dissenting.
In my judgment the majority opinion is indefensible.
It goes at length into a discussion of the meaning of the several sub-sections of Ark. Stats. § 84-1903 which have no relevancy to the question under consideration. The only part of the section which need to be considered reads as follows:
“There is hereby levied an excise tax of three per centum (3%) upon . . . fees for the privilege of having access to or the use of amusement, [or] entertainment . . . facilities . . .”
It makes a strained attempt to explain why a juke box is not an “amusement” or an “entertainment” facility.
It laboriously explains that Act 120 of 1959 does not place a sales tax on juke boxes. Of course it doesn’t, and no one has contended it does. I am firmly convinced the legislature would not have (in Act 120) made provisions for collecting a tax on juke boxes if it had not already placed (by § 84-1903) a tax on them. The majority adroitly evade the above by saying: “The Act No. 120 merely stated what the operator would have to do if and when a gross receipts tax was levied.” The simple and direct answer to the above statement is that Act 120 does not so state. Moreover, it makes such more sense to me to conclude the legislature (in passing Act 120) had in mind a tax already levied than a tax which might some day be passed.