¶ 36. (concurring). Due to the application of the statute of repose contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b), neither Cheryl Makos nor her Estate (collectively "Makos") have any possibility of recovery even though a legal wrong may have been committed. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Makos could not have discovered the injury until after the statute of repose had run; therefore, the statute of repose has completely denied Makos the right to *60bring a medical malpractice claim. Under these circumstances, and based on the legal principles discussed herein, I conclude that the statute of repose is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. It deprives Makos of the right to a remedy in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution. I therefore join that portion of the lead opinion written by Justice Steinmetz which involves art. I, § 9. However, since Makos prevails on this basis, I do not reach the issues of procedural due process, substantive due process, or equal protection. In addition, although I agree with the rationale set forth in the lead opinion regarding art. I, § 9, I write separately to further explain my reasons for concluding that Makos has been deprived of the right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9, and to suggest a framework for future cases.1 Accordingly, I join the majority in reversing the circuit court's order and judgment, and remanding this cause for a trial.
¶ 37. Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, commonly referred to as the "remedy for wrongs" provision, provides:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
*61This provision, and thirty-eight similar state constitutional provisions,2 originally derive from Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta, in which Ring John promised: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice." David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197, 1199 (1992); see also Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189-90 n.3, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980) (quoting Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347-48, 77 N.W. 174, 77 N.W. 917 (1898)). This promise was intended to prevent the practice of selling writs, which were bribes "demanded and taken to procure the benefits of the laws." Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3; see also Schuman, supra, at 1199. Subsequently, in his commentaries on the Magna Carta, Sir Edward Coke interpreted King John's promise as follows: "[E]very subject.. .may take his remedy by the course of the law and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay." See Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3; Schuman, supra, at 1199-1200. By interpreting Chapter 40 in this manner, Coke was attempting to address problems involving judicial corruption that had persisted since the days of the Magna Carta, such as interference with the courts by the king. Jonathan M. Hoffman, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279, 1293-95 (1995). Thus, Coke used Chapter 40 to support his position that the judiciary should be a branch independent from the king. Id. at 1293-95, 1308, 1311-12.
*62¶ 38. Early framers of state constitutions took the language of their respective right to remedy provisions from Coke's restatement, and subsequent constitutional framers likewise borrowed such language from previously-enacted state constitutions. Id. at 1284. However, as Professor David Schuman has determined, the purpose behind such provisions was not to protect against judicial corruption, as it had been during the time of Coke or King John. Schuman, supra at 1200-01. As Professor Schuman explains: "By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, during which the American remedy guarantees first appeared, the focus of popular distrust had shifted from the King's courts to the people's representatives." Id. Thus, state right to remedy provisions were intended to address the problems of "renegade legislatures" by "vesting increased power in the judiciary." Id.
¶ 39. Consistent with this historical purpose, this court has determined that art. I, § 9 "is primarily addressed to the right of persons to have access to the courts and to obtain justice on the basis of the law as it in fact exists." Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189. However, art. I, § 9, in and of itself, confers no rights. Id. Accordingly, art. I, § 9 "does not guarantee a remedy for every species of injury, but only such as results from an invasion or an infringement of a legal right or a failure to discharge a legal duty." Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 213, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953) (quoting 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 709). Thus, in order for art. I, § 9 to have possible application, "it must first be established that plaintiff has suffered a legal injury or wrong by reason of defendant's conduct." Id. Such a legal injury or wrong exists where an individual has an independent legislatively-recognized right, see Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3; Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 *63Wis. 2d 382, 384, 393, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975), or common-law right to bring a cause of action, see Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 181-82, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
¶ 40. In Wisconsin, an individual has a common-law right to bring a medical malpractice action. See, e.g., Skinner v. American Bible Soc'y, 92 Wis. 209, 65 N.W. 1037 (1896); Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888); Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504, 30 N.W. 674 (1886); Quinn v. Higgins, 63 Wis. 664, 24 N.W. 482 (1885); Reynolds v. Graves, 3 Wis. 371 (1854). Moreover, the legislature modified this common-law right in 1975 when it enacted ch. 655, which established an exclusive procedure for bringing a medical malpractice action. See State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 499, 261 N.W.2d 434 491 (1978). Consequently, the right to bring a medical malpractice action, subject to the applicable conditions of ch. 655, is also a legislatively-recognized right. See Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 206-09, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995).
¶ 41. However, my inquiry does not end here, because even where an independent common-law or legislatively-recognized right to bring a cause of action exists, the legislature may modify, reduce, or eliminate this right under certain circumstances without violating art. I, § 9. See Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 510, 514 (1859) (art. I, § 9 "is complied with, whatever changes may be made in the remedy, whenever a 'certain remedy' of a substantial character is left"). The Supreme Court of Florida has determined that, in situations like this, the following principles should be utilized to determine whether the remedy for wrongs provision has been violated:
*64[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become part of the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. s. 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abol-ishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). Professor Schuman has characterized the Kluger court's approach as involving the following "three-step combination of rules and balances": (1) the legislature may freely modify, reduce or eliminate post-constitutional causes of action created by the legislature itself; (2) the legislature may modify, reduce, or eliminate common-law or pre-constitutional statutory causes of action if it provides a reasonable alternative; and (3) the legislature may modify, reduce, or eliminate common law or pre-constitutional statutory causes of action if it establishes that no reasonable alternatives exist and that "an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right" exists. Schuman, supra, at 1216-17. I conclude that these principles should be adopted in Wisconsin.
¶ 42. Applying these principles to the case at hand, I conclude that the legislature cannot eliminate Makos' right to bring a medical malpractice action under any of these three principles. First, the right to bring a medical malpractice action existed at common law; therefore, the legislature cannot freely eliminate Makos' right to bring such a claim. Second, the legisla*65ture did not provide a reasonable alternative to protect Makos' right to a remedy for her injuries; rather, it completely barred her from seeking any remedy. Third, as expressly indicated by the legislature, in 1975 it enacted ch. 655 in order to address the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's. Wis. Stat. Ann. Ch. 655 (West 1995) (Historical and Statutory Notes). Accordingly, by the time the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b) in 1979-80, it had already addressed the problems created by this crisis in another manner. Therefore, it is clear that there was a reasonable alternative for meeting the public necessity created by the medical malpractice crisis, and it is further clear that the legislature consequently did not have an "overpowering public necessity" for the elimination of Makos' right. Thus, because Makos has a common-law and legislatively-recognized right to bring a medical malpractice action, and because the legislature may not eliminate this right under any of the above-explained principles, I conclude that the statute of repose denies Makos the right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9.
¶ 43. This conclusion is consistent with the historical purpose of art. I, § 9, see Schuman, supra, at 1200-01, as well as Wisconsin precedent, see Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 181-82; Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3; Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 384, 393; see also Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 356, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980) (discussing possible application of art. I, § 9), overruled on other grounds, Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983); Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 213 N.W.2d 741, 216 N.W.2d 252 (1974) (discussing possible application of art. I, § 9). In addition, this conclusion is supported by decisions from other jurisdictions, in which courts have determined that a medical malpractice statute of repose violates *66the right to remedy provision of their respective state constitutions. See McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp., 799 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1990); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
¶ 44. Furthermore, this conclusion does not conflict with CLL Associates, Ltd. v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993).3 See dissenting op. at 80-83, 86-87. As the CLL court explained, tort actions are significantly distinct from contract actions. Id. at 609-13. Therefore, although a tort statute of limitation begins to run when an injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury, the same is not true in a contract cause of action. Id. 609-17. Accordingly, the court has recognized that different principles of law apply when considering a contract statute of limitations as opposed to a tort statute of limitations. See id. Thus, although it may not violate art. I, § 9 to bar a contract claim before the injured party knew or should have known of the injury, see id. at 614-15, the same reasoning does not necessarily apply to a tort cause of action. For this reason, I conclude that CLL is inapplicable in the present case.
¶ 45. Moreover, this court has recognized that "[mjedical malpractice actions are substantially distinct from other tort actions." Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 509. Consequently, the same principles of law regard*67ing a medical malpractice statute of repose may not apply when considering statutes of repose in other areas of tort law. Consequently, because medical malpractice actions are distinct from other types of actions, I do not conclude that all statutes of repose are unconstitutional. See dissenting op. at 82-84. I also do not conclude that the statute of repose at issue here is unconstitutional on its face, because only in rare situations, such as we have here, will it completely deny an individual the right to bring a malpractice action. See Lead op. at 49 n.7.
¶ 46. In short, I conclude that courts should consider the following three principles, along with the nature of the cause of action, in determining whether an individual has been denied the right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9 through the legislature's modification, reduction, or elimination of a right to bring a cause of action: (1) whether the legislature modified, reduced, or eliminated a post-constitutional cause of action created by the legislature itself; (2) whether the legislature modified, reduced, or eliminated a common law or pre-constitutional statutory cause of action and provided a reasonable alternative; and (3) whether, if the legislature did not provide a reasonable alternative, it has established that an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right exists, and that no reasonable alternative exists. As previously explained, based on these three principles, along with the unique nature of medical malpractice actions, I conclude that the statute of repose contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b) deprives Makos of the right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9. Thus, I concur in the holding set forth in the lead opinion that, under these circumstances, the statute of repose is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I join the *68majority in reversing the circuit court's order and judgment, and remanding the cause for a trial.
I do not attempt to analyze prior cases of this court on the basis of the framework suggested herein.
See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197, 1201-02 (1992) (thirty-nine states have a right to remedy provision in their respective state constitutions). David Schuman is an Associate Professor and Associate Dean at the University of Oregon Law School.
Although CLL involved a statute of limitations, application of the statute of limitations had the same effect as application of the statute of repose in this case: it barred CLL from bringing a contract cause of action before it even discovered its injury. See CLL Associates, Ltd. v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 614, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993).