dissenting.
Without careful examination of the Constitution and statutes of the State of Texas, the majority determines that a trial court may, through its constitutional habeas corpus powers, order a Court of Appeals to hear an appeal which, under existing law, it has no authority or jurisdiction to hear. To give such authority to the trial courts of this State does indeed “turn a segment of our criminal justice system on its head.” The invitation which the majority today issues to the trial courts of this State to interfere with the jurisdiction of our Courts of Appeals will certainly be accepted by many well intentioned trial judges.
I believe we are all in agreement that Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., is totally inapplicable to this situation. Likewise, I believe we all recognize that, to a limited extent, the district courts of this State have certain constitutional authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. However, neither the statutes contained in Chapter 11 of our Code of Criminal Procedure, nor Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution, which defines the jurisdictional limitations of the district courts, provide for a hearing or an order as was entered by the trial court in this instance. Not only was the trial court in this case without jurisdiction to issue the order entered, the majority fails to recognize that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which should be exercised with extreme caution and only in situations where the law requires the intervention of our jurisdiction.
Mandamus will lie only in situations where the respondent has a ministerial duty to act and where no other adequate remedy at law is available to the petitioner. The majority asserts that petitioner has no other adequate remedy at law because the time for appeal has expired. Such assertion ignores the fact that at the time the Court of Appeals in El Paso dismissed the purported appeal petitioner failed to file a petition for discretionary review to this Court within the time limits prescribed. Instead, petitioner sought ha-beas relief in the district court and, though he may be entitled to an out-of-time appeal, with the help of this Court, has forged a new remedy heretofore unknown to the jurisprudence of this State.
Even today, petitioner has an adequate remedy of law. That remedy at law is the only remedy that is available and is the one which this Court should require: an original habeas corpus application in this Court. In examining Chapter 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitution of the State of Texas and the case law which has developed, it is clear to me that this Court, and only this Court, has the authority to grant relief to this petitioner.
In summary, mandamus does not lie because there is an adequate remedy at law. Secondly, petitioner has failed to exercise the adequate remedy at law which was available to him at the time the Court of Appeals dismissed his purported appeal. To allow a trial court to dictate the jurisdiction of a superior court flies in the face of the orderly administration of justice and as such should not be tolerated. If this Court *563is of the opinion that new remedies should be created, it is not within our constitutional purview to create them. As I write today, the Texas Legislature, whose responsibility it is under our Constitution to provide such guidance, is in session. It is there that the changes should be made. For this Court to continue to usurp a legislative function should not be countenanced.
The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing this petitioner’s purported appeal and was correct in refusing to file the record of an out-of-time appeal which was ordered by the trial court. Although the petitioner’s contentions may have merit, to disregard our Texas Constitution and to establish a remedy which flies in the face of the separation of powers provisions of our Texas Constitution is to abandon the rule of law.
If Ex parte Renter, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), was wrongly decided, then it is the duty of the majority to overrule it rather than to follow blindly our previous mistakes. Today this Court has an opportunity to bring order out of the chaos that we have created. Instead, the majority chooses to compound the problem by creating a new, court-made remedy which can lead our judicial processes into deeper disarray.
By today’s opinion, the majority attempts to shirk the constitutional responsibilities that are vested in this Court and create a new remedy which may alleviate part of our already burdened docket. But such is not our function. It is the duty of this Court to operate within the confines of the Constitution of our great State and within the statutes that have been constitutionally written by our Texas Legislature. To allow the procedure that has been here created to become law may well save us from the obligation of addressing original habe-as corpus in many instances, but it will not do justice to the system that bears that name.
I must, therefore, for the reasons expressed, dissent to the action that the majority takes today.
WHITE, J., joins this dissent.