dissenting.
In non-capital cases, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing “decisions” of the intermediate appellate courts. Tex. Const. Art. V, § 5; and, Tex.R.App. P. 200, et. seq. For this to be done in an orderly fashion, we review only decisions where the court of appeals had the benefit of all pertinent authority. Consequently, when this Court delivers a pertinent decision after the court of appeals’ opinion, our policy is to remand the case to the court of appeals for further con*3sideration in light of the opinion from this Court. See, Tate v. State, 811 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). This is also the policy of the United States Supreme Court. See, Earhart v. State, 877 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Cr.App.1994).
At the time of its opinion, the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of our decision in Williams v. State, 987 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). The majority recognizes this, ante, at 2, n. 1, but, inexplicably, does not remand the case to the Court of Appeals. We should not act contrary to the policies we have imposed on ourselves. Abdnor v. State, 808 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex.Cr.App.1991)(McCormick, J., dissenting).
Believing it is manifestly improper to rely on authority to reverse a decision of a court of appeals without first providing that court with an opportunity to resolve the issue utilizing the same authority, I respectfully dissent.
OVERSTREET and MEYERS, JJ., join this opinion.