Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) to defendant based on a determination that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations, MCL 600.5838(2); MSA 27A.5838(2).1 We affirm.
This Court was previously presented with this case in Levinson v Sklar, 181 Mich App 693; 449 NW2d 682 (1989), where a panel of this Court remanded for either a jury trial or an evidentiary hearing, at the trial court’s option, to determine whether plaintiff Betty Levinson (hereinafter plaintiff) discovered or should have discovered her *112medical malpractice claim more than six months before the complaint was filed. An evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court initially determined that plaintiffs discovery of the action fell within the six-month period and so was not barred by the statute of limitations. On rehearing, however, the trial court decided that it had improperly applied the subjective standard in reaching that conclusion, and reversed its earlier decision.
First, we disagree with plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion for rehearing. MCR 2.119(F)(3); Smith v Sinai Hosp of Detroit, 152 Mich App 716, 722-723; 394 NW2d 82 (1986).
Second, we disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court improperly applied an objective standard in resolving, the six-month discovery issue. The express language of the statute of limitations makes this inquiry two-faceted: the court must determine whether plaintiff commenced the action within six months after (1) she discovered or (2) should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever was earlier. The standard to be applied to the first prong is necessarily subjective, i.e., the answer to this question lies in the mind of plaintiff: did she discover the claim? However, the standard to be applied to the second prong of the question is objective, i.e., would a reasonable person in plaintiffs circumstances have discovered the claim? The disposition of this case hinges on the answer to the second part of the question.
In this regard, the trial court properly concluded that a reasonable person would have realized that defendant had failed to diagnose her earlier, and would have had reason to believe that his treatment of her was in some way improper. Kermizian v Sumcad, 188 Mich App 690, 694; 470 NW2d 500 *113(1991). Plaintiffs subjective beliefs do not change the fact that she had reason to know of her claim approximately one year before actually filing suit, whether she actually knew or not.
We decline to make plaintiffs subjective beliefs part and parcel of this objective standard as plaintiff would prefer, because doing so would result in a subjective standard and not an objective "reasonable person” standard. The testimony of plaintiffs husband was particularly relevant to the second prong of the inquiry, and therefore it was properly considered by the trial court.
Finally, although the Kermizian Court held that the issue of when a claim was or should have been discovered is a factual one to be decided by a jury, and that holding is binding,2 we must conclude that the doctrine of law of the case prevents our remanding for a jury trial in this case as plaintiff requests in light of the original panel’s disposition of the issue. See Levinson, supra, 181 Mich 697. Marysville v Pate, Hirn & Bogue, Inc, 196 Mich App 32, 34; 492 NW2d 481 (1992).
Affirmed.
Weaver, J., concurred.Suit was filed in this case one month before the effective date of § 5838a of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838G), which now governs medical malpractice claims. The provisions of § 5838 rather than § 5838a have been applied throughout.
See Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich lxxxiv, Mich Ct R, p A 1-47, continued in effect Administrative Order No. 1992-8, 44Í Mich lii, Mich Ct R, p A 1-63.