In the Interest of M.M.

OPINION

HARDBERGER, Chief Justice.

Introduction

In this case, we decide whether a trial court abuses its discretion in ordering an incarcerated person to pay current and retroactive child support in the absence of evidence of the person’s income and financial resources. Because the appellant, Lorenzo A. Martinez, failed to present such evidence to the trial court, we find there was no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the judgment. However, we accept the Attorney General’s invitation to reform the judgment so that Martinez’s monthly obligation does not exceed that for a minimum wage earner.

Facts and Procedural History

In January 1997, the Texas Attorney General brought a petition on behalf of Katherine Mendiola to establish paternity of her minor daughter. Following court-ordered paternity tests and a family law master’s hearing on support, the trial court signed an order adjudicating Martinez as the child’s father and ordering him to pay current child support of $200 per month and retroactive support of $19,550. Martinez, who is currently serving a ten-year sentence in state prison, filed a general denial at the instigation of the suit, but did not appear at the hearing on child support. He now raises four points of error: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in establishing current child support payments without taking into consideration Martinez’s income; (2) that the trial court erred in assessing retroactive child support without taking into account Martinez’s income; (3) that the trial court erred in not providing Martinez with a jury trial; and (4) that the trial court violated his constitutional rights.

Standard of Review

A determination of child support will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Sanchez v. Sanchez, 915 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ). For legal questions, a trial court abuses its discretion only if it clearly fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992). For factual questions, the trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 839-40. In this ease, the trial court made no findings of fact, and Martinez requested none. Therefore, we assume the trial court found all facts to support the judgment, and we will affirm the judgment if there is any legal theory supported by the record to justify it. Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Dooley, 884 S.W.2d 805, 807-808 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied). When, as here, a reporter’s record is filed, those findings are not conclusive. Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.1989).

Discussion

Martinez argues that, because he is incarcerated, he has no income. However, he did not appear at the hearing or put on any evidence that he is without financial resources. Thus, he is asking this court to hold that there is a legal presumption that an incarcerated person has no assets on which to base a child support award. We agree with the other courts of appeals who have addressed this issue that such a presumption would not be in the best interests of children and parents seeking child support. See Reyes v. Reyes, 946 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ); Hollifield v. Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex.App.—Austin 1996, no writ); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 496.057 (Vernon 1990) (mandating that dependant support be withdrawn from wage-earning inmate’s trust account).

In assessing child support, a trial court first determines the net resources of the parties. Sanchez, 915 S.W.2d at 102. The court then ascertains the number of children before it, determines the percentage of net resources the non-custodial parent would pay under the Family Code guidelines, and then considers whether any additional factors would justify varying from those guidelines. Id.; see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.125 (Vernon 1996) (establishing guide*701lines according to number of children, where obligor’s net resources are less than $6,000 per month); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.123 (Vernon 1996) (outlining additional factors to be considered by trial court). In the absence of evidence regarding the obligor’s resources, the court may presume that the party in question earns the minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.068 (Vernon 1996).

We do not believe incarceration alone can rebut this minimum-wage presumption. See Reyes, 946 S.W.2d at 630. As the Attorney General points out, many people enter prison with assets from past employment. Some inmates earn an income while in prison. In the absence of proof from an incarcerated person that he or she does not have such resources, it would not be in the best interest of his children to excuse that person from support obligations.2 See Sanchez, 915 S.W.2d at 102 (primary consideration in assessing child support is best interests of child). In addition, although Martinez may not be able to make support payments now, the assessment makes it possible for Mendio-la to collect arrearages, should his financial condition improve in the future. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.123(b)(17) (Vernon 1996) (allowing trial court to deviate from guidelines if in the best interests of child).

The State concedes that an error was made in calculating Martinez’s current support award. Applying the Family Code guidelines based on a presumed 40-hour work week at minimum wage, Martinez’s support obligation should be $155 per month, rather than $200. We accept the Attorney General’s invitation to reform the judgment accordingly. See Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Smith, 553 S.W.2d 771, 778 (Tex.Civ.App.— Tyler 1977, no writ) (where correct amount can be determined by mathematical caleulation, appellate court may reform incorrect judgment).

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment of retroactive support. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.009 (Vernon 1996) (allowing retroactive support tb be assessed using child support guidelines). The trial court was permitted to presume, in the absence of proof otherwise, that Martinez had earned the minimum wage from the time of his daughter’s birth.3

The Attorney General acknowledges that, applying the guidelines, the trial court’s assessment of $19,550 in retroactive support exceeds the appropriate amount by $90. Although similarly negligible errors have been held not to be harmful, see Zajac v. Penkava, 924 S.W.2d 405, 409-10 n. 3 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ), we will modify the judgment to reflect the correct amount, in light of our decision to modify the current support award.

Martinez argues that both the current and retroactive awards were abuses of discretion because he was not permitted to appear at the child support hearing and offer evidence on his financial resources. However, the record does not support this contention. While a prisoner has a constitutional right of access to the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 820, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), prisoners have no absolute right to appear personally at civil proceedings. Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ). While Martinez contends that his mother called the court to inquire about having a bench warrant issued, there is no motion in *702the record and no evidence that the trial judge ruled on any request that Martinez be present at trial. See Pedraza v. Crossroads Sec. Sys., 960 S.W.2d 389, 342 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (where there is no record that trial judge ruled on motion for bench warrant, he did not abuse his discretion by refusal to grant writ of habeas corpus on that issue); Conely v. Peck, 929 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex.App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (where record contains no motion for bench warrant and no record of court’s ruling on such motion, court presumes record supports judgment); Huizar v. State, 841 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.) (where record shows no indication that bench warrant for motion to appear at hearing on motion for new trial, court did not err by allowing motion to be overruled by operation of law).

Martinez also claims that he was denied his right to a jury trial. However, the record shows no request for a jury and no ruling on such a request. In order to secure the right to a jury trial, the applicant must make a written request to the clerk of the court and pay the jury fee. Tex.R. Civ. P. 216. We overrule this point.

Finally, in his prayer for relief, Martinez alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights. Martinez makes no specific allegations and cites no constitutional provisions. We construe this claim to be that Martinez was denied his due process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Tex. Const. art I, § 19. The record reflects that he received notice, and there is no evidence that he requested the opportunity to be heard in person. See Oliver v. Oliver, 741 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (without evidence that appellant was denied notice and hearing, court finds no due process violation). We overrule this point.

Conclusion

In the absence of any proof regarding Martinez’s present or past financial resources, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding child support to his minor daughter. However, we agree with the Attorney General that errors in calculation resulted in improper awards. Therefore, we reform the judgment and order that Martinez pay $155 per month for current support and $19,460, in monthly installments, for retroactive support. All other points of error are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed as reformed.

. The Attorney General asks this court to hold that incarceration qualifies as "voluntary unemployment” under the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.066 (Vernon 1996) (trial court may order individual to pay more that actual income would indicate where that individual could earn more money but has intentionally chosen not to). We see no need to reach this issue, in light of the absence of proof regarding Martinez’s resources, and we will not make a per se ruling that inmates may be assessed child support beyond their resources by virtue of their decision to commit a crime. See Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d at 156 (assuming incarceration is involuntary, but finding nonetheless that incarcerated person could be assessed child support).

. At any rate, the presumption is not unreasonable in this case. The record reflects that Martinez had a bachelor's degree in meteorology and served in the Air Force during the period the child was growing up. At the time of the hearing, he had served two years of a ten-year sentence. The child's mother testified that this was his fourth prison sentence, but the record does not reflect the length of the other sentences.