(dissenting).
The attack upon the contested sections of Act 75 of 1962 and of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes has for its basis, among other, the charge that these legislative pronouncements contravene the fundamental law of this State in that they constitute a delegation of legislative power to the Commissioner of Administration and to the Legislative Budget Committee. The validity of this attack, then, leads me to inquire into who and what these alleged delegates might be.
The Commissioner of Administration is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Governor, and his activities' are directed and supervised by the Governor. LSA-1 R.S. 39:5 so declares.
The Legislative Budget Committee is composed of fifteen members,' thirteen of whom are appointed by the Governor. Act No. 368 of 1962 so declares.
Unmistakably the Commissioner of Administration and the Legislative ■ Budget Committee deriving their offices from the Governor are by reason thereof in theory and, in fact, merely arms of the executive branch of the government.
It is the very essence of constitutional government that the legislative, executive and judicial branches should be'distinct and separate. Thereby the checks and balances so essential to the preservation of democratic government has its Source. Our constitution makes this unmistakably clear for by Article II, Section 1, it declares: “The powers of the government of the State of Louisiana shall be divided into three distinct departments — legislative, executive, and judicial.” It is further provided by Article II, Section 2, thereof that “No one of these departments, nor any person or collection of persons holding office in one of them, shall exercise power properly belonging to either of the others, * * The legislative power, of ¿ourse, is vested in the legislature consisting of the senate and house of representatives. (La.Const. art. Ill, § 1). All bills'for .raising revenue or appropriating monejl- originate in the house of representatives. (La.Const. art. Ill, § 22). And no money-shall be drawn *387from the treasury except in pursuance of specific appropriations made by law. (La.Const. art. IV, § 1). And each appropriation shall be for a specific purpose and for a specific amount and no appropriation shall be made under the head or title of contingent.
I understand from these constitutional enactments, our paramount law, that the appropriation of public funds is exclusively a function of the legislature; and that authority and responsibility having been constitutionally imposed, cannot be delegated to any other body or authority. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 90 So.2d 343 (1956); City of Alexandria v. Alexandria Fire Fighters Ass’n, 220 La. 754, 57 So.2d 673 (1952); Carso v. Board of Liquidation, 205 La. 368, 17 So.2d 358 (1944); State v. Watkins, 176 La. 837, 147 So. 8 (1933); Carter v. State, 42 La.Ann. 927, 8 So. 836 (1890).
I consider the foregoing propositions to be indisputable and their wisdom conceded by all who cherish liberty.
It is contended that by the contested legislation, particularly LSA-R.S. 39:52 and Sections 5, 6, and 9 of Act 75 of 1962, the Commissioner of Administration and the Legislative Budget Committee are in effect exercising functions of a purely legislative character when they are empowered to dispose and appropriate the funds of the State to the payment of particular debts of the State. This is accomplished, it is said, by their authority to approve or to disapprove the work programs and expenditures of the various budget units. The approval which is referred to results from their “allotting” funds for the work programs of the budget units and the disapproval is manifested when they place certain items of expenditure already approved by the legislature in the “unallotted” category, thereby reducing the appropriation which the legislature has previously approved for the affected budget unit. Until the funds placed in the unallotted category are released therefrom they are unavailable for expenditure by a budget unit; and if they remain unallotted at the end of the fiscal year, these funds remain in the State’s general fund.
It is self-evident from a reading of the contested legislation that the approval of the Commissioner and Budget Committee is a prerequisite for the payment to any budget unit of any money appropriated to it by the legislature. Can it be denied that all appropriations in Act 75 of 1962 are in fact no appropriations at all; for is it not required that before those funds thus approved can be expended the approval of the Commissioner and Budget Committee must be obtained? If this be so, has the legislature not relinquished its responsibility to others whom we have seen are primarily appointees of the Governor? Does it not *389follow that a delegation of legislative authority to the executive has in fact taken place ?
The proponents of the validity of the legislation in question assert that the Commissioner and the Budget Committee cannot increase or decrease the amount of money so appropriated by the legislature to any agency, conceding that if they possessed this power, it would be an unlawful delegation of legislative functions.
To illustrate the error of the contention of the proponents, it is only necessary to set forth that by Section 9 of Act 75 of 1962 it is declared that “No expenditure shall be made pursuant to this Act except in accordance with allotments made by the Commissioner of Administration.” By LSA-R.S. 39:52 it is seen that “[appropriations shall be made available to the budget units in allotments * * * and no allotment shall be made available to them until the * * * requests have been approved by the commissioner.”
What I perceive to be the plan of this legislation is what I consider to be reprehensible and unconstitutional. Although an agency of the government, the schools for example, may submit to the legislature a request for an appropriation and justify this request prior to the appropriation, and though the appropriation becomes a legislative enactment, there is no assurance that their problem ends there. They have still to confront the Commissioner and the Budget Committee after the legislation has become law and that Commissioner and Budget Committee under the contested legislation has the sole and unrestrained authority to approve or disapprove “as he sees fit” or if “in their opinion” approval or disapproval is indicated.1
Such a result is repugnant to the manifest tenor of Article IV, Section 1, of the constitution ; for that provision does not require the approval of the Commissioner or Budget Committee for money to be withdrawn from the State Treasury. It requires an appro*391priation. by an act of the legislature for such withdrawal, and nothing further. The clear intendment of that constitutional provision is that the people have entrusted to the legislature the obligation of determining the wisdom of all expenditures and not to an administrative, agency or an arm of the executive branch.
The only restraint which the contested legislation imposes upon the Commissioner and Budget Committee is that they cannot approve the expenditure of funds in excess of those authorized by the “so called” appropriation bill; there is no guide post, however, nor is there any limitation upon the reductions which may take place in the appropriation ostensibly made. In other words, except to place the limit upon the maximum funds a budget unit may expend, the legislature has delegated to the Commissioner and Budget Committee the authority to determine whether any budget unit will be perrnitted to expend any funds at all. Hereafter, if this legislation is permitted to stand, the ultimate authority to which all budget units must look for their expenditure are fifteen administrative officers, thirteen of whom are appointees of the executive; they will in fact appropriate the funds.
The purse strings of our government have been entrusted by our constitution to the representatives of the people — the house and senate — the legislative branch of the government. It is their greatest power. For who will deny that the power over a man’s subsistence is in fact a power over his will. Thus that power is reposed in a diverse body of various views and interest— the legislature, elected by the people from many areas of the State and the will of that body is the will of the people. The people in adopting the constitution did not deem it proper to entrust the ultimate power over the purse strings of our State to any other group appointed by the executive or even a select few of the legislature.
And why has this fundamental tenet of all free societies been embodied in our constitution? It is to avoid so far as can be done by fallible man the obvious improper delegation of that power and results such as may readily flow from the legislation before us.2
Let us visualize that the funds of the State are inadequate to finance all budget units and the Commissioner and Budget Committee conceive that “in their opinion” some other budget unit should properly be entitled to operate and be “allotted” its full appropriation, whereas, the funds essential to maintaining certain necessary aspects of the school system will not be “allotted”. Conceive, if you will, of the Commissioner and Budget Committee issuing an edict to*393morrow that hereafter -no funds shall be allotted for certain necessary and essential functions of the school system of the State. As a result the schools would be required to close their doors.3
It seems quite clear to me from our constitution that such a decision is not to be made by the Commissioner or the Budget Committee. If such | a decision is to be made it is properly to be made by the legislature. True, it would' be necessary to anticipate the -needs of the .budget units, but that responsibility and that obligation are there and cannot be^andoned by the legislature to others.
I respectfully dissent,
. The rule of law is well-known that any statute purporting to vest arbitrary discretion in a public officer without prescribing definite rules or specific conditions for Ms guidance is unconstitutional because it is in effect a surrender of legislative power to make law. Other legislation has been declared unconstitutional on this basis by this court. Banjavich v. Louisiana Licensing Board for Marine Divers, 237 La. 467, 111 So.2d 505 (1959); State v. Morrow, 231 La. 572, 92 So.2d 70 (1956); City of Baton Rouge v. Shilg, 198 La. 994, 5 So.2d 312 (1941); City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925). See also 42 Am.Jur. Public Administrative Law, Sec. 44.
The legislation under attack is not a complete expression of legislative will, but attempts to clothe an administrative officer with unrestricted discretion to make fundamental decisions on what is best for the public welfare without setting any uniform requirements for his guidance, and for that reason is violative of Article II of the Louisiana Constitution. See 42 Am.Jur. Public and Administrative Law, Sec. 43; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 133, 138.
. It is no answer to this proposition to say the ,act may not be unconstitutionally administered. It is the unlawful dolegation of constitutional authority which is reprobated and the act which purports to do this is unconstitutional in its inception.
. The contested legislation goes far beyond that approved by this court in Wall v. Close, 203 La. 345, 14 So.2d 19 (1943).