dissenting.
The State of Texas, acting through the Prosecutors Coordinating Council, filed a petition to remove Oscar B. McInnis from his office of Criminal District Attorney. In 1978, while the removal suit was pending, Mclnnis was reelected for a second term. After his reelection, McInnis filed a motion to dismiss the removal suit. The motion to dismiss was based on article 5986, which provides, “No officer in this State shall be removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to office.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5986 (Vernon 1962). The removal suit was dismissed, the dismissal order stating that “all claimed acts, behavior and conduct set out or alleged . . . occurred, according to the said pleadings of the State, prior to the election of Oscar B. Mclnnis to office for the term commencing January 1, 1979.”
On appeal to the court of civil appeals, the State urged that article 5986 prevents an official’s removal for misconduct only when there is a showing that the official’s election constituted a public “forgiveness” of the alleged acts of misconduct. The court of civil appeals agreed, and held that because there had been no showing that the acts were “forgivable” or that the public was aware of them at the time of Mclnnis’ reelection, the trial court’s dismissal order *184was erroneous. The State’s removal suit was remanded for trial on the merits.
In our first opinion, which has now been withdrawn, this court stated that article 5986 prevents removal if the alleged acts of misconduct occurred before election. Because Mclnnis had established that all acts alleged had occurred before his reelection, dismissal of the proceedings against Mcln-nis was held to be correct. We withdrew that opinion to consider the State’s contention on motion for rehearing that article 5986 is inapplicable to these proceedings.
Article 5, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution provides that county officers may be removed by district judges for “incompetency, official misconduct, habitual drunkenness, or other causes defined by law . . . .” The cause for removal must be set forth in writing and determined by a jury trial. Tex.Const. Art. 5, § 24. The legislature has enacted article 5970 and other statutes to deal more specifically with removal of county officers. These removal statutes apply to district and county attorneys. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5970 et seq. (Vernon 1962). Article 5986 prohibits removal for acts committed before election to office. It has been construed to bar removal of a reelected official for misconduct occurring during a prior term. See Reeves v. State, 114 Tex. 296, 267 S.W. 666, 669 (1925). In 1977, the legislature enacted article 332d, creating the Texas Prosecutors Coordinating Council. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 332d (Vernon Supp.1980) Section 10 of article 332d deals with reprimand, disqualification, and removal from office of prosecuting attorneys. The relevant subsections provide:
“(d) A prosecuting attorney shall be suspended from office when:
“(1) he has been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in the State of Texas, whether through trial or upon agreement;
“(2) he has been found guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction of any felony or any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude;
“(3) a finding of incompetency or misconduct following a trial on the merits of a petition for removal.
“(e) A prosecuting attorney shall be removed from office upon final adjudication or conviction for any cause of action which was the basis for his suspension.”
Id. § 10. The procedure as well as the grounds for disciplinary proceedings is set out in the statute. Like removal under article 5970, removal of prosecutors under article 332d requires a trial on the merits before a district judge. The removal provisions of article 332d contain no provision similar to article 5986. Article 332d is silent on whether a prosecuting attorney may be removed for acts committed before election.
In its motion for rehearing in this court, the State’s primary contention is that article 5986 does not apply to this removal suit because it was brought under article 332d, and not under article 5970. According to the State, article 332d is a comprehensive plan, under which the Prosecutors Coordinating Council is empowered to remove prosecuting attorneys, and impliedly repeals article 5986 with respect to these removal proceedings. I cannot agree because I am unable to find any expression of legislative intent that article 332d repeals article 5986 and because I do not find that article 332d operates as a complete replacement of existing law dealing with removal of prosecuting attorneys.
I note that article 332d has no provisions of repeal of existing law, and begin with the principle that “ ‘all statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law . and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts.’ ” McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1942). A new statute “should be so construed that its *185operation will harmonize with existing laws, unless a contrary intention is clearly manifested by its provisions.” Freels v. Walker, 120 Tex. 291, 26 S.W.2d 627, 630 (1930), on rehearing, 35 S.W.2d 408 (1931). Accordingly, article 5986 continues in effect, barring removal of district attorneys for acts committed before election, unless it is shown that the legislature intended otherwise when it enacted article 332d or that the necessary effect of article 332d is to repeal article 5986.
Whether, in the absence of specific and express repeal, an existing statute continues to be applicable after the enactment of a new statute dealing with the same subject was discussed in Gordon v. Lake, 163 Tex. 392, 356 S.W.2d 138 (1962). This court stated, “Repeals by implication are not favored and laws relating to the same subject should be considered as though incorporated in the same act. If they can be harmonized and effect given to each when so considered, there is no repeal by implication.” Id. at 139. “If the later statute reasonably admits of a construction which will allow effect to the older law and still leave an ample field for its own operation, a total repugnance cannot be said to exist, and therefore an implied repeal does not result, since in such case both may stand and perform a distinct office.” Cole v. State, 106 Tex. 472, 170 S.W. 1036, 1037 (1914). See Flowers v. Pecos River Ry. Co., 138 Tex. 18, 156 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1941); General Elevator Corp. v. Champion Papers, 590 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n. r. e.). When there is no inconsistency between the earlier and later laws, repeal by implication occurs only if a later enactment “embrace[s] all the law upon the subject with which it deals” and is clearly intended as a complete replacement for former law. Motor Investment Co. v. City of Hamlin, 142 Tex. 486, 179 S.W.2d 278 (1944).
Applying these rules of construction, I would hold that article 332d was not intended to repeal article 5986. While I agree with the State that article 332d provides a comprehensive plan for regulating the conduct of prosecuting attorneys, I cannot ignore the fact that article 332d contains no provisions expressing an intent to repeal existing statutes. The presumption against an implied repeal of article 5986 is not outweighed by either the language of article 332d or evidence of legislative intent. Article 5986 and article 332d are easily harmonized. The removal provisions of article 332d define the nature of' misconduct that constitutes grounds for removal, but are silent on when the misconduct must occur. Therefore, the application of article 5986, prohibiting removal for acts committed before election, is not inconsistent with article 332d. Nor is the application of article 5986 to article 332d removal proceedings inconsistent with the expressed legislative purpose in enacting article 332d. Article 332d creates the Prosecutors Coordinating Council as a “centralized agency” and seeks “to improve the administration of criminal justice through professionalization of the prosecuting attorney’s office.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 332d, § 1 (Vernon Supp.1980). The Council is authorized to initiate and pursue disciplinary proceedings. Applying article 5986 to such proceedings gives effect to a legislative policy that seeks to protect the people’s right to choose, through the election process, the public officers they feel will best serve them. To this end, the legislature enacted article 5986, which limits the authority of a district judge to remove county officials by absolutely prohibiting removal for acts occurring before the official’s election.
This case is distinguishable from cases holding that a subsequent enactment is a complete substitute for a prior scheme dealing with the same subject. In many cases, the courts have noted the inclusion of a general repeal clause in the later enactment. Such a clause “evinces that the Legislature had in mind that something was to be repealed,” and “the courts will be less, inclined against recognizing repugnancy in applying such statutes.” Commercial Credit Co. v. American Manufacturing Co., 155 S.W.2d 834, 839 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1941, writ ref’d); see Motor Investment Co. v. City of Hamlin, supra 179 S.W.2d at 281; *186First National Bank v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 274 S.W. 127, 131 (Tex.Comm’n App.-1925, judgment adopted); State v. Dancer, 391 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Other cases have found implied repeal of existing law as a necessary effect because of unwarranted cumulative duties or penalties that would result if the prior law remained effective. See St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Kay, 85 Tex. 558, 22 S.W. 665, 666 (1893); Commercial Credit Co. v. American Manufacturing Co., 155 S.W.2d 834, supra at 839.
I would be compelled to hold, therefore, that article 5986 continues to be applicable to proceedings to remove district attorneys for misconduct, even when those proceedings are brought under article 332d.1 I would also hold that the court of civil appeals incorrectly held that article 5986 is limited by the requirement that the acts of misconduct must be known to the public at the time of reelection. The rule applied by the court of civil appeals is a judicial doctrine known as the “forgiveness doctrine.” It was recognized in several Texas cases dealing with removal of district judges in constitutionally authorized proceedings to which article 5986 does not apply. In the absence of a statutory guideline such as article 5986, the “forgiveness doctrine” is similar to article 5986 but is limited by the requirements that the misconduct be “for-giveable” and that the public was aware of the misconduct at the time of the election. See In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. 183, 265 S.W.2d 805, 808 (1954); Matter of Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.1977); Matter of Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.1976); In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.1974).
Unlike the cases to remove district judges, this case is a statutory removal proceeding to which article 5986 applies. On its face, article 5986 does not contain the limitations of the judicial “forgiveness doctrine,” such as the requirement of public knowledge. Although the public interest might be better served by the addition of the “forgiveness” principles to article 5986, amendment of the statute is the function of the legislature and not the judiciary. A recent court of civil appeals’ decision, in a suit to remove a county attorney under article .5970, held that article 5986 must be applied according to its express language. Thus, the county attorney could not be removed for alleged acts of misconduct committed before his reelection. State v. Knorpp, 575 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The fact that the removal proceedings against Meln-nis were brought by the Prosecutors Coordinating Council under article 332d does not compel a different result, article 5986 being applicable in both cases.
I would conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the suit to remove Mcln-nis.
GREENHILL, C. J., and BARROW and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this dissent.
. The applicability of article 5986 to removal proceedings for preelection acts resulting in disbarment would present a different question. Failure to maintain the qualifications for office may also be grounds for removal of a district attorney. See Phagan v. State, 510 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ refd n. r. e.).