(dissenting).
Reference is made to my concurring opinion found in Matter of Discipline of Johnson, 488 N.W.2d 682, 686 (S.D.1992). Therein, I joined the majority opinion holding that Johnson be disbarred. I now join the minority holding that Johnson be disbarred.
There are, of course, different viewpoints in appellate courts such as majority and minority holdings. A reader of the law will note, from time to time, special concurrences or concurrences in result. Rarely, ever so rarely, do we read what I would term an “eclectic decision.” An “eclectic decision” is a decision composed of elements, methods, styles, precedent and doctrine from various sources. In the end, it is a composite of compromise to such an extent that it attempts to serve splinters of irreconcilable positions. In both Jeffries, handed down contemporaneous herewith, and instanter, we have two “eclectic decisions.” Thereby, in attempting to further a decision of compromise and several legal purposes, it fails to attain an identifiable correctness. Not only is there a failure of identifiable cor*219rectness, there is, also, an antithetical vote by one of the concurring Justices to this opinion. Apparently, still not believing the disciplinary measure taken is proper, one Justice votes for the majority decision because it is “the best of the objectionable options.”
Both Jeffries and Johnson were prosecutors in Pennington County. As the Chief Justice has pointed out, Johnson represented the State of South Dakota in criminal proceedings. They were associates, friends, fellow prosecutors, and men, by their own statements, who knew what they were doing was subserving the law. Essentially, neither now wish to ethically account for their wrongdoing. At pages 9 and 10, of a transcript concerning a hearing before the Disciplinary Board on October 26, 1990, at the Ramada Inn, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, testimony of Jeffries reveals that Johnson and he (and at least one other Deputy State’s Attorney in Pennington County) smoked marijuana together; Jeffries and Johnson used cocaine together twice. See Hearing Transcript, page 10. While Johnson acted in a role as a Deputy State’s Attorney, he shared marijuana with his friends at least 100 times. This factual scenario is supported by the record. At the initial argument before this Court in December, 1991, Johnson openly admitted he had been using drugs since he was sixteen years of age. At that time, Johnson had never undergone counseling for his drug habit nor was he contemplating any treatment and/or counseling.
Johnson’s case is distinguishable from Matter of Discipline of Hopp, 376 N.W.2d 816 (S.D.1985); Matter of Discipline of Brende, 366 N.W.2d 500 (S.D.1985); Matter of Discipline of Kessler, 366 N.W.2d 499 (S.D.1985), and Matter of Discipline of Strange, 366 N.W.2d 495 (S.D.1985). Not one of the above lawyers were representing the people of South Dakota and taking their money as agents of the state when they used drugs. Not one of these lawyers were prosecutors. Johnson was a servant of the public (the same as Jeffries) and was responsible to try to eradicate the drug culture, which pervades our Nation, not aid it and give it an implied blessing. Both Johnson and Jeffries applied a double standard and in so doing infected the criminal justice with poison. James Zieser, longtime counsel for the Disciplinary Board, in argument before the Supreme Court stated emphatically: “Johnson gave the legal profession a black eye.” Zieser also expressed: “He admitted to committing felonies.” In Matter of Discipline of Hendrickson, 456 N.W.2d 140, 141 (S.D.1990) we held:
Disbarment is warranted when it is clear that the protection of society requires such action or where the maintenance of respect for courts and judges or the respectability of the legal profession itself demands such action. (Emphasis supplied mine).
As I expressed in my dissent in Jeffries, handed down contemporaneous herewith:
As the United States Supreme Court has held, the prosecutor is “a servant of the law,” not an advocate of an ordinary party. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). As such, prosecutors are held to a higher standard lest the “special significance to the prosecutor’s obligation to serve the cause of justice” be lost. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 61, 63, n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 333, 340, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 [96 S.Ct. at 2401]).
As a people, we cannot tolerate or condone drug activity by prosecutors. The maintenance of a healthy, free society forbids it. Respect for the courts in our land demands it. And a respect for the legal profession cannot survive with its existence.