concurring.
The plain language of the statutes support the holding of the majority. Majority op. at 471-73. Despite reaching reasonable conclusions under a plain meaning analysis, the majority turns to legislative history in an effort to “buttress” its conclusions. Majority op. at 473-74; but see Majority op. at 471 (recognizing that court should not turn to extratextual factors unless “application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the legislature could not possibly have intended” citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)); see, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d 824, 827-28 (Tex.Crim.App.l997)(where statutes unambiguous, court must give effect to plain meaning); Brown v. State, 943 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex.Crim.App.l997)(recognizing that inquiry into legislative history is “unnecessary and improper under Boykin” where court is able to “determine from the clues in the statutory language” the effect of the statute in the given situation). This is a violation of the Separation of Powers Clause, not to mention that it clutters our jurisprudence with dicta. I concur in the result only.
BAIRD, J., joins.