concurring.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I would have dismissed Sabot’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
Sabot’s “NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT AS APPEL[L]ATE PROCEDURE RULE # 11 RECORD APPEAL” states:
1. Plaintiff Nancy Sabot did not receive a fair trial before a fair and impartial judge and or jury.
2. Plaintiff makes this appeal as the injured party who is on disability.
3. Plaintiff here makes demand for all or anu [sic] rights under Supreme Court rules of appel[l]ate procedure and so informs this low or in [crossed off] District Court: As they pertain to bond, transcript, or partial transcript.
4. Plaintiff here informs one and all she here orders from Cass County District Court Administrator a complete copy of civil case No. 89-91 transcript and five copies. Complete copies of this appeal, transcript order, notice of service to NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CLERK, COURT ADMINISTRATOR and attorney’s for the defendants.
Joint Appendix, p. 165. A document entitled “SUPPLEMENTARY TO NOTICE OF APPEAL” states:
1) The Plaintiff asks the Supreme Court according to rule 2 of appel[l]ate procedure, that because this plaintiff is not a lawyer they suspend any rules that she may misunderstand or break *895until she is able to retain legal counsel to resume legal matters on this case.
2) The Plaintiff asks according to Rule lOd of appel[l]ate procedure that the trial court extend the time to obtain and deliver the transcript to the Supreme Court. The plaintiff asks for the full 90 days at this point in time. If denied by the trial court plaintiff request[s] additional time be granted to her by the Supreme Court.
Joint Appendix, p. 167. The Rules of Appellate Procedure are not to be applied differently because the party is acting pro se. Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 470 N.W.2d 230, 231 (N.D.1991). Accordingly, Sabot’s notice of appeal is to be considered no differently than had it been drafted by an attorney.
The right of appeal in North Dakota is governed by statute, and is a jurisdictional matter which the Supreme Court will consider sua sponte. Vorachek v. Citizens’ State Bank of Lankin, 421 N.W.2d 45, 49 (N.D.1988). See also North Dakota Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 6. Appeals are authorized from judgments. Section 28-27-01, N.D.C.C. Appeals to the Supreme Court may also be taken from several specified orders. Section 28-27-02, N.D.C.C. The Supreme Court has a duty to dismiss an appeal if the attempted appeal fails for lack of jurisdiction, even where the only defect is in the content of the notice of appeal specifying what judgment is being appealed. Bye v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n., 422 N.W.2d 397, 399 (N.D.1988).
Examining the notice of appeal and the “supplementary” to the notice of appeal it appears that the only complaint directed toward the trial court was that “Plaintiff Nancy Sabot did not receive a fair trial before a fair and impartial judge and or jury.” There was no designation that the appeal was being taken from the judgment or from a court order. Rule 3(c), N.D.R.App.P., requires that the notice of appeal designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from. Although if the notice of appeal only cites an unappealable order for judgment, but the record contains a judgment consistent with the order, the appeal will be considered in the interests of justice, Olson v. Job Service North Dakota, 379 N.W.2d 285, 287 (N.D.1985), here there is no specific order or judgment stated from which an appeal may be taken.
The content of the notice of appeal is a factor in determining whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. The Supreme Court previously held that it lacked jurisdiction where a party appealed from orders denying a motion for summary judgment and granting the opposing party’s motion for summary judgment but where the party did not appeal from the judgment itself. First Nat. Bank of Hettinger v. Dangerud, 316 N.W.2d 102, 103 (N.D.1982). (Olson, supra, effectively reversed this holding, but, as noted above, Olson does not apply to the present facts.) The order for summary judgment in Dangerud was held to be an intermediate order which is not appealable. Id. at 104. Because the notice of appeal did not state an appealable order, the Supreme Court held that it was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id. However, the Supreme Court also noted that the notice of appeal must be served within 60 days of the judgment, and upon a showing of excusable neglect the trial court may extend the time by an additional 30 days. Id., see also Rule 4(a), N.D.R.App.P.
Although the notice of appeal is defective by not stating an appealable order, which deprives the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, it is the greater 90-day limit which should ultimately determine the action. Bye v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n., supra, 422 N.W.2d at 399. Where the Supreme Court was presented with a notice of appeal that was filed after the 60-day initial-filing period, but within the 30-day period in which the trial court could find excusable neglect, the case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of excusable neglect under Rule 4(a), N.D.R.App.P. Dehn v. Otter Tail Power Co., 248 N.W.2d 851, 856 (N.D. 1976).
Here, there was a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in the alternative, for a new trial, which was denied on 4 June 1992. Joint Appendix, p. 34. *896Sabot’s attorney on this appeal was representing her at least by IB August 1992 as noted in the trial court’s order extending time to file transcripts. Joint Appendix, p. 170.1 Therefore, Sabot had an attorney during the 30-day period in which the trial court could grant an extension of time to file, the notice of appeal under Dehn, supra. There is nothing in the record indicating that a motion for an extension of time to file a proper notice of appeal or, rather, to amend the notice of appeal, was ever made. Sabot’s counsel notes only that the 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal from the 4 June 1992 order had run, and makes no argument or even mention of the additional 30 days in which an extension could have been granted. Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 1.
The Supreme Court has often chosen to overlook a failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, especially when the records and briefs on the merits are filed and the case is ready to be heard, Appeal of Dickinson Nursing Center, 353 N.W.2d 754, 756 (N.D.1984), or when a missing document was prepared by the opposing party and filed with the court, Matter of Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894 (N.D.1983). However, the Supreme Court has also stated:
We have repeatedly warned that all appellate rules must be complied with_ The rules must be treated respectfully, and we do not intend our admonitions to be treated as “empty noise.”
[[Image here]]
Raketti, supra, 340 N.W.2d at 898 [citations omitted]. Here the appellant did not comply with Rule 3(c), N.D.R.App.P., and made no attempt to cure this defect even after obtaining an attorney. See State v. Freed, 340 N.W.2d 172, 175 (N.D.1983).
The question of prejudice to the opposing party has been viewed as the first question to be asked where a party has failed to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Freed, supra. This has been the common element in cases where a proce-
dural defect was overlooked by the Supreme Court, although often left unstated. See Raketti, supra; Dickinson Nursing Center, supra. Although any prejudice to the appellees caused by the appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 3(c), N.D.R.App.P., is difficult to assess after the appellees have won the case on the merits, the fact remains that this is a jurisdictional issue which should not be treated lightly. See Vorachek, supra; Bye, supra.
. Sabot’s attorney states that he became Sabot’s attorney on 12 August 1992. Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 1.