportionality review requires consideration of all prior capital cases, regardless of whether a death sentence was imposed, Ramsey rejected what it called the argument that it should be “parsing through homicide cases” by examining and weighing different facts. 864 S.W.2d at 327. Rather, it said, section 565.035 proportionality review “merely provides a backstop against the freakish and wanton application of the death penalty.... If the case, taken as a whole, is plainly lacking circumstances consistent with those in similar cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, then a resentencing will be ordered.” Id. at 328.
Although Ramsey briefly mentioned that cases imposing a life sentence “had been examined” and found to differ in regard to the presence of aggravating circumstances and the lack of mitigating ones, id., it did not cite or discuss such cases. Thereafter, in reliance on Ramsey’s statement that the purpose of proportionality review is to provide a “backstop against the freakish and wanton application of the death penalty,” id. at 328, with rare exceptions3 this Court’s eases began to compare the facts of the defendant’s case against only other cases in which imposition of the death penalty had been approved. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 933-34 (Mo. banc 1994); State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 330 (Mo. banc 1996); Lyons v. State, 39 S.W.3d 32, 44 (Mo. banc 2001); State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 50-51 (Mo. banc 2006); State v. Barton, 240 S.W.3d 693, 709-11 (Mo. banc 2008).
Few of these cases actually analyze the language of section 565.035, however, or compare the analysis this Court undertakes to that required by the statute. Instead, they cite to the statement in Ramsey that the purpose of proportionality review is to protect against the freakish or wanton imposition of a death sentence and then note that prior cases have imposed death on similar facts so the death sentence is not disproportionate.
C. Section 565.035 Requires Consideration of Both Death and Life Imprisonment Cases
Section 565.035 does not permit this Court to limit its analysis to a determination whether imposition of the death penalty was “freakish or wanton,” however. That language comes from Ramsey, which notes the minimum standard that is constitutionally required to be met in order to avoid the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. I agree that this is the ultimate constitutional issue, but the statute sets out a more specific, and I believe more stringent, proportionality analysis: the Court is required to determine whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate after considering similar cases in light of three factors — the crime, the defendant and the strength of the evidence. § 565.035.3.4 Whether a death sen*559tence is imposed is not a listed factor. To the contrary, after stating that this Court is to list “those similar cases which it took into consideration,” § 565.035.5, the statute requires that this Court appoint an assistant to “accumulate the records of all case in which the sentence of death or life imprisonment without probation or parole was imposed.” § 565.035.6 (emphasis added).
It would be pointless for section 565.035.6 to require this Court to accumulate records of cases in which life imprisonment is imposed if life imprisonment cases are inherently dissimilar to this Court’s proportionality review under the statute. That is why the cases interpreting section 565.035 and its predecessor prior to Ramsey considered both death and life imprisonment cases, for both may constitute “similar cases” under section 565.035.5
Although this type of proportionality review is required by statute, rather than by the Eighth Amendment, the duty is no less important. Cases in which a life sentence was imposed should be included in this Court’s proportionality analysis. That is not to say that the existence of a large number of cases in which a death sentence was imposed on similar facts may not be more persuasive or that cases that did not compare the case before them to those in which a life sentence was imposed reached the wrong result. Rather, the analysis simply is incomplete unless one also looks at cases in which life imprisonment resulted, and there is a risk that this lack of complete analysis, in the rare case, may have prevented this Court from identifying a case in which the death penalty was disproportionate when considered as against similar cases as a whole.
Further, it is worthwhile to note that United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, in a statement respecting the denial of a petition for writ of certiora-ri in Walker v. Georgia, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 453, 454-55, 172 L.Ed.2d 344 (2008), recently expressed concern about Georgia’s current failure to consider cases in which a life sentence was imposed, stating that consideration of the latter cases seems “judicious because, quite obviously, a significant number of similar cases in which death was not imposed might well provide the most relevant evidence of arbitrariness in the sentence before the court.”
In Walker, the defendant argued that Georgia’s capital punishment scheme was unconstitutionally arbitrary because it failed to conduct a meaningful proportionality review. Justice Stevens noted that this issue was not preserved properly; *560therefore, he concurred in the denial of certiorari but said, “I write separately to emphasize that the Court’s denial has no precedential effect.” Id. at 454. The reason he wanted to emphasize this point, he said, was his concern that Gregg and similar cases had affirmed the lack of arbitrariness of Georgia’s death penalty procedures partly in reliance on Georgia’s statutory requirement that its supreme court independently review the imposition of the death penalty and its proportionality to similar cases in which death or a life sentence without parole had been imposed. Id. at 454.
Justice Stevens noted there is a “special risk of arbitrariness” in cases in which the victim and defendant are of different races, such as in Walker; therefore, it greatly troubled him that Georgia had carried out only a “perfunctory” proportionality review and had not considered cases in which death was not imposed, despite the heightened risk of arbitrariness, stating, “had the Georgia Supreme Court looked outside the universe of cases in which the jury imposed a death sentence, it would have found numerous cases involving offenses very similar to petitioner’s in which the jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.” Id. at 455-56.
Justice Stevens further found such cases to be “eminently relevant to the question whether a death sentence in a given case is proportionate to the offense,” id. at 456, and that, “failure to acknowledge ... cases outside the limited universe of cases in which the defendant was sentenced to death creates an unacceptable risk that [the reviewing court] will overlook a sentence infected by impermissible considerations.” Id. In other words, if one limits one’s consideration only to cases in which a similar penalty was imposed, then it is almost preordained that the cases will be found to be similar, but this says nothing about whether the case also is similar to cases outside the orbit of the court’s analysis.
While it is unclear whether the other justices share Justice Stevens’ viewpoint, the concern he raises is a realistic one that, by categorically refusing to look at cases in which a life sentence was imposed, a court may be excluding from consideration cases that are in fact similar to the one before it. It therefore is not surprising that Missouri’s legislature expressed its intent that eases in which a life sentence was imposed are to be a part of this Court’s proportionality review.
Such a review does not impose a new requirement on this Court to count good and bad facts or to become a super-juror and second-guess the jury’s consideration of the evidence. Such a review requires the Court only to continue doing what it now does in regard to cases in which death was imposed — review them to determine whether the sentence of death is disproportionate in light of the crime, the defendant and the strength of the evidence, see, e.g., State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 59-60 (Mo. banc 1998) (finding death sentence disproportionate in light of strength of the evidence after comparing to other death cases) — but to include similar cases in which a life sentence was imposed in that analysis. See, e.g., State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333, 341-42 (Mo. banc 1982) (finding death sentence disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases after considering both death and life sentence cases). The Court now simply must apply its already existing analysis to the broader universe of cases required by statute— those in which either death or a sentence of life without parole were imposed.6
*561The principal opinion already considers similar cases in which a death penalty resulted. Therefore, this separate opinion determines whether the death sentence here is disproportionate in light of similar cases by additionally reviewing the cases Mr. Deck cites as similar but in which a life sentence was imposed, and also by reviewing other cases in which a life sentence was imposed that also involved multiple murders during the course of a robbery or burglary.
II. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
The facts of Mr. Deck’s case are chilling. He and his mother’s boyfriend originally decided to rob the home of an older couple, James and Zelma Long, while the couple was at church. But because they wanted the money sooner for a trip, Mr. Deck and his sister went to the Longs’ rural home in DeSoto, Missouri, on a weekday night. After gaining entry through a ruse, Mr. Deck pulled a pistol from his waistband and ordered the Longs to lie face down on their bed. They did so. Mrs. Long opened their home safe and gave Mr. Deck the paper and jewelry inside as well as $200 from her purse and additional cash in the house. Mr. Deck then forced the Longs to lie back down while he stood at the foot of the bed trying to decide what to do for ten minutes, as they begged for their lives. When his sister got tired of acting as a lookout and left the house for the car, he put the gun to Mr. Long’s head and shot him twice, then did the same to Mrs. Long. Neither survived. During the penalty phase of the trial, the Longs’ son read a statement the family had prepared addressing the impact of the deaths on their family.
Mr. Deck offered mitigation evidence that it was not a planned murder, that he made a “lousy” decision while scared and nervous, and that he confessed and cooperated with police. As the majority notes, he presented additional mitigation evidence, which in a prior case was described this way:
The defense presented substantial evidence concerning the abuse Mr. Deck suffered as a child, the lack of parental love and his continual move from one foster home to another. It presented evidence that, despite all this, he continued to love and care for his younger siblings, scrounging for food for them and bathing them while his mother was out at clubs or with boyfriends. It showed how the Pucketts wanted to adopt him and give him a chance to grow up in a loving family, but he was instead returned to his mother and further abuse.
Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 430 (Mo. banc 2002). He also presented expert evidence in this trial as to the effect of his difficult childhood, evidence which the jury heard and considered before deciding to impose the death penalty, as had the 24 jurors in his two prior penalty-phase trials.
The jury found six aggravators — that each murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of another homicide; that the murders were committed for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; that the murders were outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman in that they involved depravity of mind; that they were committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest; that they were *562committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of a burglary; and that they were committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of a robbery.
Mr. Deck argues the facts were insufficient to support imposition of the death penalty because persons in other cases with similar facts were sentenced to life in prison. He relies most heavily on State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. banc 1989), and Conn v. State, 769 S.W.2d 822 (Mo.App.1989). Mr. Conn and his girlfriend, Ms. Dulaney, acted together to rob and murder Mr. Conn’s aunt and uncle, possibly because his aunt and uncle had refused to loan him money for bail. In Conn, although the State had announced its intent to seek the death penalty, the State and defendant reached a plea agreement of a life sentence, and a jury never heard the case. 769 S.W.2d at 828-24. This Court always has held that cases in which the State agrees not to seek the death penalty are not considered in the proportionality analysis. See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d at 11.
Dulany did go to trial. But the State had no direct evidence that Ms. Dulaney actually committed the murders, and she testified that she merely assisted Mr. Conn, who actually murdered both victims. The State argued, therefore, that she should be found guilty either as the perpetrator or as an accomplice to Mr. Conn. 781 S.W.2d at 53-55. The jury may have found that Ms. Dulaney acted only as an accomplice to her boyfriend, particularly in light of the evidence of her dependence on him. By contrast, in Deck the evidence is not ambiguous as to who directly killed the victims. Mr. Deck was the mastermind; he committed the two murders himself— his role is like that of Mr. Conn, not of Ms. Dulaney.
Mr. Deck also relies on State v. Owens, 827 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1991), in which the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for shooting two persons during the course of a burglary yet received a life sentence. Id. at 227. While both cases involve multiple murders in the course of a robbery, there were five co-conspirators in Owens, three of whom pleaded guilty and blamed the murders on the defendant. Id. at 232. The jury may have found that testimony self-serving and not credible in light of their plea agreements. Further, a jury deadlocked as to the fifth defendant, and the court imposed a death sentence. State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. banc 1988).
The remaining cases Mr. Deck cites in support of his argument are substantially factually disparate from Mr. Deck’s case. See State v. Merrill, 990 S.W.2d 166 (Mo.App.1999) (conviction was based largely on testimony of girl who was four years old at time of murders); State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo.App.1997) (murders did not take place in the course of a robbery); State v. Futo, 932 S.W.2d 808 (Mo.App.1996) (same); State v. Clark, 859 S.W.2d 782 (Mo.App.1993) (same).
Although Mr. Deck does not cite to them, consideration also has been given to other cases in which multiple murders were committed during the course of a robbery or burglary but in which the jury decided to impose a life sentence. In most of these cases, multiple persons were involved in the crimes, each of whom either denied involvement or claimed that their co-defendants were the ones who actually killed the victims. In such circumstances, the jury might well have concluded that the defendant was involved in the crime but that the evidence was unclear whether the defendant personally caused the death or acted merely as an accomplice.
This is an important distinction from Mr. Deck, who clearly was the mastermind of the crime and admits committing the *563murders himself. Compare State v. Downs, 593 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. banc 1980) (youthful defendant without priors denied involvement, and statements of co-defendants sometimes implicated him but at other times inconsistently implicated others as actually committing murders in the course of robbery); State v. Harper, 713 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.App.1986) (credibility of co-defendant who claimed defendant actually shot victims during home robbery undermined by plea deal he made in return for his testimony; testimony of surviving victim identifying defendant arguably was inconsistent with co-defendant’s testimony that defendant just shot once and unsure if hit anyone, and defendant strongly argued credibility issues); State v. Jennings, 815 S.W.2d 434 (Mo.App.1991) (multiple co-conspirators pointed fingers at each other as actual killers in multiple homicide store robbery). See also State v. Clark, 711 S.W.2d 928 (Mo.App.1986) (19-year-old defendant did not confess to the crime and presented evidence that one of two murders occurred during a struggle for his gun in a robbery gone wrong and that he had a two-year-old daughter).
While these cases in which a life sentence was imposed are comparable in some ways to Mr. Deck’s case, they differ from it in important respects in regard to the age of the defendant, the strength of the evidence and whether the defendant actually committed the murder or acted as an accomplice. It is also appropriate to consider that Mr. Deck admitted committing a multiple homicide after deliberating over the victims and placing them in fear for 10 minutes, that he did so to hide his crime in the course of a robbery, and that the jury found his conduct vile and outrageous. As noted by the principal opinion, there are many cases in which a person has received a death sentence when the crime involved multiple murders during the course of a robbery and, as here, involved acts of brutality and showed depravity of mind, or was committed to avoid detection or arrest. See also Deck, 136 S.W.3d at 490; Deck, 994 S.W.2d at 545.
For all of these reasons, while I believe the principal opinion errs in failing to consider similar cases in which a life sentence was imposed, I conclude that consideration of these cases would not change the result and that imposition of the death penalty is not disproportionate or excessive to the sentence imposed in similar cases.
. Accordingly, all statutory references for the remainder of this opinion shall be to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
. The Court rejected the view of the three dissenting judges that the defendant’s age — he was a minor at the time of the offense — as well as his cognitive-emotional disorder and his extensive drug abuse made him categorically ineligible for the death penalty. Id. at 422-23.
. See, e.g., State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 467 (Mo. banc 1993) (without mentioning Ramsey, which had been decided just a few months earlier, the Court said it "examines capital murder and first degree murder cases in which the sentencer considers death and life imprisonment to determine whether the sentence is proportionate to other cases”).
. The principal opinion notes that State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 549 (Mo. banc 2003) (written by Stith, J.) states that this Court's role is, "to act as a safeguard by ensuring that a sentence of death is not imposed in a case in which to do so is freakish and disproportionate to the sentence given in similar cases considered as a whole.” That statement is accurate, although to the extent *559that it could be read to suggest that this is the only analysis this Court must undertake, it would be incomplete. Edwards also quotes the portion of the statute requiring this Court to consider similar cases and to determine whether the sentence is proportionate to them in light of the crime, the defendant and the strength of the evidence, however. It also notes that under the statute this Court's duty is to examine similar cases as a whole, not to simply identify a single similar case in which a particular sentence was imposed, and then examines similar cases in which either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed, before determining that the death sentence is not disproportionate.
. The principal opinion notes that the legislature has not changed section 565.035 since Ramsey was decided over 16 years ago and therefore must approve of Ramsey's decision not to consider similar cases that resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. I would note that the legislature also did not change section 565.035 during the more than 14 years that this Court interpreted that section to require consideration of similar cases that resulted in either death or life in prison without parole. Indeed, since the statute unambiguously has required consideration of both types of cases, if similar, for all 30 years since it was enacted, there would be no reason for it to change; it is this Court’s recent jurisprudence which is incorrect.
. I agree with the principal opinion that the statute simply requires the Court to gather information about all of these cases and that it leaves to the Court the discretion to determine which of these constitute similar cases to which the current case should be compared. If the Court exercised such discretion *561when it found similar life sentence cases, then it would be fulfilling its statutory duty, and, in fact, in the past it has done this sub silencio. But Ramsey itself says, and the principal opinion nominally appears to affirm, that cases in which a life sentence was imposed are categorically dissimilar and so will not be examined. That is not an exercise of discretion but a refusal to exercise it and makes the statutory requirement to gather life sentence cases pointless.