(on rehearing). On August 12, 1992, this Court determined Gustav K. Johnson had not preserved his right to practice law and we ordered him disbarred. In re Discipline of Johnson, 488 N.W.2d 682, 685 (S.D.1992) {Johnson I). We later granted Johnson’s petition for rehearing. We now determine the judgment of disbarment of Johnson will be vacated and that Johnson will be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years beginning August 12, 1992, the effective date of his disbarment.
FACTS
A more complete factual background can be found at Johnson I, so only a brief outline will be restated here. Johnson was admitted to the practice of law in this state in 1984. In 1987, he became a Pennington County Deputy State’s Attorney and continued this employment until 1990. Though primarily a civil lawyer in the state’s attorney’s office, he nonetheless represented the State at various stages of criminal proceedings as well. In 1990, Johnson was contacted by law enforcement officers concerning his alleged illegal drug use. Johnson entered a guilty plea to a Class 2 misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana.1
The Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of South Dakota conducted an investigation. At a hearing before the Board, Johnson freely admitted he had possessed and used marijuana as many as one hundred times since his admission to the Bar and had used cocaine at least once. The Board found such conduct to be in violation of the criminal statutes of the State of South Dakota (SDCL 22-42-5 makes possession of cocaine a Class 5 felony) and to be in violation of several of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board recommended formal disciplinary proceedings. This Court directed the Board to file a formal accusation and a Referee was appointed. After an evidentiary hearing, the Referee also made recommendations to this Court.
A hearing was held before this Court on December 4, 1991, to determine the appropriate discipline to be imposed. This Court did not adopt the Referee’s recommendation that Johnson be suspended for a period of ninety days from the practice of law under various conditions. Rather, Johnson was ordered disbarred. However, as John*217son points out in his petition for rehearing, three Justices expressed in that decision a preference for a suspension.
We granted rehearing and we view the issues presented by Johnson as facets of this single issue: What is the appropriate discipline of an attorney who uses illegal drugs while licensed to practice law in this state? Due to the difficulty of this question, made more difficult by the fact that at least some of Johnson’s illegal drug use occurred while he was a deputy state's attorney, we took the extraordinary step of again hearing oral arguments.
DISCUSSION
We find our discussion in In re Discipline of Jeffries, 500 N.W.2d 220 (S.D.1993), of this date, to be applicable here as well as Jeffries ’ standards for our consideration of the findings and recommendations of the Disciplinary Board and Referee.
DECISION
Johnson has been convicted on only one Class 2 misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana. As this conviction is not of the type of “serious crime” for which we have previously ordered an attorney disbarred, we adopt our reasoning from Jef-fries to find our previous order of disbarment is not an appropriate discipline at this time. Therefore, although Johnson has, by his illegal drug use while an attorney, joined those “few lawyers who ‘are the scandal of the profession,’ ” In re Egan, 37 S.D. 159, 166, 157 N.W. 310, 312 (1916), our prior Judgment of Disbarment of Johnson is vacated.
Nevertheless, Johnson’s conduct does warrant discipline. To Johnson’s credit, he freely admits his regular illegal drug use while an attorney was part of his “life style” which included the use of cocaine on at least one, and possibly more, occasions. Johnson admits this conduct was “incredibly stupid” and wrong. Johnson has used illegal substances since he was in high school. Although Johnson asserts he does not have a chemical dependency and asserts he is currently drug free, we are, nonetheless, concerned by the lack of a formal evaluation of Johnson’s actual dependency status.
We find it particularly objectionable that Johnson’s illegal drug use spanned the time during which he was a deputy state’s attorney. Although Johnson may never have prosecuted an entire drug case during his tenure with that office, he did participate in criminal arraignments and sentences and was in a position to prosecute an entire drug case. Nevertheless, Johnson’s drug use does not appear to have occurred on the job and there is no evidence that his illicit drug use adversely affected his abilities as an attorney and deputy state’s attorney. There is extensive testimony that Johnson has been a properly prepared and professional lawyer who has had no complaints lodged against him by a client, attorney or judge.
In light of all the evidence, we find Johnson has, by his conduct, severely tarnished the image and integrity of the Bar. Balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before us, In re Discipline of Simpson, 467 N.W.2d 921, 923-24 (S.D.1991) (Henderson, J., specially concurring), and considering especially his status as a deputy state’s attorney, his misdemeanor conviction, his long-term illegal drug use, his remorse, the absence of harm to the public, his cooperation with law enforcement and the Disciplinary Board, and his apparent lack of a chemical dependency and apparent success at leading a drug-free life, we determine Johnson has not demonstrated to this Court that he is a fit and proper person to continue to practice law.
Therefore, pursuant to SDCL 16-19-22, an order will be entered directing that Johnson be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years effective August 12, 1992, the date of this court’s prior judgment of disbarment. During the period of Johnson’s suspension from the practice of law, he is directed to (1) submit proof to the Disciplinary Board that he has been evaluated by a certified drug counsel- or to determine whether or not he is a candidate for any type of treatment for any chemical dependency; (2) in the event treat*218ment is recommended, undertake and successfully complete any recommended courses of treatment and regularly submit proof of compliance to the Disciplinary Board; (3) refrain entirely from the use of illicit drugs; (4) perform one day of public service per month at the direction of the presiding judge of the judicial circuit wherein he resides; and (5) be available to share and discuss with lawyers and students the (a) choices he made in developing a lifestyle encompassing the use of illegal drugs and (b) the effects of his lifestyle on himself, others and the Bar. That part of our prior judgment which ordered Johnson to reimburse the State Bar for its itemized allowable expenses remains in effect and includes the itemized allowable expenses for this rehearing.
We emphasize that Johnson’s reinstatement to practice law is not automatic at the expiration of his two-year period of suspension. He must first file a petition for reinstatement accompanied with a deposit to cover the expected costs of his reinstatement proceeding and then demonstrate to this Court
by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this state and that his resumption of the practice of law within the state will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest.
SDCL 16-19-84; In re Reinstatement of Trygstad, 435 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1989); In re Reinstatement of Husby, 426 N.W.2d 27 (S.D.1988). Only then will we issue an order reinstating Johnson, thus allowing him to resume the practice of law. SDCL 16-19-83.
Judgment will be entered accordingly.
WUEST, J., concurs. AMUNDSON, J., concurs in result. HENDERSON and SABERS, JJ., dissent.. The maximum penalty for a Class 2 misdemeanor charge at that time was "thirty days imprisonment in a county jail or one hundred dollars fine, or both." SDCL 22-6-2(2).