(dissenting). Because the nature of the discretion Farrell exercised in advising the Kierstyns was professional rather than governmental, immunity is inapplicable in this case. Thus, I dissent.
Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980), sheds light on why Farrell should not be protected in the present case. There, a medical examiner performed an autopsy on a girl despite her parents' objections. The court explained why the examiner was not protected from liability by governmental immunity:
The defendants' acts in performing the actual procedure of an autopsy are discretionary in nature, but the discretion is medical, not governmental. The theory underlying the creation of immunity for government officials is that immunity will foster the fearless, vigorous and effective administration of policies of the government. That theory is not applicable to the exercise of normal medical discretion during an autopsy. The theory behind immunity for quasi-judicial decisions does not dic*573tate an extension of the immunity to cover the medical decisions of medical personnel employed by a governmental body.
Id. at 686-87, 292 N.W.2d at 827. Thus, immunity does not protect nongovernmental decisions made by professionals within their business arena just because they happen to be employed by the government.
Farrell's bad advice to the Kierstyns is similar to the medical examiner's bad autopsy in Scarpaci. Whatever discretion Farrell exercised in advising the Kierstyns was not governmental in nature: it was the type of professional discretion exercised by benefits specialists whenever they advise clients, whether they work for the government or not. That Farrell had to apply a statute to the Kierstyns' situation does not change the nature of his work. He is a benefits specialist, not a judge, city council member or county functionary. His job does not involve the "determination of fundamental governmental policy." See id. at 687,292 N.W.2d at 827 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts § 895B cmt. d (1977) for explanation of when immunity is appropriate). Just as the examiner's discretion in Scarpaci remained medical despite the fact that he was employed by the county, Farrell's discretion was professional, despite the fact that he was employed by the District. The mere fact that he is employed by a public entity should not protect him from liability when his professional performance is shoddy.
The majority asserts that Scarpaci is strictly limited to cases involving medical discretion. See majority op. n.3. That Bauder and Stann declined to extend Scarpaci does not mean that it can never apply outside the arena of medical decisions. See Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 818, 468 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Ct. *574App. 1991) (noting that cases discussing the medical discretion exception are restricted to their facts and have not been applied in other settings). Rather, I see the supreme court recognizing in Scarpaci that a doctor has a duty separate and apart from his duty as a government employee by virtue of his membership in the medical profession. But there is nothing magical about physicians that limits the Scarpaci result. Whether Scarpaci covers other professionals should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In Stann, we declined to extend the immunity exception to a park planner because there was not the same type of professional discretion present as in Scarpaci. Similarly, the one-on-one professional-client relationship requiring the exercise of expertise, personal care and advice was missing in Bauder v. Delavan-Darien School District, 207 Wis. 2d 310, 558 N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1996), where the decision at issue was to move a soccer class inside due to inclement weather. Our reluctance to extend Scarpaci in those cases, where the relationship between the professional and his individual clients was not present, should not preclude us from applying the Scarpaci exception to cases where it makes sense — such as the present case. Like the doctor in Scarpaci, Farrell had a professional duty to advise his clients well, a duty outside the scope of his function as a government employee. Like the doctor in Scarpaci, he should be held accountable for poor professional performance.