dissenting.
I fear that, in its eagerness to disapprove the approach taken in one of the panel opinions, the court has given this case short shrift. We should begin from scratch rather than by adopting a dissenting opinion. Saying that the panel opinion was wrong will not support the conclusion that the trial court’s ruling was right. The court’s action on rehearing masks its failure to analyze this case according to well established principles of fourth amendment law. By carefully adhering to these principles I conclude that, although neither of the panel opinions was completely correct, the State’s motion for rehearing should be overruled.
This is an appeal from a conviction for felony possession of marihuana. After a hearing was held on the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, which was overruled by the trial court, the appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere.
After the appellant entered his plea, the State called Officer Vedro of the Abilene Police Department as a witness. Vedro testified that pursuant to a search warrant he had entered and searched an apartment occupied by the appellant. During the search Vedro discovered a quantity of marihuana which was later found to weigh more than four ounces.
After hearing this evidence the trial court found the appellant guilty of the offense. In accordance with a plea bargain, punishment assessed was a fine of two hundred fifty dollars and confinement for three years, with the term of imprisonment probated.
The appellant challenges the validity of the search warrant which was used to obtain the evidence against him. He argues that the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant does not set forth sufficient underlying facts and circumstances in support of the affiant’s conclusion that methamphetamine would be found on the premises.
The affidavit reads:
THE STATE OF TEXAS X X COUNTY OF TAYLOR
I, Terry A. Odom, do solemnly swear that heretofore, on or about the 19th day of August, A.D., 1980, in the Abilene Taylor County, Texas, one known only as Homer, described as a white male, mid-twenties, long brown bushy hair, and person or persons unknown to your affiant, either by name or description, but located on said residence and curtilage (hereinafter referred to as “Suspected Party” for purposes of this affidavit” [sic] did then and there unlawfully possess and does at this time unlawfully possess a substance prohibited by the Controlled Substance Act of the State of Texas, to-wit: METHAMPHETAMINE in a residence, curtilage being described as apartement [sic] number 613 of a multi-apartment complex being constructed of tan stucco with brown trim and having a brown shingle roof. The number 613 being on a brown door entering the suspected residence, (hereinafter [sic] referred to as “Suspected Place” for purposes of this affidavit) *300located at 1000 South Clack, Apartment number 613
Quail Run Apartments TAO
DHL
in Abilene Taylor County, Texas, which said above described “Suspected Place” is possessed, occupied, under the control and charge of the above mentioned “Suspected Party”
MY BELIEF OF THE AFORESAID STATEMENT IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTS:
Prior to making application for this search warrant your affiant has received information from a confidential informant whose name must remain anonymous for security reasons. This same confidential informant is reliable, credible, and trustworthy, and this belief is based on the following set of facts:
1. That this confidential informant has never been convicted of a felony offense in the State of Texas and has no record with the Texas Department of Public Safety to the best of your affiant’s knowledge.
2. This confidential informatn [sic] is gainfully employed in a lawful occupation and enjoys a good reputation in the community for being an honest individual.
3. This same confidential informant has admitted to your affiant past involvement with marihuana.
4. The confidential informant knows what marihuana looks and smells like and can identify in it’s [sic] various forms.
5. That your affiant has known this confidential informant for approximately a month. That during this one month period of time this same confidential informant has given information in reference to narcotic dealers and users to your affiant on numerous occasions and this information has always proven to be true and correct.
6. This same confidential informant has admitted prior use of marihuana in the past, but to your affiant’s knowledge does not smoke marihuana now and does not condone the use of chemical drugs.
Within the last thirty-six hours this confidential informant has personally been in the living room of the above described suspected place, at which time the confidential informant did observe a quantity of white powder substance, that the suspected party claimed to be Speed, which is a common street word for Methamphetamine.
Wherefore, I ask that a warrant to search for and seize the said controlled substance the above described premises be issued in accordance with the law in such cases Provided [sic]:
/s/ Terry Odom
Sworn to and subscribed before me by Terry Odom on the 19th day of August A.D. 1980.
/s/ Don Lane
MAGISTRATE
Judge Don Lane 42nd District Court
It should be obvious from reading this affidavit, that the affiant did not have personal knowledge of the facts related. Rather, the affiant’s belief that methamphetamine would be found at the named location was based on hearsay information provided to him by the unnamed informant.
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), the United States Supreme Court established what has been called a “two-pronged test”1 for determining the validity of search warrant affidavits which are based on hearsay information. The Court held:
“Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances *301from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825 [11 L.Ed.2d 887], was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’. Otherwise, ‘the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint’ will be drawn not ‘by a neutral and detached magistrate,’ as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ Giordenello v. United States, [357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 1250, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503]; Johnson v. United States, [333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436], or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant.”
378 U.S. at 114-115, 84 S.Ct. at 1514.
Under the Aguilar test the search warrant affidavit must set forth specific facts from which a neutral and detached magistrate can reasonably conclude (1) that the informant had a basis for his allegation that evidence of crime would be found at a certain location (the “basis of knowledge” prong)2 and (2) that the informant’s information is reliable (the “veracity” prong).3 Both prongs of this test must be satisfied.
I turn now to an examination of the affidavit in this case. The first part of the affidavit contains an allegation by the affi-ant that an individual “known only as Homer” and other persons unknown to the affiant possessed the controlled substance methamphetamine in a described place “possessed, occupied, under the control and charge of the above mentioned ‘Suspected Party’” (presumably “Homer”). Nowhere in the affidavit are there any facts set out which would support the affiant’s allegation that “Homer” or any of the other unknown persons possessed, occupied or controlled the described premises. Without such facts, this allegation should not be considered in determining whether probable cause existed to search the premises.
The second part of the affidavit sets forth the basis for the affiant’s allegation. In the first through sixth numbered paragraphs the affiant sets forth his reasons for believing that his “confidential informant” is “reliable, credible, and trustworthy.” These six paragraphs are sufficient to satisfy the second or “veracity” prong of Aguilar with respect to the confidential informant.
Following the sixth numbered paragraph of the affidavit the affiant sets out the facts which explain the informant’s “basis of knowledge”:
“Within the last thirty-six hours this confidential informant has personally been in the living room of the above described suspected place, at which time the confidential informant did observe a quantity of white powder substance, that the suspected party claimed to the Speed, which is a common street word for Methamphetamine.”
This paragraph contains the personal observations of the informant (the viewing of a “white powder substance” in the living room of the described place within the last thirty-six hours), a hearsay statement by the “suspected party” (a claim that the substance was “Speed”), and an unattributed assertion (that “Speed” is a “common street word for Methamphetamine”). I shall analyze each of these parts in turn to see whether they satisfy the requirements of Aguilar.
As noted above, the first six numbered paragraphs of this affidavit adequately show reasons for crediting the information supplied by the informant. In addition, since the affidavit shows that the informant personally observed the “white powder substance” in the living room of the described place within the last thirty-six hours, the first or “basis of knowledge” prong of Aguilar is satisfied with respect to the informant’s observations. See Carmichael v. State, 607 S.W.2d 536, 539. n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Collins v. State, 502 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Guerra v. State, 496 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
*302However, the informant’s personal observations do not alone supply probable cause for believing that an offense has been committed or that evidence of crime would be found on the premises. In Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), this court held that the viewing of a white powder cannot alone support a finding of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. However, the court noted that although white powder is “not an object that is inherently dangerous, contraband, or stolen goods”, Id. at 60, other facts and circumstances or specialized knowledge in combination with the viewing of the powder can support a finding of probable cause.
In the context of a search warrant affidavit based upon information supplied by an informant the possible additional facts and circumstances include
“... previously demonstrated familiarity with drugs by the informant, an admission to the informant by the possessor that the substance observed is what the informant says it is, observed use or treatment of the substance in a manner unique to what the informant says the substance is, obtaining of a part of the substance by the informant for testing and identification by the police officer, or use of a part of the substance by the informant followed by the effects to be expected from what the informant says it is.” (footnotes omitted).
W. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure 540-541 (1978). I do not mean to suggest that the above is exhaustive of the possible ways to supply the additional necessary facts and circumstances to justify a finding of probable cause in connection with the viewing of a white powder. It is merely illustrative.
In this affidavit there is no showing of use of the observed substance in any manner. There is no showing that a sample was taken for later testing. There is no showing that the informant observed any effects from the substance. Although the affidavit does allege the informant had some expertise in the identification of marihuana, it contains no assertion that he was familiar with, or could identify, any other controlled substance.
The only additional facts set out in this affidavit are the claim by the “suspected party” that the substance was “speed” and the assertion that “speed” is a common street word for methamphetamine. As I have previously noted, the claim of the substance as “speed” was hearsay to the informant and, therefore, double hearsay to the affiant. I must, therefore, determine whether this affidavit adequately sets forth the facts necessary to show that this claim meets the two-prong Aguilar test. At first glance this claim is in the nature of an admission against penal interest. However, this affidavit contains no facts which indicate that the “suspected party” was the possessor of the substance. The informant’s information does not show that the “suspected party” had personal possession of the substance. Neither does the informant’s information show that the “suspected party” possessed, occupied or controlled the described premises. The mere identification of a substance as a controlled substance cannot be a declaration against penal interest. Without some showing that the declarant possessed the substance this identification remains nothing more than a simple hearsay statement. It has none of the reasons for crediting its truth that traditionally are associated with declarations against penal interest.
In addition, without some facts set forth in the affidavit which support the allegation the “suspected party” possessed the substance himself, or otherwise had reason to know the nature of the substance, there is no basis of knowledge shown for the “suspected party’s” claim. Without some showing of a connection between the “suspected party” and the substance, this affidavit fails to show that the identification of the substance was based on anything more than rumor or report.
For these reasons, I would hold that the claim by the “suspected party” that the white powder was “speed” cannot be credited and may not be considered in determining whether this affidavit sufficiently sets *303forth probable cause to believe that methamphetamine would be found on the premises.
The only remaining assertion contained in this affidavit is that “speed” is a “common street word for Methamphetamine.” Whether I attributed that assertion to the “suspected party”, to the informant, or to the affiant, it adds nothing to a finding of probable cause. It only serves to explain the claim that the substance was “speed”. Since I have concluded that that claim cannot be credited, the explanation is irrelevant.
In Powell v. State, 505 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this court upheld the validity of a search warrant which was based on a combination of facts personally observed by an informant and hearsay statements by the possessor of a controlled substance. The affidavit in that case read, in part:
“Informer further stated they were at this location inside the apartment when an unknown Negro male came to this apartment and asked Nikki Taylor for some heroin. Nikki Taylor then went into the back bedroom, returned after a short period of time with a small bundle of small wax paper packages containing a brown powder which she gave to the unknown Negro male, and the Negro male gave her an unknown amount of paper money. Nikki Taylor then told the unknown Negro male, ‘If you see anyone else who wants to buy some heroin, send them to me.’ The informer also stated that before they left the apartment Nikki Taylor showed the informer several small wax paper packages containing brown powder which Nikki Taylor stated was heroin. Nikkie [sic] Taylor then placed these packages in her purse. Nikki Taylor also told the informant, ‘If you see anyone who wants to buy some heroin, bring them to me.’ ”
Id. at 586.
The affidavit involved in Powell thus contained specific facts which indicated that the person who made the hearsay identification of the substance had personal knowledge of the nature of the substance and had possession of the substance, thereby making the identification of the substance a declaration against penal interest.
In Nicol v. State, 470 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), this court held that a search warrant affidavit based on an informant’s information was invalid. That affidavit read, in part:
“... That the informant had seen BRUCE LEGER, of Apartment B, 1704 N. Azalea Street, and CHARLES NICOL, possess what he was told [sic] marijuana. Informant stated that the marijuana is wrapped in red cellophane packages, the approximate size of a brick.”
Id. at 894.
The warrant in Nicol was held to be invalid because “the affidavit shows neither that the informant possessed personal knowledge of the contents of these packages nor that the informant’s source was reliable.” Ibid.
In the ease now before us, we have an affidavit which falls somewhere between the extremes contained in Powell and Nicol. Like Powell, this affidavit shows that the informant personally observed the substance. But, like Nicol, the identification of the substance as a controlled substance depends upon the hearsay statement to the informant by a person not shown to be credible. Furthermore, like Nicol, this affidavit does not set out the facts which would show the basis for the hearsay identification. Absent additional facts set forth in the affidavit, such as those contained in Powell, the hearsay statement to the informant should not be considered in determining whether probable cause existed for the issuance of this warrant.
I would not hold that a search warrant such as this one must contain facts to support a connection between a person and a controlled substance. Of course, a search warrant can be issued for a search of a named place where contraband or evidence of a crime has been observed. Turner v. State, 543 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). The connection between the “suspected party” here and the “white powder substance” *304observed by the informant is significant because the identity of the substance was established only by the claim by the “suspected party”. Without the facts set forth in the affidavit which would support such a connection, this affidavit fails to demonstrate that the “suspected party” had any basis for his claim and fails to demonstrate that the “suspected party” is either credible or that the claim is reliable. It, therefore, fails to meet either prong of the Aguilar test.
Since the claim by the “suspected party” was necessary to a finding of probable cause for the issuance of this search warrant, and since the testimony admitted against the appellant at trial was the fruit of what I have concluded was an unlawful search and seizure, I would overrule the State’s motion for rehearing, and reverse and remand this case for a new trial.
I dissent.
CLINTON and TEAGUE, JJ., join in this opinion.
. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S.Ct. 584, 587, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
. Moyian, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741, 773 (1974).
. Id. at 755.