concurring and dissenting opinion on rehearing.
I concur in the majority’s disposition affirming, after modification, the trial court’s judgment insofar as it was rendered for appellee the City of Houston (“the City”) on the ground of governmental immunity from suit. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s disposition of the judgment insofar as it was rendered for appellee the Houston Firemen’s Relief and Retirement Fund (“the Fund”) and the individual appellees (collectively “the trustees”). Accordingly, I would grant the rehearing motion of appellant, Elmer F. Williams II, deny the Fund and the trustees’ joint rehearing motion as moot, affirm the judgment in part, reverse the judgment in part, and remand the cause with instructions.
WILLIAMS’S CHALLENGES TO THE ADOPTION OF THE GUIDELINES AND TO THE PSC DETERMINATION
I first disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over certain of Williams’s challenges to the adoption of guidelines (“the guidelines”) establishing prerequisites for prior service credit (“PSC”) and the determination of Williams’s PSC request. I would instead hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider these particular challenges, and I would reach their merits.
*441A. Jurisdiction
The Fund’s board is “in the nature of a public administrative body.” Herschbach v. City of Corpus Christi, 883 S.W.2d 720, 728 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); cf. Thayer v. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys., 95 S.W.3d 573, 576-77 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (holding that municipal pension system and board, as state-created, governmental entities, are generally immune from tort liability). Persons aggrieved by an administrative agency’s action have no absolute right to challenge that action in court: the right of judicial review of an agency determination exists only when
1. a statute allows judicial review,
2. the agency’s action adversely affects a vested property right,
3. the agency’s action violates certain constitutional rights,
4. the action exceeds the agency’s jurisdiction, or
5. the agency action involves a pure question of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, when the agency does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine that question of law.
See Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 599 (Tex. 2001); Helton v. R.R. Comm’n, No. 01-01-01007-CV, slip op. at 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2003, no pet. h.); Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Schutz, 101 S.W.3d 512, 522 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet. h.); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Motor Vehicle Div., Tex. Dept. of Transp., 860 S.W.2d 223, 230 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Int’l Union of United Auto. Aerospace & Agrie. Implement Workers of Am. Local 119 v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 558, 566 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
Williams asserted below and in this Court that each of the five bases for review listed above gave the trial court jurisdiction, before he was eligible to retire or was disabled, to review the Fund’s adoption of the guidelines and its PSC determination. In two opinions, we rejected all five bases on which Williams sought judicial review, holding that he could not assert his challenges in court until he was eligible to retire or disabled. See Williams v. Houston Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund, No. 01-98-00681-CV, slip op. at 5-8, 12-14, 1999 WL 82441 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 11, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (interlocutory appeal; hereinafter “Williams I”); Williams v. Houston Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund, No. 01-99-01361-CV, slip op. at 11-12, 20-23, 2001 WL 1671349 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 27, 2001, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication) (appeal after final judgment; hereinafter “Williams II”).
I still agree with our holding in Williams I and Williams II, and with the majority here, that the express language of the current retirement statute does not provide for judicial review at this time.1 *442See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), §§ 2(j), 12(a) (Vernon 2003). However, unlike the majority, I would now hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider and to declare whether the Fund correctly interpreted the former retirement statute’s PSC provision — the Fund’s sole basis for both its adoption of the guidelines and its PSC determination — because the Fund’s actions involved statutory interpretation, a pure question of law that the Fund applied to undisputed facts,2 and because the Fund did not have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the statute.
Texas trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and they presumably have subject-matter jurisdiction unless a contrary showing is made. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex.2002); Dubai Petroleum v. Kazi 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). This is due to article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, which provides that a trial court’s jurisdiction “consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” Tex. Const, art. V, § 8; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.007 (Vernon 1988) (giving district courts jurisdiction provided by Texas Constitution article V, § 8); id. *443§ 24.008 (Vernon 1988) (“The district court may hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity... .”). In contrast, “there is no presumption that administrative agencies are authorized to resolve disputes. Rather, they may exercise only those powers the law, in clear and express statutory language, confers upon them.... Courts will not imply additional authority to agencies, nor may agencies create for themselves any excess powers.” Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 212.
Courts have jurisdiction to perform the inherently judicial function of determining pure questions of law, such as interpreting a statute. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 566; see also Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Cooper v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (“[Mjatters of statutory interpretation ... are nothing more than questions of law.”). Under article V, section 8, that jurisdiction remains in the district court unless, and only unless, the Legislature grants an agency exclusive jurisdiction over the question of law. See Tex. Const, art. V, § 8 (providing for broad, inherent district-court jurisdiction “except in cases where exclusive ... jurisdiction may be conferred ... on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body”) (emphasis added); Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 566. The majority claims that the retirement statute grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Fund to determine all matters relating to the Fund’s operation and administration, including interpreting the retirement statute. I disagree that the Legislature intended for the Fund to have exclusive jurisdiction over statutory interpretation, especially after the Fund has issued a final order for which no administrative remedies were prescribed.3
An administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over a matter only when the Legislature grants it the sole authority to determine that matter. See Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 221. Determining whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction is a question of statutory interpretation. Id. Therefore, the question of whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo. Id. at 222.
This Court recognized in Williams I that none of the former retirement statute’s provisions gave the Fund exclusive jurisdiction to interpret or to construe the statute. See id., slip op. at 13-14. I continue to adhere to that view. The former retirement statute, like its successor, provided that the Fund’s board “has, in addition to all other powers and duties arising out of this Act ... the duty and power to control and [to] manage the operation and administration of the fund according to the terms and purposes of this Act and all applicable sections of the code and all powers necessary to accomplish these purposes .... ” See Act of May 28, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1095, § 2(j), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4492, 4493-94 [hereinafter “former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, § 2(j)”], repealed by Act of May 21, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1268, § 3, 75 Tex. Gen Laws 4794, 4811 (current version at Tex. *444Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), § 2(p) (Vernon 2003)); see also Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), § 2(p) (providing for similar powers). Both versions of the retirement statute also identify specific powers that are included within the general delegation of power.4
Neither the enumerated nor the general powers delegated to the Fund demonstrate a legislative intent to grant the Fund exclusive jurisdiction over matters of statutory interpretation. Subaru shows why. In Subaru, the supreme court considered whether and to what extent the former Texas Motor Vehicle Code granted the Motor Vehicle Board exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims for code violations, Deceptive Trade Practices — Consumer Protection Act5 (“DTPA”) violations, contract breach, and bad faith. See Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 217, 220-21. In its original opinion, the supreme court concluded that article 4413(36), section 3.01(a) of the former Code, quoted below as it then read, did not give the board exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims:
(a) The board has the general and original power and jurisdiction to regulate all aspects of the distribution, sale, and leasing of motor vehicles and to do all things, whether specifically designated in this Act or implied herein, or necessary or convenient to the exercise of this poiuer and jurisdiction, including the original jurisdiction to determine questions of its own jurisdiction.....
(b) Unless otherwise specifically provided by Texas law not in conflict with the terms of this Act, all aspects of the distribution and sale of motor vehicles shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this Act.6
See Subaru, 44 Tex. S.Ct. J. 779, 781, 783-85, 2001 WL 578337 (Tex May 31, 2001); accord Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 206, 207 (Tex.2002) (holding, “[W]e disagree that [Texas Motor Vehicle Code] section 3.01(a)’s former version granted the Board exclusive jurisdiction.”). The Court reasoned that that version of section 3.01(a) did not use the word “exclusive”; that the Legislature would have *445said that section 3.01 (a)’s grant was exclusive if it had meant for it to be; and that other sections of the same Code expressly granted the board exclusive jurisdiction.7 See Subaru, 44 Tex. S.Ct. J. at 783-84, 2001 WL 578337.
Around the time that the original opinion issued, however, the Legislature amended article 4413(36), section 3.01(a) of the former Code retroactively. See Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 218-19. On rehearing, the Subaru Court held that amended section 3.01(a), quoted below, showed a clear legislative intent to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the board over matters governed by the Code, thus requiring exhaustion of remedies for those matters:
(a) The board has the exclusive, original jurisdiction to regulate those aspects of the distribution, sale, and leasing of motor vehicles as governed by this Act and to do all things, whether specifically designated in this Act or implied herein, or necessary or convenient to the exercise of this power and jurisdiction, including the original jurisdiction to determine questions of its own jurisdiction.8
See id. at 218.
Although Subaru and this case differ in several ways, they have important similarities.9 The retirement statute’s jurisdictional grant resembles the pre-amendment jurisdictional grant reviewed on original submission in Subaru. Neither of those jurisdictional provisions employed the term “exclusive.” Each gave the agency broad powers, general and enumerated.10 Both statutes provided a pervasive regulatory scheme for the matters that the agency governed.11 Nonetheless, until section *4463.01(a) was amended in ways that materially distinguish it from the retirement statute here, the Subaru court held that pre-amendment section 3.01(a) did not grant the board exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims, based in large part on that section’s language. And the supreme court reached the same conclusion concerning pre-amendment section 3.01(a) in Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex.2002).
The majority believes my position to be that courts should not recognize an agency’s exclusive jurisdiction unless the Legislature expressly uses the term “exclusive.” That is not my position. The Legislature can, of course, create exclusive jurisdiction by otherwise clearly showing its intent to grant the agency the sole authority over a particular matter.12 See Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 221 (explaining that agency has exclusive jurisdiction “when a pervasive regulatory scheme indicates that [the Legislature] intended for the regulatory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the regulation is addressed.”) (emphasis added); cf. Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex.1996) (“If [a statutory] provision’s wording does not indicate whether the Legislature wanted courts to consider it jurisdictional, we must resolve the issue by applying rules of statutory construction.”).
The majority views the retirement statute’s comprehensive regulatory scheme to show that intent. I do not. Many agencies are granted broad powers (like those given to the Fund) to enforce and to administer complex regulatory schemes. That fact alone, without something indicating that the Legislature further intended some or all of those powers to be exclusive, cannot be enough. If that fact alone sufficed, most agencies could be deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction over most of the matters that they regulate. And if that fact alone had sufficed, the Subaru and Butnaru courts would have held that the former version of section 3.01(a) granted exclusive jurisdiction. See Subaru, 44 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. at 783-85, 2001 WL 578337; Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 206. They did not so hold. The majority’s view also runs against the construct that we should normally not imply additional authority to agencies. See Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 220.
In this retirement statute, I see the Legislature’s intent to grant broad powers to the Fund to carry out the statute’s purposes. I also see the Legislature’s intent to allow the Fund the first shot at ruling on matters that the statute governs *447(akin to primary jurisdiction, though that rule does not apply here). But I see no legislative intent, once the Fund has made and applied a statutory interpretation to undisputed facts in arriving at a final order, to make that interpretation the sole province of the Fund, to the exclusion of the courts, when interpreting statutes is one of the raisons d’etre of any court.
I write further to respond to the majority’s arguments against my position. Because the majority believes that the Fund has exclusive jurisdiction over legal questions, it concludes that my position would eviscerate agencies’ exclusive jurisdiction. That view misunderstands my position, which is simply that, in the absence of statutory authority to do so, courts may still consider pure questions of law that are raised by an agency’s action when the agency itself does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the particular question of law. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 566. If I read the retirement statute to grant the Fund exclusive jurisdiction over pure legal questions, I would not apply the pure-question-of-law exception here. I do not so read the statute, however.
The majority next implies that parties might nonetheless abuse the pure-question-of-law exception by falsely claiming that every agency ruling fits the exception. In answer, I begin by noting that the pure-question-of-law exception is well accepted, having expressly been recognized or applied by at least seven courts of appeals (including ours) and having been recognized, though not applied, by the Texas Supreme Court.13 I have found no court that has denied the exception’s existence. If the supreme court uses this case to reconsider the validity of this exception, or if it decides that the exception does not *448apply in situations clearly analogous to those involving exhausation of remedies (see footnote nine above), so be it. Until then, I would recognize and apply the exception here because I believe that this case fits squarely into it.
More importantly, and contrary to the majority’s claim, the pure-question-of-law exception is limited, not “expansive.” This is especially true here. First, the exception applies only when a pure question of law of exists; that is, there must be no material fact issues involved in the agency’s action.14 Determinations of PSC requests, as with most agency rulings, will normally involve the application of law to disputed facts. It is only because of the very unusual circumstances present here— the Fund’s admission that it based the guidelines solely on its statutory interpretation and that it denied Williams’s PSC request solely for the undisputed reason that he did not meet the guidelines — that the pure-question-of-law exception can apply. And I note that the majority’s slippery-slope argument could apply equally well to the other exceptions to judicial review- — that the agency action adversely affects a vested property right, violates certain constitutional provisions, or exceeds agency authority. Nonetheless, our supreme court has repeatedly recognized the validity of these exceptions, rather than rejecting them for allegedly allowing the exception to swallow the rule through artful pleading. Parties sometimes do try to label a challenge to an administrative agency’s ruling in a way that will fit one of these exceptions, even though the exception does not apply (as Williams did with his “ultra vires” challenge, for example). The response to that type of pleading is to overrule the challenge because it does not truly fit the exception, rather than to eliminate the exception entirely because some litigants might improperly invoke it.
The majority finally contends that applying the pure-question-of-law exception to construe the former retirement statute’s PSC provision effectively allows a person “with non-vested rights [in a pension fund] ... to freeze [his] non-vested rights in time and subject them to judicial enforcement” and thus to prevent changes in the retirement law that he might not otherwise be able to prevent. I disagree with this policy argument because of the procedural posture of this case.
First, the Fund affirmatively and consistently urged in its summary judgment motions, as it continues to do on appeal, that the former retirement statute controlled this case and that we should thus apply and construe that statute, rather than the current one.15 “[A] trial court cannot grant summary judgment for a reason that the movant does not present to the trial court in writing. Also, ... issues an appellate court may review are those the movant actually presented to the trial court.” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex.1996). Accordingly, for purposes of this lawsuit, the Fund has effectively chosen for itself which statutory version applies. See id. *449Likewise, the Fund has never claimed that Williams’s lack of a vested right in the laws’ continuation precluded his statutory challenges to the Fund’s interpretation of the former retirement statute.16 If the Fund — the rule-166a(e) summary judgment movant — never claimed that Williams’s lack of vested rights precluded his statutory challenges, then neither should the majority rely on a policy argument based on that ground. Cf. id.
In sum, Williams’s lack of a vested right does not change the rules of summary judgment. Because my proposed holding is based on the application of those rules to the Fund’s arguments in this case, that holding would not necessarily “freeze non-vested rights in time” across the board or prohibit the Legislature from altering or repealing statutory pension schemes, as the majority claims.
And even if I am wrong that the pure-question-of-law exception allows Williams presently to obtain a declaration of the former PSC provision’s meaning, I note that Williams will have obtained the requisite years of service for retirement under his interpretation of the PSC provision some time later this year. When that time comes, the retirement statute’s judicial-review provisions should no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider, in a new lawsuit, Williams’s challenges to the merits of the Fund’s adoption of the guidelines and its denial of his PSC request. See Tex.Rev.Cw. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(l), § 12(a) (Vernon 2003) (providing that member “who is eligible for retirement for length of service” and who is “aggrieved by a decision or order of the [Fund’s] board, whether on the basis of rejection of a claim or of the amount allowed, may appeal.... ”). Surely even the Fund would not then argue that Williams must work 20 years before a court has jurisdiction to declare whether he had to work only 13½ years.
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to interpret the PSC provision of the former retirement statute, and consequently to determine and to declare whether the Fund correctly interpreted that provision, regardless of whether the retirement statute provided for present judicial review of the adoption of the guidelines or the PSC determination. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 565; see also Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. I would sustain the portion of Williams’s issue one and his rehearing arguments concerning the trial court’s jurisdiction to interpret the former retirement statute’s PSC provision (and thus to consider whether the Fund correctly interpreted that provision).
B. The Merits
Having determined that the trial court presently had jurisdiction to consider Williams’s challenges to the adoption of the guidelines and the PSC determination, I would reach the merits of those challenges. The Fund and the trustees’ summary judgment motions asserted that the guidelines were a correct interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provi*450sion. By motion for partial summary judgment, Williams asserted that the guidelines were an incorrect interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provision. In issue four, Williams argues that the trial court erred to the extent that it granted the Fund’s and the trustees’ summary judgment motion on this ground.
The former retirement statute’s PSC provision was section 30 of Revised Civil Statute article 6248e.2. See Act of May 27, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 432, § 30, 64 Tex. Gen. Laws 1135, 1148 [hereinafter “former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, section 30”], repealed by, Act of May 21, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1268, § 3, 75 Tex. Gen. Laws 4794, 4811 (current version at Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), § 16(a) (Vernon 2003)). Former section 30 provided:
“A firefighter who transfers from the fire department of one city to that of a city covered by this Act and desires to participate in the fund of that city shall: ... [meet three requirements].”
Former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, § 30(a).
The PSC provision of the current retirement statute, which the Legislature enacted several months after the Fund had adopted the guidelines, provides:
“A person who becomes a firefighter in a municipality to which this article applies may receive service credit for prior employment with the fully paid fire department of another municipality in this state with a similar fund benefit-ting only firefighters of that municipality to which the firefighter contributed if ... [the firefighter meets five requirements].”
Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), § 16(a) (emphasis added). The Fund interpreted the first sentence of former section 30(a) to mean what the italicized portion of current section 16(a) now expressly says, ie., that years worked for Texas fire departments other than HFD could be credited towards retirement with the Fund only if the former city also had a statutory firefighter’s fund similar to that of Houston.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law. In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex.2001). Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Id. at 702; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.005 (Vernon 1998). In doing so, we begin with the statute’s plain language before resorting to rules of construction. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex.2001); Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865-66 (Tex. 1999). We begin with the plain language because we assume that the Legislature tried to say what it meant; therefore, its words should be the surest guide to its intent. Id. at 866. In ascertaining legislative intent, we do not confine our review to isolated statutory words, phrases, or clauses, but we instead examine the entire act. Meritor Auto., Inc. v. Ruan Leasing Co., 44 S.W.3d 86, 90 (Tex.2001). We presume that every word in a statute was used for a purpose, and we must give each sentence, clause, and word effect if reasonable and possible. Perkins v. State, 367 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Tex.1963).
In construing a statute, we must consider “the old law, the evil, and the remedy,” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.005 (Vernon 1998), and the law’s nature, its object, and the consequences that would flow from a given construction. Sayre v. Mullins, 681 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.1984). The purpose of municipal pension plans is “to provide a pension plan for the type of city employee named.” Davis v. Peters, 224 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1949, no writ). We liberally construe the pension statute *451here, as with any Revised Civil Statute, to achieve this purpose and to promote justice. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.006(a) (Vernon 1998) (concerning Revised Civil Statutes generally); Bd. of Firemen’s Relief & Ret Fund Tr. of Houston v. Powers, 411 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ.App.-Austin 1967, writ refd n.r.e.) (“[T]he purpose of the legislation creating a pension plan is to be subserved by a broad and liberal construction of the act, and may not be defeated by a narrow and technical construction.”); Colson, 492 S.W.2d at 310 (municipal pension plan); Davis, 224 S.W.2d at 493 (municipal pension plan).
The Fund and the trustees rely on the rule that “[cjonstruction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute.” Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.1993). The Fund’s construction of former section 30(a) does not comport with the statute’s plain language, however, and I thus conclude that we are not bound by that interpretation. See id.; see also Firemen’s Pension Comm’n v. Jones, 939 S.W.2d 730, 735 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no writ). In adopting the guidelines, the Fund effectively read the phrase, “[a] firefighter who transfers from the fire department of one city to that of a city covered by this Act ...,” in former section 30(a) to mean, “[a] firefighter who transfers from the fire department of one city covered by this Act to that of another city covered by this Act....” Had the Legislature intended the result that the Fund reached in adopting the guidelines, the Legislature would have used such language, or at least language like “[a] firefighter who transfers from the fire department of one city to that of another city covered by this Act....” It did not do so. “Only when it is necessary to give effect to the clear legislative intent can we insert additional words into a statutory provision.” Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex.1981). Such an intent is not clear here. If anything, the opposite intent is clearer: because the subordinate clause “[that is] covered by this Act” is placed beside “a city,” but not beside “one city,” that clause appears to modify only “a city” and not “one city.” See U.S. v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 436 (3rd Cir.2003) (“The doctrine of the last antecedent teaches that ‘qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding’ and not to ‘others more remote.’ ”) (citation omitted); see also Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362, 382, 34 S.Ct. 627, 633, 58 L.Ed. 1001 (1914) (“The natural and grammatical use of a relative pronoun is to put it in close relation with its antecedent, its purpose being to connect the antecedent with a descriptive phrase.”); William StRünk, ⅞. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style at 29 (3rd ed. 1979) (“The relative pronoun should come, in most instances, immediately after its antecedent.”).
Additionally, the timing of the Legislature’s amendment of former section 30(a) supports Williams’s interpretation. Only after the Fund had interpreted former section 30(a) to include the previously unexpressed requirement that the firefighter have transferred from a city with a statutory firefighter’s fund did the Legislature amend former section 30 to include that requirement expressly. If the Legislature had thought that former section 30(a) already implicitly included the extra requirement discerned by the Fund, the Legislature would not necessarily have had to *452amend the statute.17 Cf. Cities of Austin, etc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 92 S.W.3d 434, 445 (Tex.2002) (holding that, when Legislature re-enacts without material change ambiguous statute that has been given long-standing administrative interpretation, court presumes that Legislature intended statute to have meaning ascribed by agency); see also Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex.1968); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 40 S.W.2d 46, 50 (1931) (same, concerning court’s interpretation).
The Fund and the trustees nonetheless reply that the former retirement statute’s history supports their interpretation. Specifically, they claim that former section 30’s predecessor expressly said what the Fund construed former section 30(a) to say in the guidelines; therefore, the Legislature must have intended to carry forth the meaning of the predecessor statute into former section 30. I disagree. Former section 30’s predecessor was Revised Civil Statute article 6243e, section 7E. See Act of May 29, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 167, § 3, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 348, 349, repealed by Act of May 27, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 432, § 30, 64 Tex. Gen. Laws 1135, 1148, repealed by Act of May 21, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1268, § 3, 75 Tex. Gen. Laws 4794, 4811 (current version at Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), § 16(a)). Former article 6243e, section 7E read in pertinent part:
(a) This Section applies only to cities ... having an organized “fully paid” fire department covered by a Firemen’s Relief and Retirement Fund.
(b) A fireman who transfers from the fire department of one city to that of a city covered by this section and desires to participate in the fund of that city shall: [meet three requirements].
See Act of May 29, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 167, § 3, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 348, 349 (emphasis added). The Fund and the trustees argue that subsection (a)’s statement that “this Section” applied to “cities” that were “covered by a Firemen’s Relief and Retirement Fund” referred to both the transferor and the transferee cities mentioned in subsection (b). This is a misreading of the predecessor statute. Subsection (b) required only that the transferee city be “covered by this section”; in context, then, subsection (a) was also speaking about transferee cities. If subsection (a) had meant any city, not just the transferee city, then the phrase “covered by this section” in subsection (b) would have been superfluous. The predecessor statute should not be read this way. See Perkins, 367 S.W.2d at 146 (holding that courts should presume that every word in statute is used for purpose, giving each sentence, clause, and word effect if reasonable and possible). I thus read former section 30’s predecessor the same as I read former section 30.18
The Fund was and is empowered to adopt written rules and guidelines “not *453inconsistent with this [retirement statute].” Former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, § (2)(j)(1) (emphasis added); see Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), § 2(p)(1). The guidelines adopted in this case were inconsistent with that statute. That was error.
For these reasons, I would hold that the Fund’s interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provision, on which the Fund based both its adoption of the guidelines and its decision to deny Williams’s PSC request, was incorrect. I would thus further hold that the trial court (1) erred to the extent that it rendered summary judgment for the Fund and the trustees on the ground that the guidelines were a proper interpretation of the former retirement statute's PSC provision and (2) erred by not granting Williams’s motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that the guidelines had improperly interpreted the former retirement statute’s PSC provision. Accordingly, I would sustain issue four.
Given my conclusions, I would not reach those portions of Williams’s issue one, or his issues three and five through 10, concerning whether the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment on some of his alternative challenges to the adoption of the guidelines and the PSC determination.
WILLIAMS’S COMMON-LAW CLAIMS AGAINST THE TRUSTEES IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
I also disagree with the majority’s disposition of Williams’s common-law claims asserted against the trustees in their individual capacities.
The Fund and the trustees moved for summary judgment on Williams’s common-law claims against the trustees individually on the grounds that (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the common-law claims because they were not ripe and (2) four affirmative defenses barred the common-law claims. In Williams II, we held that Williams’s common-law claims were unripe, and we thus did not reach the merits of the trustees’ affirmative defenses to those claims. See Williams II, slip op. at 22-23. Departing from the ripeness holding of Williams II,19 the majority opinion on rehearing affirms the summary judgment rendered for the trustees individually on the basis of one of the four affirmative defenses: official immunity. Because I disagree that the Fund and the trustees proved this affirmative defense as a matter of law, I would sustain Williams’s challenge to the rendition of summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. I would then consider whether the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the trustees individually based on the three remaining affirmative defenses.20
*454A. Official Immunity
In issue 15, Williams argues that the trial court erred in granting the Fund and the trustees’ summary judgment motion on the ground that official immunity shielded the trustees in their individual capacities from Williams’s common-law claims. I agree.
The trustees had the burden to prove this affirmative defense as a matter of law. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994). Government officials are entitled to official immunity from suit arising out of their performance of (1) discretionary duties (2) performed in objective good faith, as long as the officials are (3) acting within the scope of their authority. Id. The parties disputed only the good-faith element. To carry their burden of showing good faith, the trustees had to produce evidence that a reasonably prudent trustee might have believed that his actions in adopting the specific guidelines and determining Williams’s PSC request were reasonable and lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information then possessed by the trustee. See id. at 656-57.
The trustees submitted the affidavits of appellee trustees Maxie Patterson, Donnie R. Meyers, and George E. Lowdermilk in support of this ground of their motion. These affidavits each read in pertinent part as follows:
In 1996, the Board was faced with the task of considering many applications for prior service credit. As permitted by the statute, the Board determined that it needed to promulgate general written guidelines to aid in determination of ah prior service credit applications. At its regularly-scheduled meeting on July 25, 1996, the Board promulgated guidelines for prior service credit, which are reflected in a July 26, 1996, letter sent to Williams.
As a Board member, it was my duty to participate in the Board’s exercise of its functions, which include administering the Fund, construing the act and determining all questions relating to eligibility for participation. I interpreted the statute to require that a transferring firefighter come from a fully-paid fire department of a Texas city having its own firefighters’ relief and retirement fund similar to the Fund, which is the interpretation that the Board adopted.
As a Board member, it was also my duty to participate in the Board’s adjudication of the prior service credit applications. In connection with Wilhams’s application, I considered the interpretation of the statute adopted by the Board, the application and materials submitted by Williams, and Wilhams’s testimony at the December 19, 1996, administrative hearing. Based on those items, I concluded that Wilhams’s application did not meet the statutory requirement for prior service credit in that he had not transferred from a city having its own firefighters’ relief and retirement fund.
The three affidavits merely state what the trustees did — that they adopted and applied the guidelines to Wilhams’s PSC request — and what the former retirement statute generally empowered the board to do — to interpret the statute, to adopt guidelines, and to determíne PSC applications. The affidavits do not explain how a reasonably prudent trustee might have believed that adopting and applying these particular guidelines did not commit the wrongs that Williams alleged. That is, the affidavits do not explain why the trustees interpreted the statute as they did or why that interpretation was objectively reason*455able.21 Explaining why a trustee might have viewed the interpretation upon which the guidelines were based to be objectively reasonable (even if that interpretation was incorrect) was important, given Williams’s allegations that the trustees had purposefully changed their interpretation for the sole and improper purpose of defeating pending PSC requests and given his evidence that the Fund had afterwards petitioned the Legislature to amend the statute in ways supporting the Fund’s earlier interpretation. The evidence of objective good faith had to be tailored to the plaintiffs allegations and could not simply be stated in the abstract.
For these reasons, I conclude that the trustees’ affidavits do not meet Chambers’s test for proving good faith. The opinion in Campbell v. Jones,22 upon which the majority relies for the proposition that good-faith immunity can shield an official even if he misinterprets or violates the law or incorrectly adjudicates a claim (a general proposition with which I have no dispute), shows that the trustees’ affidavits do not suffice. In Campbell, a teacher sued school-board trustees individually for having incorrectly determined that her employment contract was invalid because she allegedly had not met the regulatory requirements to fulfill that contract. See id. at 425-26. The parties had stipulated that the trustees “actually believed in good faith” that no valid contract existed because the teacher did not meet the regulatory requirements for teaching; “acted at all times without any intent to deprive” the teacher of her contract salary, “without any corrupt motives,” and “without bad faith in any respect”; “acted on the advice of legal counsel, which advice was that no contract existed ... and no money was due” the teacher; and “acted in all respects as to the transactions involved in this cause according to their best judgment in the matter.”23 See id. at 426-27. The supreme court held that this evidence showed that the trustees were entitled to official immunity. See id at 427. Here, in contrast, the trustees’ affidavits did not even attempt to discuss the bases for their actions or how a trustee might have found those bases objectively reasonable.24
*456I respectfully disagree 'with the majority’s reasons for concluding that the trustees proved as a matter of law that they acted in objective good faith. The majority concludes that the trustees could reasonably have believed that the general acts of interpreting the statute’s PSC provision, adopting the guidelines, and determining Williams’s PSC request were lawful because the former retirement statute gave the trustees the power to do these things. See former Tex.Rbv.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, § (2)(j) (providing for these powers); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. 6243e.2(l), § 2(p) (same). I agree- — and so would Williams — that the retirement statute gave these powers to the trustees and that a trustee could thus reasonably believe that construing the retirement statute, adopting guidelines, and determining PSC requests, in the abstract, was lawful. But that was not the basis for Williams’s common-law claims against the trustees individually. Rather, these claims were based on the trustees’ allegedly abusing those general powers by adopting guidelines that they supposedly knew were groundless solely in order to deny pending PSC requests. Given Williams’s allegations, I believe that the proper focus is on the objective reasonableness of adopting this interpretation and these guidelines, rather than on the objective reasonableness of adopting guidelines, interpreting the statute, or determining PSC requests in general. See, e.g., Campbell, 264 S.W.2d at 426-27 (focusing on evidence concerning reasonableness of motives for making particular decision claimed to be wrongful).
I would thus sustain issue 13.
B. Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”)25 Section 101.106
In issue 11, Williams argues that the trial court erred in granting the Fund and the trustees’ summary judgment motion on the ground that TTCA section 101.106 barred his common-law claims against the trustees in their individual capacities. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.106 (Vernon 1997). I agree.
The trustees had the burden to prove this affirmative defense as a matter of law. See Urban v. Canada, 963 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). They based their section 101.106 summary judgment ground on one order and one judgment: (1) the interlocutory order26 dismissing some of Williams’s challenges to the Fund’s actions, which order we reviewed in Williams I, and (2) a summary judgment disposing of Williams’s equal-protection and due-process claims in a federal suit that arose out of the same incident involved here.
TTCA section 101.106 bars an action against a government employee when *457there is a “judgment in an action or a settlement of a claim under this chapter ” involving the same subject matter against his government employer. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.106 (emphasis added). The TTCA waives sovereign immunity from suit only for certain claims for property damage, personal injury, or death. See id. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997). Williams did not assert these or any other tort claims against the Fund in either lawsuit, and he thus did not have to avail himself of the waiver of sovereign immunity from suit found in the TTCA. See id. Therefore, his judicial challenges to the Fund’s actions were not ones “under this chapter” for purposes of section 101.106. See White v. Annis, 864 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, writ denied) (noting that “[wjhether the plaintiffs claim against the governmental unit falls under the [TTCA] is relevant” to whether TTCA section 101.106 bars claims against governmental unit’s employee); see also Welch v. Cocar-Cola Enters., Inc., 36 S.W.3d 532, 538 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. withdrawn pursuant to settlement) (stating that TTCA section 101.106 did not protect government employee because plaintiffs suit against employer governmental entity was for contract breach, to which TTCA did not apply).
For these reasons, the cited order and judgment could not trigger section 101.106’s application or bar Williams’s common-law claims against the trustees individually. I would thus hold that the trial court erred to the extent that it rendered summary judgment on this ground. Accordingly, I would sustain issue 11.
C. Absolute Judicial Immunity
In issue 14, Williams argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that the trustees enjoyed absolute judicial immunity in their individual capacities from his common-law claims. I agree.
The trustees had the burden to prove this affirmative defense as a matter of law. See Rea v. Cofer, 879 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). They argued below that they were entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their actions taken as part of the “adjudication of [Williams’s] claim for prior service credit.” The extent of the trustees’ summary judgment argument was as follows:
In determining Williams’s claims, the trustees were performing core judicial functions, and such functions are historically afforded absolute immunity.... The Fund and its Board of Trustees constitute a “governmental unit” to which judicial immunity potentially applies. As held by [this Court in Williams I ], the trustees were performing quasi-judicial determinations in the scope of their statutory authority and administrative capacity.27 The adjudication of Williams’s claim for prior service credit thus constitutes a core judicial function, and the trustees are entitled to absolute immunity.28
(Citations omitted.)
“Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity from liability for judicial acts, no matter *458how erroneous the act or how evil the motive, unless the act is performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” City of Houston v. W. Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., 961 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (citations omitted). Persons whose responsibilities are functionally comparable to those of a judge are also immune from liability. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex. v. Juneau, 114 S.W.3d 126 (Tex.App.-Austin, 2003, no pet. h.) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507, 510-13, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 2912-14 (1978)). Texas courts use the federally conceived “functional approach” to determine if one who is not a judge is nonetheless entitled to judicial immunity. See W. Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., 961 S.W.2d at 689. This analysis entails determining “whether the activities of the party invoking immunity are ‘intimately associated with the judicial process,’ i.e., whether the party is functioning as an integral part of the judicial system or as an ‘arm of the court.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).
Like other officials, administrative officials may sometimes enjoy absolute judicial immunity, but only when performing functions closely associated with the judicial process. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-202, 106 S.Ct. 496, 499-501, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985); see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 504-08, 98 S.Ct. at 2909-11.29 Some factors to consider in determining whether an administrative official enjoys absolute judicial immunity are “(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal.” Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202, 106 S.Ct. at 501; see also Juneau, slip op. at 6-7 (recognizing Supreme Court’s adoption of same factors). However, administrative officials generally receive no more than qualified immunity and are granted absolute immunity only in “exceptional situations” in which the application of absolute immunity is “essential.” See Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201, 106 S.Ct. at 500-01; Butz, 438 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 2911.
The trustees cited neither here nor below any ease holding that pension trustees performing functions like theirs are entitled to absolute judicial immunity, as opposed to the usual qualified immunity. I have found no such Texas authority. Nor have the trustees explained or produced evidence showing what “exceptional circumstances” justify application of the absolute privilege here, how they were functioning “as an integral part of the judicial system or as an ‘arm of the court,’ ” or how factors like those set out in Cleaving-er and Butz weigh in favor of absolute immunity for them.30
*459I would thus hold that the Fund and the trustees did not conclusively prove that the trustees were entitled to the affirmative defense of absolute judicial immunity. Accordingly, I would sustain issue 14.
D. Absolute Legislative Immunity
In issue 13, Williams argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the trustees on the ground that they were entitled to absolute legislative immunity in their individual capacities “for any claims arising out of the promulgation of the guidelines.” I agree.
The trustees had the burden to prove this affirmative defense as a matter of law. See Lopez v. Trevino, 2 S.W.3d 472, 473 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). The Fund and the trustees asserted below and argue here that “[wjhen the Board promulgated the guidelines ..., the trustees were acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, and this conduct was specifically within the trustees’ statutory authority.” In support, the trustees cited only the former retirement statute’s provision giving the Fund’s board power to “adopt for the administration of the fund written rules and guidelines not inconsistent with this Act.”31 See former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, § (2)(j)(1).
Courts have extended legislative immunity beyond legislators to other individuals performing legitimate legislative functions. See In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2001). Whether the function that the actor performs is legislative depends upon the nature of the act. Id. For example, courts have sometimes looked at the nature of the facts used to reach the decision. If the underlying facts on which a decision is based are “legislative facts,” such as generalizations concerning a policy or a state of affairs, then the decision is legislative; if the facts used in the deci-sionmaking are more specific, such as those that relate to particular individuals or situations, then the decision is administrative. See Lopez, 2 S.W.3d at 473-74; Bartlett v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 908 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no writ). Courts have also stated that a function is legislative if the decision that it produces establishes a general policy, but that the function is adjudicatory if the resultant decision singles out specific individuals and affects them differently from others. See Lopez, 2 S.W.3d at 473-74; Bartlett, 908 S.W.2d at 235. A legislative function has thus been described as one “look[ing] to the future and chang[ing] existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.” Bartlett, 908 S.W.2d at 236 (quoting Brown v. Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir.1992)).
I would hold that the Fund and the trustees did not conclusively prove that the trustees’ actions in adopting the guidelines were entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Viewed in the light most favorable to Williams, the summary judgment evidence shows that the guidelines were adopted, at *460least to some extent, as part of the trustees’ discussion of and response to pending PSC requests, then applied retroactively to those pending requests, resulting in their denial. The effect of the guidelines’ adoption was thus at least partially specific to individual members. Therefore, the guidelines not only “look[ed] to the future ... to be applied thereafter to all or part of those subject to its power,” but they also worked retroactively against individual firefighters like Williams. Compare, cf., R.R. Comm’n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 289 S.W.2d 559, 562 (1956) (“[Rules setting] Utility rates as rules of conduct are prospective only and do not in any manner involve an ‘adjudication’ of a rights arising from a ‘past’ controversy. It is true that the fixing of rates requires a study of existing and past facts, but the rate as promulgated is not ‘res adjudicata’ of any fact so studied.”).
Additionally, the trustees have repeatedly asserted that their adoption of the guidelines was based solely on their interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provision. A statute’s interpretation is generally a judicial act, not a legislative one. Cf. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 566 (“The resolution of this issue involves construction of the statutes cited, which presents a question of law.... A question of law is primarily judicial in nature.”).
I would thus hold that the Fund and the trustees did not carry their burden of showing that the trustees’ adoption of the guidelines was entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Accordingly, I would sustain issue 13.
E. Conclusion
I would hold that the Fund and the trustees did not carry their burden of proving the trustees’ affirmative defenses as a matter of law. I would thus hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Williams’s common-law claims against the trustees in their individual capacities.
CONCLUSION
I would grant Williams’s rehearing motion and deny the Fund and the trustees’ joint rehearing motion as moot. I would also reverse the judgment to the extent that it was rendered in favor of the Fund and the trustees in their individual capacities and remand the cause. I would further instruct the trial court, upon remand, to render a declaratory judgment in favor of Williams concerning the Fund’s interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provision that underlay the guidelines and the PSC determination. I would affirm the judgment to the extent that it was rendered in favor of the City.
. Williams argues extensively on rehearing that Dubai Petroleum v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex.2000), and its progeny affect this holding by removing the prerequisite found in the retirement statute’s judicial-review provision that Williams be eligible to retire or be disabled. I need not discuss the potential effect of Kazi on the retirement statute’s judicial-review provision because I would ultimately rule that the trial court nonetheless presently has jurisdiction over all of Williams's challenges to the adoption of the guidelines and the PSC determination. In contrast, Williams’s Kazi argument is not mooted by the majority’s disposition of his challenges to the adoption of the guidelines and the PSC determination.
The majority nonetheless claims that it need not address Kazi specifically because its *442current discussion already addresses one holding of Kazi: that district courts are presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction unless a contrary showing is made. See id. at 74-75. That is not Kazi’s exclusive holding, and it is merely the starting point for Williams's rehearing argument. Williams’s principal rehearing argument relies on Kazi’s further holding that statutory prerequisites to suit are generally not jurisdictional, overruling years of precedent to the contrary. See id. at 76. He claims that the retirement statute's requirement that he be eligible to retire or be disabled before he may sue is the type of statutory prerequisite to suit that Kazi held was not jurisdictional, allegedly relieving him of the need to meet that requirement before suing. That Kazi-based argument is not addressed by the majority’s current discussion of the jurisdictional issues, which discussion is anchored on the premise that the retirement statute's judicial-review provisions are jurisdictional. Based on two of this Court's recent opinions and on the type of statutory requirement involved here, I happen to disagree with Williams that Kazi affects the jurisdictional nature of the judicial-review requirement. See Harris County Emergency Servs. Dist. No. 1 v. Miller, 122 S.W.3d 218, 222-228 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 7, 2003, no pet. h.); Helton v. R.R. Comm’n, No. 01-01-01007-CV, slip op. at 13, - S.W.3d-,-(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2003, no pet. h.). But I also recognize that an earlier opinion of this Court, on which Williams relies on rehearing, likely conflicts with Miller and Helton. See Fincher v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Hunters Creek Vill., 56 S.W.3d 815, 817 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). The majority should address the matter. For this reason, too, I respectfully decline to join the majority’s opinion.
. As for the guidelines, the Fund admits that it adopted them based solely on its interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provision, a basis involving a pure question of law. As for the PSC determination, the undisputed evidence that Williams produced at the PSC hearing satisfied his interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provision, but could not satisfy the Fund's new interpretation of the PSC provision, i.e., the guidelines. The sole reason that the Fund denied Williams's request for PSC was that he did not meet the guidelines. The PSC determination was thus based entirely on the guidelines — a pure question of law because it involved a statutory construction that was applied to undisputed material facts. Therefore, although Williams phrases his challenges to the PSC determination in evidentiary terms (e.g., “substantial evidence," “insufficient evidence,” "no evidence”), those challenges actually involve pure questions of statutory interpretation applied to undisputed facts.
. As we did in Williams I and Williams II, the majority states that Williams has exhausted his administrative remedies. Actually, the retirement statute makes the complained-of PSC ruling, like all of the Fund’s rulings, final without then providing for administrative remedies to exhaust. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(l), § 2(j) (Vernon 2003); id.., art. 6243e.2(l), § 12(a) (Vernon 2003). The statute then allows judicial review of such final rulings upon the occurrence of a triggering event: eligibility for retirement or disability. See id. § 12(a). Therefore, Williams did not technically exhaust administrative remedies, though he did obtain a final ruling.
. These include the power to "(1) adopt for the administration of the fund written rules and guidelines not inconsistent with this Act; (2) construe all provisions of this Act ...; (3) correct any defect, supply any omission, and reconcile any inconsistency that may appear in this Act in a manner and to the extent that the board considers expedient to administer this Act for the greatest benefit of all members; (4) select, employ, and compensate such employees as the board considers necessary or advisable in the proper and efficient administration of the fund; (5) determine all questions relating to eligibility for participation, service, or benefits or relating to the administration of the fund for the purpose of promoting the uniform administration of the fund for the benefit of all members; and (6) establish and maintain all records as are necessary or appropriate to the proper administration of the fund." Former Tex Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann art. 6243e.2, § (2)(j) (emphasis added); see also Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(l), § 2(p) (Vernon 2003) (providing for similar powers).
. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. §§ 17.41-.50 (Vernon 2002).
. Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 639, § 11, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2185, 2191, amended by Act of May 18, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 155, § 5, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 313, 317, repealed & codified by Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch.’ 1421, § 5, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 4936, 4936-37, amended by Act of May 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., H.B. 3507, § 14A.605(a) (to appear at Tex Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.151) (emphasis added). Texas Revised Civil Statute article 4413(36) was repealed and codified in the Texas Occupations Code effective June 1, 2003. For simplicity’s sake, I refer to all versions of any section of superseded article 4413(36) that were effective at the time of either Subaru opinion as "former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4413(36), § —,” generally without further citation to session law.
. The Court also considered the Code's limited review provisions, the board’s inability to award damages, and the Code’s purpose in holding that the board did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s common-law and DTPA claims. See Subaru, 44 Tex. S.Ct. J. at 784-85, 2001 WL 578337. Those considerations are not particularly applicable to Williams’s challenges against the Fund, which are not based on the common law or the DTPA.
. Act of May 18, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 155, § 5, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 313, 317, repealed. & codified by Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1421, § 5, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 4936, 4936-37, amended by Act of May 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., H.B. 3507, § 14A.605(a) (to appear at Tex. OccCode Ann. § 2301.151) (emphasis added).
. One difference that I find immaterial is that Subaru concerned exhaustion of administrative remedies, while this case does not. A statute that requires one to exhaust administrative remedies to obtain a final ruling before seeking court review {Subaru's situation) is analogous to a statute requiring one to wait for a triggering event, despite having obtained a final agency ruling, before seeking court review (Williams’s situation). Both types of statutes allow judicial review after certain prerequisites are met. And the rationale underlying the requirements in either situation is the same: the sovereign may generally not be sued without its consent, i.e., without a statute that provides a means for review. See Helton, No. 01-01-01007-CV, slip op. at 8, at -; Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Schutz, 101 S.W.3d 512, 522 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet. h.).
. See former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, § (2)(j); see also Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1), § 2(p); former Tex.Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4413(36), § 3.01(a); id. §§ 3.03-.06 (granting board broad powers, general and enumerated; including power to issue rules and to make conclusions of law).
. See, e.g., former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4413(36), § 1.02 (establishing as Code’s purposes to ensure sound distribution and selling system through licensing and regulation and to prevent fraud, discrimination, and other abuses through Code’s enforcement); id. § 3.02 (establishing board’s duties); id. §§ 4.01-.07, 5.01-.05 (providing for detailed regulation of governed entities, establishing requisites for licenses, making certain conduct by or between governed entities unlawful, etc.); id. §§ 6.01-07 (providing for enforcement of matters governed by the Code).
. However, I do note that the Legislature often — if not usually. — expressly employs the term “exclusive” when it wishes to grant exclusive jurisdiction to an agency. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 43.052(a) (Vernon 2002); id. § 43.102(b) (Vernon 2002); id. § 43.153(a) (Vernon 2002); Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 30.022(h) (Vernon 1996); id. § 30.052(h) (Vernon 1996); Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 232.096(d) (Vernon Supp.2003); Tex. Nat. Res.Code Ann. § 131.022 (Vernon 2001); id. § 134.012(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 2001); Tex. Occ.Code Ann. § 2301.354 (Vernon Supp. 2003); Tex Transp. Code Ann § 61.006 (Vernon 1999); id. § 62.024 (Vernon 1999); id. § 62.067 (Vernon 1999); id. § 66.015 (Vernon 1999); id. § 67.015 (Vernon 1999); id. § 68.015 (Vernon 1999); id. § 70.015 (Vernon 1999); id. § 366.171(d), (e) (Vernon 1999); Tex. Util.Code Ann. § 32.001(a)(1), (2), (b) (Vernon 1998); id. § 33.002(b) (Vernon 1998); id. § 41.055 (Vernon Supp.2003); id. § 52.002(a) (Vernon 1998); id. § 60.002(a) (Vernon 1998); id. § 60.122 (Vernon 1998); id. § 102.001(a), (b) (Vernon 1998); id. § 103.003(a) (Vernon Supp.2003); id. § 104.201(a) (Vernon 1998); Tex Water Code Ann. § 13.042(a), (b), (e) (Vernon 2000); id. § 36.011(b) (Vernon Supp.2003); id. § 51.027(a) (Vernon 2000); id. § 51.049(a) (Vernon 2000); id. § 56.249(e) (Vernon 2002); id. § 58.027(a) (Vernon Supp.2003); id. § 62.028(a) (Vernon 1988); id. § 63.030(a) (Vernon 1988); former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4413(36), § 3.01(a); id. § 5.01(4).
. See Grounds v. Tolar, 707 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. 1986) (recognizing exception, but not applying it because question was not one of pure law, and for other reasons distinguishing the case from the one currently under review); City of Austin v. Pendergrass, 18 S.W.3d 261, 264-65 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (recognizing and applying exception); Frasier v. Yarns, 9 S.W.3d 422, 427 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (same); Hicks v. Lamar Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 943 S.W.2d 540, 542-43 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, no writ) (recognizing exception, but not applying it because fact issues existed); Mercedes Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Munoz, 941 S.W.2d 215, 216-18 (same); Jones v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 872 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) (same); Tex. Dept. of Health v. Tex. Health Enters., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 498, 508 (Tex.App.Dallas 1993, writ denied) (recognizing and applying exception), overruled on other grounds by Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.1997); Int’l Union of United Auto. Aerospace & Agrie. Implement Workers of Am. Local 119 v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 558, 566 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (same); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Houston Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415, 715 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986) (recognizing exception, but not applying it because fact issues existed), rev’d on other grounds, 730 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1987); see also Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 647-48 (Tex. 1987) (Kilgarin, J., concurring, joined by Wallace, J.) (recognizing exception); Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 471 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (noting exception in dictum); cf. Cooper v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (holding that complaining party could assert statutory-construction in suit for judicial review, despite not having presented that argument in administrative proceedings because, "the need for exhaustion administrative remedies has generally been held inapplicable to questions of law”); Pension Bd. of Police Officers Pension Sys. of Houston v. Colson, 492 S.W.2d 307, 308-09 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d, n.r.e.) (recognizing, in dictum, exception in support of holding that substantial-evidence review did not apply because agency action involved pure question of law). As explained in footnote 9, above, the fact that these courts applied the exception in the context of exhaustion of administrative remedies supports by analogy the exception’s application here.
. See, e.g., Hicks, 943 S.W.2d at 542, 543; Munoz, 941 S.W.2d at 216, 218; Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415, 715 S.W.2d at 370-71; cf. Colson, 492 S.W.2d at 308-09.
. That the Fund would take this position is understandable. Williams's PSC request was decided, and a final order rendered on it, before the current retirement statute was enacted. The amended statute added eligibility requirements for obtaining PSC. Had Williams's PSC request been pending when the Legislature amended the statute, one might have argued that Williams had to comply with the revised legislative prerequisites for obtaining PSC. But that did not happen, and the amended statute was never applied to Williams's PSC request.
. Again, that the Fund has never taken this position is understandable, given its other consistent position that the guidelines did not make new law, but instead comported with then-existing law. Indeed, an admission that the guidelines changed the law — if that change was inconsistent with the former retirement statute — might also have been an admission that the Fund had violated the power granted to it to adopt "guidelines not inconsistent with this Act.” See former Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2, § (2)(j)(l) (emphasis added); see also id. § (2)(j)(3) (delegating the Fund power to "correct any defect, supply any omission, and reconcile any inconsistency” in retirement statute, which language implies that Fund’s actions must be consistent with statute).
. The same observation can be made concerning the Fund, for that matter, because Williams’s summary judgment evidence indicates that the Fund proposed the bill that became the current retirement statute. If former section 30(a) had already said what the Fund interpreted it to say in the guidelines, the Fund would not have needed the Legislature to amend former section 30(a) to conform with the guidelines.
. Moreover, even if former section 30’s predecessor had said what the Fund claims, the fact that the Legislature dropped the predecessor's pertinent language when it enacted former section 30 would, if anything, have evidenced an intent not to carry forward the predecessor’s meaning.
. By reaching the merits of Williams’s constitutional challenges and common-law claims, the majority effectively concludes that those challenges and claims are ripe, although its reasoning is unexpressed. I agree for reasons of my own. Our holding in Williams II that Williams's common-law claims were unripe was based on our earlier holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over any of his challenges to the adoption of the guidelines and the PSC determination until he was eligible to retire or was disabled. Because I would hold that the trial court presently had jurisdiction to interpret the former retirement statute's PSC provision, I would further hold that the trial court erred to the extent that it granted summary judgment against the common-law claims on the ground of ripeness.
. I reach Williams’s challenges to the individual trustees’ three remaining affirmative defenses because my disposition of them determines whether I concur with or dissent from the majority’s judgment.
.The Fund and the trustees offered an argument here and below as to why their interpretation of the former retirement statute’s PSC provision was reasonable, but did not produce evidence in support. They argued that their interpretation was objectively reasonable given the language of the former retirement statute and of its predecessor, i.e., that a reasonable trustee might in good faith have interpreted the former retirement statute’s PSC provision as they did in the guidelines, based on the statute’s plain language. However, none of the affidavits submitted in support of this argument even stated the basis for the trustees’ interpretation, much less why a reasonable trustee in their shoes might objectively have thought that such an interpretation was reasonable. The majority construes the affidavits as testimony by the trustees that “they believed their conduct to be lawful in light of the powers conferred on them by the retirement statute....” I do not read the affidavits that way, but even if I did, that reading would still not explain how a reasonable trustee might objectively have believed the conduct lawful.
. See id., 153 Tex. 101, 264 S.W.2d 425 (1954).
. Of course, most of this stipulated evidence went beyond objective good faith and into the realm of subjective good faith. But the point is that the evidence was tailored to the plaintiff’s allegations.
. The majority claims that my position would hold public officials liable “unless they prove [that] their motives are pure”; would make public officials personally liable simply “for getting [statutory] interpretation wrong”; and would establish a subjective standard of good faith. My position does none of these things. I would require nothing more than what Chambers does in the context of summary judgment: proof (not merely argument) that a reasonably prudent trustee (an objective *456standard) might have believed (not subjectively believed) that his actions in adopting the guidelines and determining the PSC request were reasonable and lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information then possessed by the trustee. If the trustees' affidavits had shown something along these lines— a relatively easy standard — then the fact that they got the interpretation wrong would not have deprived them of the defense of official immunity.
. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.2003).
. Because Williams has not argued otherwise on appeal or below, I assume without deciding for purposes of my discussion that an interlocutory order rendered for the Fund could trigger section 101.106’s application, despite some case law to the contrary. See Lowe v. Teator, 1 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.App.Dallas 1999, pet. denied); Johnson v. Resendez, 993 S.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 52 S.W.3d 689 (Tex.2001) (noting that no conflicts jurisdiction existed on this issue).
. I note that we neither held nor implied in Williams I that the trustees were performing quasi-judicial determinations that might entitle them to absolute judicial immunity. See id., slip op. at 10.
. The Fund and the trustees also relied on TTCA section 101.053, which exempts certain claims against governmental entities from the TTCA’s waiver of immunity when the claim is based on, among other things, a judicial function of a governmental unit. See Tex. Ctv. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.053(a) (Vernon 1997). Section 101.053 has no application in this suit because Williams asserted his com*458mon-law claims against only the trustees in their individual capacities, not against the Fund.
. Cleavinger and Butz involved constitutional wrongs, not torts such as those here. However, Williams argued without objection here and below that Cleavinger and Butz applied, and Texas courts have applied the general judicial-immunity principles from federal civil-rights cases to tort claims in state court.
See Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777, 785 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (concluding that no reason existed not to apply the basic derived-judicial-immunity principles from federal opinions concerning civil-rights violations to state-court tort claims).
. And I note that several of the Cleavinger and Butz factors appear to weigh against absolute judicial immunity for the trustees, giv*459en, among other things, that the Texas Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the Fund’s decisions and that none of the trustees is required to be a professional and independent hearing officer or administrative law judge. See & compare Blitz, 438 U.S. at 513-14, 98 S.Ct. at 2914-15; Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 203-04, 106 S.Ct. at 502.
. The Fund and the trustees also relied on TTCA section 101.052, which exempts certain claims against governmental entities from the TTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity when the claim is based on, among other things, the legislative functions of a governmental unit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.052 (Vernon 1997). Section 101.052 does not apply in this suit because Williams asserted his common-law claims against only the trustees in their individual capacities, not against the Fund.