OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
ONION, Presiding Judge.This is an appeal from a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder charged in the indictment. The jury assessed punishment at 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of $10,-000.00.
On appeal the appellant inter alia raised the contentions that the trial court erred in overruling his amended motion for new trial because he had shown the jury received “other evidence” in violation of Article 40.-03(7), V.A.C.C.P., and had shown the jury engaged in “misconduct” in violation of Article 40.03(8), V.A.C.C.P.
On appeal the conviction was affirmed by the Dallas Court of Appeals in a panel opinion written by Justice Allen. See Monroe v. State, 644 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1978).
The Court of Appeals held the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in overruling the new trial motion on ground the jury received “other evidence” concerning length of time the appellant would actually serve on any given sentence, in that once such expressions were stated, the jury foreman immediately admonished the jurors they were not to discuss that, and statements made were fairly accurate *451statements of the parole law. The Court of Appeals further held there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial on ground of “misconduct” in discussing parole laws during deliberations in that no “discussion” of parole laws ensued, there was no showing of more than one vote on punishment, and mere mention of parole drew immediate admonition of jury foreman that it was not a proper consideration and would not be discussed. In so holding, the Court of Appeals distinguished Munroe v. State, 637 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), on the facts.
In his petition for discretionary review appellant contends the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with Munroe and the determination that no “discussion” occurred during jury deliberations on the issue of punishment was unsupported by the record. We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
Justice Allen in his opinion for the Dallas Court of Appeals discussed the evidence developed at hearing on the motion for new trial as follows:
“... Three jurors testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial. The jury foreman, Noel Pittman, in his testimony estimated that during the jury deliberation on punishment the length of time appellant would have to serve in the Texas Department of Corrections on any sentence assessed was mentioned on two or three occasions. He testified that on each occasion he said to the jury that ‘the court had specifically proscribed such discussions and that we would not discuss that.’ A second juror, Allen Cros-land, testified that he recalled a couple of times during deliberation on punishment it was mentioned that the defendant would serve approximately one-third of the time assessed. Juror Crosland testified further that the jury foreman reminded the jury that they were not to talk about the length of time the defendant would serve for any sentence given but were to concern themselves with the specific number of years they were to assess as punishment. He testified that no juror mentioned any particular case with which he or she was familiar. He remembered the foreman’s admonishing the jury a ‘couple of times’ that they were not to consider the length of time a defendant would serve on any given sentence. He further testified that statements were made two or three times during the deliberations on punishment with regard to the length of time a defendant would have to serve on a given sentence.
“The third juror to testify was Sharon L. Tharp. She testified that statements were made two or three times during the deliberations on punishment with regard to the length of time a defendant would have to serve on a given sentence. She remembered a mention of the statements that ‘seven months equaled a year,’ and ‘if he is a good prisoner, he will be off in a third of his sentence.’ She testified that one juror mentioned a case where the defendant served less than the sentence given. She testified that the jury foreman instructed the individuals who made the statements that their statements were not within the realm of that which they were instructed to discuss in the jury room. She testified that the statements were not discussed. When asked if she relied on the statements as being accurate she first answered, ‘No.’ In answer to a similar question she answered, ‘Well, I don’t know.’ When the prosecutor persisted in propounding the same question in different ways, the witness testified that she did rely on the statements as being true and that the statements affected her verdict. The witness admitted that she possessed a general knowledge of the parole laws before appearing for jury service. The statement made which she claimed had affected her verdict was, ‘That he would serve only a third of the time assessed.’ She further testified that she knew that the jury was not supposed to consider the parole situation. She testified that she did consider the parole situation be*452cause somebody had to compromise. Juror Tharp told the trial judge that if the statements about parole had not been made she would have held out for a different verdict and would never have gone with the maximum sentence.
“Appellant contends that the statements made during jury deliberations concerning good time and early release required the trial court to grant a new trial upon it being shown that Juror Tharp relied on the statements. The evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion for new trial proved that parole was mentioned two or three times during jury deliberation at the penalty phase of the trial. Each time it was mentioned before the verdict was reached, the jury foreman admonished the jury that the court had instructed them that they were not to consider the length of time one would serve on any sentence imposed and that they were not going to discuss that subject. No juror professed to know the law. The proof shows that no discussion was held on the statements made. Based on this evidence we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial so as to require reversal of the cause by this court.”
Since the time of the decision in question, this Court has laid down a five-prong test to determine if a jury’s discussion of parole laws results in reversible error.
In Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), this Court stated:
“After further consideration, we readopt the five-prong test gleaned from pre-Heredia cases.
“To show that a jury’s discussion of the parole law constitutes reversible error, it must be shown that there was
“ '(1) a misstatement of the law
“ ‘(2) asserted as a fact
“ ‘(3) by one professing to know the law
“ ‘(4) which is relied upon by other jurors
“ ‘(5) who for that reason changed their vote to a harsher punishment.’
“Such test shall apply to cases under §§ 7 or 8 of Article 43.03, supra. All cases to the contrary are now overruled.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying this test to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.