disssenting.
The witness, Frederick, a real estate broker and professional appraiser, was sworn and qualified as an expert on land values in the involved area. He was then allowed over objection to recite out-of-court statements, made to him by parties not present at the trial, concerning sales prices for property comparable to that condemned. The witness, Frederick, had no personal knowledge of these sales. Objection was made that this testimony was inadmissible because in violation of the rule against hearsay. The State admits that the testimony was hearsay, but contends it offered the testimony not to prove the truth of the sale price but to show one of the bases from which the witness arrived at his opinion of value. In my opinion, the testimony violated the *473rule against hearsay, and the introduction thereof was improper and prejudicial.
“The Hearsay rule, as accepted in our law, signifies a rule rejecting assertions, offered testimonially, which have not been in some way subjected to the test of Cross-examination.”1 But it is more than a technical rule. It is a principle, whose purpose is assurance that a full and truthful disclosure of facts will be possible. It must be as broad as its purpose:
“The testimony of N. though not, technically, hearsay evidence, is liable to the same objections; for it is resorting to an inferior or secondary species of proof, without necessity; * * *. Hearsay testimony is from the very nature of it, attended with all such doubts and difficulties, and it cannot clear them up. ‘A person who relates a hearsay, is not obliged to enter into any particulars, to answer any questions, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities: He intrenches himself in the simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely on his dead or absent author.’ It is against sound principle, and would at once awaken distrust, for a party to resort to a secondary species of evidence, so long as the original and primary evidence exists and can be produced. The plaintiff, by means of this species of evidence would be taken by surprise, and be precluded from the benefit of a cross-examination of S. as to all those material points which have been suggested as necessary to throw full light on his information.”2
There are factors in the present case which require the application of the rule.
“* * * certainly most transactions are likely to be influenced by motives of the parties thereto, such as the special needs or the strong desires of the buyer, the financial or other exigencies of the seller, and the whims, follies, fancies or ignorance of local values on the part of one or both of them. Since these are all matters of which persons with only hearsay knowledge of a sale can be expected to know little or nothing, whereas those with first hand knowledge, such as a party to the sale itself or the broker or agent who effected it, can be expected to know at least something, we think the hearsay *474rule should be adhered to in the interest of justice to both parties.”3
The main reason for using an expert is to provide a partial substitution of his judgment concerning the credibility of his sources of information for that of the jury on the basis that his experience better qualifies him to evaluate his findings than the official triers of fact who have only their general knowledge. Judgment and experience serve the same purpose for the expert as does cross examination for the jury. The jury rather than judging the expert’s sources, judges his ability, and cross examination is available to test him in this regard. When the expert is allowed to recite in detail the specific bits of information he receives from others, those facts are before the jury to be weighed without the benefit of either experience or cross examination. If I am right in believing the jury will be more impressed by the price recited than by the experts’ own opinion, then the rule4 obtaining in Texas that hearsay has no probative force and will not support a judgment is violated. The question is: What is the best rule from the standpoint of justice which can be established in a case of this type? It seems to me it would be the better policy to adhere to the well-settled rule that hearsay testimony is not admissible as original evidence.
“An expert may testify to value, although his knowledge of details is chiefly derived from inadmissible sources, because he gives the sanction of his general experience. But the fact that an expert may use hearsay as a ground of opinion does not make the hearsay admissible.”5
The Court in the present case puts too great a burden on Oakley, from the standpoint of surprise, if nothing else. Obviously, under the rule laid down, if there are circumstances which could be shown as bearing on the price testified to, even assuming it is not a puffed or deflated price, the opponent must produce someone with personal knowledge of the transaction. Because the opponent does not know what sale prices may be testified about he must in order to protect his client know of every land sale involving land comparable to that involved in the suit he is trying and he must be able to produce a witness with firsthand knowledge of the sale on very short notice. This means, *475in order to be well prepared, he must know of every sale within three or four miles,6 and perhaps much farther in a rural area, and over a time span of seven or eight years or longer.7 It would be more in harmony with well-established rules for the party who wishes the price put in evidence to have the burden of producing competent proof.
If the Court’s opinion becomes the law, then not only will the parties be licensed to shop for a favorable expert, this Court will have licensed the expert to shop for favorable information to relate on the witness stand. Why use competent proof of different sales, which would necessitate putting several witnesses on the stand, with the possibility some unfavorable fact might turn up on cross-examination? Find a favorable expert, or two, who are good witnesses and they can put forth the same information and retire behind the “I was told so” shield. I fear this would be setting a dangerous precedent. If such procedure is permitted in this type of case, then there is no logical reason why it should not extend to medical testimony, for example, and allow, a doctor to relate what others have told him or read excerpts from text books to the jury, or both, to show a basis for his opinion. The same would be true where a lawyer might be called upon to testify as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. Indeed, the New Jersey case quoted in the majority opinion would apply the rule broadly enough to include such testimony.8 Such is not the rule in Texas. Hearsay evidence is incompetent as original evidence and has no probative force. In the case of Texas Co. v. Lee, supra, this Court said hearsay is incompetent as original evidence and has no probative force. In the case of Texas Co. v. Lee, supra, this Court said hearsay is incompetent and can never form the basis of a finding of fact or of the judgment of a court. This is so whether it be objected to or not, citing Henry v. Phillips, 105 Texas 459, 151 S.W. 533; Austin Bros. v. Patten, Texas Comm. App., 294 S.W. 537.
*476The case of Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Texas 1, 219 S.W. 2d 779 (1949), held that certain medical books which were offered in evidence were “but hearsay evidence” and not admissible as original evidence. This Court in holding that such evidence must be excluded as original evidence, said:
“When a doctor testifies as an expert relative to injuries or diseases he may be asked to identify a given work as a standard authority on the subject involved; and if he so recognizes it, excerpts therefrom, may be read not as original evidence but solely to discredit his testimony or to test its weight.” (Emphasis added.)
This Court apparently is now of the belief that a different rule should apply in a condemnation suit where an expert is testifying than the rule applied in the cases I have heretofore discussed. The case of City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Texas 324, 267 S.W. 2d 808, decided by this Court in 1954, was a condemnation suit. That case, in principle, supports the position taken in this dissent. The exclusion of an inquiry into the details or mental processes by which the witness arrived at his conclusion was held in the Cannizzo case to be proper. This Court at that time was of the opinion that inquiry into the details or mental processes by which the witness arrived at his conclusion was only proper on cross-examination for the purpose of testing the credibility of the witness or for laying a predicate for impeachment. What were the details in that case? The details were that testimony as to the front-foot value of non-existent lots in a hypothetical subdivision was admitted in evidence over objection. This Court held that such testimony was too speculative to be admitted as direct evidence of market value. At least the Cannizzo case does not indicate a departure from the well-settled rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible as original evidence. In the Cannizzo case, this Court said:
“* * * * A witness may give his opinion of the present market value of the land, taking into consideration its adaptability to subdivision for residential and commercial purposes and the cost of converting it to such uses, but inquiry into the details or mental processes by which the witness arrives at his conclusion is only proper on cross examination for the purpose of testing the credibility of the witness or for laying a predicate for impeachment. * * *”
We have already made one exception to the hearsay rule in behalf of valuation experts. We let them base their opinion on *477hearsay.9 I do not think we should go farther and unnecessarily allow the hearsay to be paraded through the courtroom. To do so denies to the opponent a very substantial right without cause. It denies to him the effective use of our judicial process by denying him the right of cross-examination. Cross-examination results many times in obtaining the truth when it otherwise would not be disclosed.
The cases of City of Houston v. Collins, Texas Civ. App. (1958), 310 S.W. 2d 697, no writ hist., and City of Houston v. Huber, Texas Civ. App., 311 S.W. 2d 488, no writ hist., tend to support the State’s view. These cases should not be followed. They apparently went off on the theory that the admission of such evidence was not error in view of the Court’s instructions in its charge to the jury. It is impossible to eliminate prejudicial error by written instructions. It would be the best policy to not allow such evidence over proper objection to get before the jury. It should be noted that in the Huber case, supra, the Court of Civil Appeals held the admission of hearsay evidence harmless in view of the admission of similar testimony by the opposite party.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be affirmed.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES GRIFFIN, WALKER and HAMILTON join in this dissent.
Opinion delivered March 28, 1962.
5 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 1362 (3rd Ed. 1940).
Coleman v. Southwick, 9 John. 45, 49-50 (N. Y. 1812).
Woodbury, J., United States v. Katz et al, 213 F. 2d 799, 800 (1st Cir. 1954).
Texas Co. v. Lee, 138 Tex. 167, 157 S.W. 2d 628 (1941, 1 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, Section 31 (2d Ed. 1956).
National Bank of Commerce of New Bedford v. City of New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900).
State v. Morse, Tex. Civ. App. (1960), 342 S.W. 2d 165, wr. ref. n.r.e. (sale of land four miles from that condemned).
Curfman v. State, 240 S.W. 2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, ref. n.r.e.) (sale five years before condemnation), City of Houston v. Collins, 310 S.W. 2d 697 (1958), (2*4 years after condemnation).
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 16 N. J. Super. 543, 85 A. 2d 200, 206 (1951). Compare: People v. Samuels, 302 N.Y. 163, 96 N.E. 2d 757 (1951), reversing a lower court holding, in a sanity ease, that a doctor could testify he based his opinion partly on hospital records containing some observations of laymen with this language: “* “ *if it was improper that the jury should see them, they should not have been received in evidence as a basis of the experts’ opinions.”
See for example: Reed v. Barlow, 157 S.W. 2d 933 (Texas Civ. App. 1941, ref.), reversing, in a damage suit for failure to drill an offset well, for allowing an expert to base his opinion on: “Schlumbergers”, reports of oil scouts, production data from adjoining wells, logs of nearby wells, and cores of sand from nearby wells on the ground that none of this was in evidence and all was hearsay.