(dissenting).
I regret that I am unable to concur in the holdings of the majority opinion or in its result.
The facts as stated in the pleadings are admitted and there is also a stipulation of further facts and these together with the exhibits attached to the pleadings are the source of the facts upon which the issues of law must be decided. The undisputed facts as so developed are set out in a printed Abstract of the Record.
The relators and the respondent have filed briefs. Leave was granted and a brief was filed on behalf of an amicus curiae. The brief is signed by a firm of attorneys but the name of the amicus curiae is not disclosed. The amicus curiae’s brief endorses the respondent’s position but does not purport to brief or argue the issues made by the parties. Instead the unnamed amicus curiae undertakes to brief and argue these additional questions: (1) that § 165.833 and the entire Junior College Districts Act are special legislation in violation of Art. Ill, § 40, subd. (16), of the Constitution of Missouri 1945, and (2) that Art. IX, § 8, Constitution of Missouri 1945, prohibiting public aid for religious purposes and institutions, and the Junior College Districts Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and are, therefore, unconstitutional. The law is well settled that the court will not pass on grounds of invalidity urged by an amicus curiae but not presented by the parties since an amicus curiae cannot formulate issues but must take the case as he finds it. Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, 345 Mo. 449, 134 S.W.2d 65, 70 [11]; State ex rel. News Corp. v. Smith, 353 Mo. 845, 184 S.W.2d 598, 600[6]. Since the brief of the amicus curiae does not bear upon the issues before us, it must be disregarded.
The respondent’s principal contention of invalidity is his Point II, which is as follows: “Section 165.833, R.S.Mo. (Laws 1961, S.B. No. 7, Section 14), is unconstitutional in that it is not germane to the general subject of the Junior College Districts Act (Section 165.790, et seq., Laws 1961) nor was the subject of Section 165.833 clearly expressed in the title to the Bill. If Section 165.833 is not unconstitutional, then its provisions can only apply to a leasing or selling of school board property to a Junior College District and a sale to The University of Missouri is void.” In support of this point, the respondent cites Art. Ill, § 23, Constitution of Missouri 1945, and Edwards v. Business Men’s Assurance Co. of America, 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82.
Section 23 of Art. Ill of the Constitution provides that: “No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title * * The constitutional section therefore provides for two things: (1) that no bill shall contain more than one subject, and (2) that the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title.
The majority opinion holds that the Junior College Districts Act violates the constitutional prohibition in both respects, stating on page 870: “We think it clearly appears that the provisions of Section 165.-833 are wholly foreign to the title and subject matter of the Act in which the section has been placed.” With this viewpoint I cannot agree. I believe it to be out of harmony with adjudicated cases and well-established rules of interpretation. It has been said repeatedly that each case arising under Art. Ill, § 23, must be decided on its own particular facts. It would serve no purpose to review even a small portion of the many adjudicated cases on this issue, but a brief reference to accepted standards and rules of construction may be helpful.
Both parties rely upon Edwards v. Business Men’s Assurance Co. of America, 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82. In that case the court held an insurance statute was constitutional and not in violation of Art. Ill, § 23. The majority opinion quotes liberally from the decision and there is no need to repeat any part of it here.
*876The writer has found six cases in which school legislation has been attacked as being unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Art. Ill, § 23. In each case the legislation was held not to be unconstitutional. In one of the earlier cases. State ex rel. Wolfe v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 21 S.W. 1125, 1126, this court stated: “These and other cases show that this section of the constitution is to be reasonably and liberally construed and applied, due regard being had to its object and purpose. It was designed to prevent the insertion of disconnected matters in the same bill. The section asserts only two propositions. The first is that no bill shall contain more than one subject, and the second is that this single subject must be clearly expressed in the title. If all the provisions of the bill have a natural relation and connection, then the subject is single, and this, too, though the bill contains many provisions. As to the second proposition, namely, that the single subject must be clearly expressed in the title, it is sufficient to say that the legislature may select its own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act; mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title.” The title of the act, Acts 1891, p. 26 involved was “An act to establish and maintain a uniform course of text-books to be used in all the public schools within this state, and to reduce the price thereof.” In spite of the all-inclusive title, a proviso of the act excluded from its operation cities and districts having more than 100,000 inhabitants. It would seem that those included or excluded might have been misled, but the court held that the fact that the title was broader than the act itself did not make it unconstitutional.
; The latest school law case seems to be State ex rel. Reorganized School Dist. No. 4 of Jackson County v. Holmes, 360 Mo. 904, 231 S.W.2d 185. The court held that an act providing for ’the creation of county boards of education, the preparation of a reorganization proposal and its_ submis-. sion at an election and the granting of state aid to the reorganized school district did not violate the constitutional provisions against the bill having more than one subject because they were all related to reorganized school districts. The court stated, 231 S.W.2d loc. cit. 187-188: “We have uniformly ruled that where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single.” Emphasis added. The court also denied a contention that the title was less comprehensive than the act, stating loc. cit. 188: “ ‘In adopting a title, the legislature may select its own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act; mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title.’ State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, loc. cit. 445-446, 13 S.W. 677, 678. If the title is a fair index to all that is embraced in the statute, then it complies with the constitutional mandate that the title clearly express the subject of the bill.”
Other cases where attacks have been made on school legislation as being unconstitutional in violation of Art. Ill, § 23, are State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S.W. 677; State ex rel. School Dist. of Memphis v. Gordon, 223 Mo. 1, 122 S.W. 1008; State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, 170 S.W. 892; and State ex rel. and to Use of Consolidated School Dist. No. 3 of Franklin County v. Miller, 326 Mo. 830, 33 S.W.2d 122. In all of these cases the constitutionality of the acts were upheld.
A number of cases stress the fact that the subject of an act is single when all provisions fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection therewith, and are incidents or the means of accomplishing it. See Thomas v. Buchanan County, 330 Mo. 627, 51 S.W.2d 95, 97[3].
• The title of an act should be liberally' construed to support the power sought to be *877exercised by the general assembly, and where neither the public nor the general assembly would likely have been misled as to the general contents or subject matter it will be deemed a sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate. See Willhite v. Rathburn, 332 Mo. 1208, 61 S.W.2d 708, 711 [4, 5].
A similar principle was involved in State ex rel. Board of Fund Commissioners v. Holman, Mo., 296 S.W.2d 482, 491 [6], where a number of items in a bond issue were held to be “germane to a single controlling purpose.” See also State v. Bennett, 102 Mo. 356, 14 S.W. 865, 10 L.R.A. 717; State ex rel. Lorantos v. Terte, 324 Mo. 402, 23 S.W.2d 120; and State v. Ludwig, Mo., 322 S.W.2d 841.
The approach of the courts to the determination of this question is well stated in a case determining the validity of the County Budget Law, Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543, 549, as follows: “There is a presumption that the statute here assailed is constitutional. The burden rests upon the party questioning the constitutional validity of a statute to establish its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt, and if its constitutionality remains in doubt, such doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. [citing cases.] This court has long been committed to the principle that section 28 of article 4 of our Constitution must be liberally construed. [citing cases.] A liberal construction of the constitutional provision in question requires that such construction be fair, reasonable, and rational, to the end that legislative action shall not be thwarted and nullified by the courts by a resort to undue subtleties and refinements or extreme and artificial formalism.”
Viewed in the light of these well-established principles, I am unable to find anything in the Abstract of the Record or the respondent’s brief that convinces me that the respondent has carried his burden of demonstrating that the Act in question is unconstitutional either because of a multiple subject, or because of a defect in the title of the Act. The Act relates entirely to education and to education beyond grade twelve. Although the title stresses “formation” of the junior colleges, sections of the Act deal with operations such as financing and curriculum. Disposition and acquisition of physical property is a necessary part of the operation and it is required that the accreditation standards shall give due consideration “to curriculum offerings and entrance requirements of the University of Missouri.” Section 165.833 is directly related to junior college districts. It would certainly justify a transfer by the school district of the real estate in question to a junior college organized under the Act because a junior college is a public educational institution offering education beyond grade twelve. The respondent recognizes this fact in the second or alternative part of his Point II. The University offers instruction in grades thirteen and fourteen and I cannot see any valid reason for holding the proposed transfer void because the University may in the future (as indicated by the record) also offer a complete college course which would have to include grades thirteen and fourteen. Since § 165.833 is related to education beyond grade twelve, I think it is strictly for the general assembly to determine the legislative question of whether public educational institutions offering education beyond grade twelve should be permitted to contract with and acquire property to be used for such an educational purpose. See Art. VI, § 16, Constitution of Missouri 1945; §§ 70.210(2) and 70.220, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; Art. IX, §§ 9(a) and 9(b), Constitution; § 172.020, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.
I cannot subscribe to the view that the purposes of the constitutional safeguards as listed in Edwards v. Business Men’s Assurance Co. and other cases have been violated. A clear example of the sort of thing prohibited by the state constitution is the combination of such unrelated mat*878ters as a proposal to establish a national monument and a proposal to abolish the state poll tax which misalliance is apparently in a bill now before the National Congress where such practice is not prohibited. Certainly the junior college bill was not “hodgepodge or log rolling legislation” which is the practice of combining unrelated matters for parlimentary strategy, concealment or vote-getting purposes. Nor does it violate the second or third purposes which are to give reasonable information and notice to legislators and to the public of the contents of bills.
Perhaps the respondent’s strongest condemnation of § 14 of the Act (§ 16S.833) is his statement that: “Respondent doubts that some members of the Legislature and the public were aware of the fact that this exception to the general rule governing sale of surplus school district property, was adopted.” This probably could be said of many other perfectly valid statutes in force today, but it is not the constitutional standard. Anyone with an active interest in education generally, education beyond grade twelve, junior colleges or colleges generally, would undoubtedly be stimulated to read the bill and would not be deceived or misled as to its contents, it has been said that such constitutional provisions “presuppose a reasonably inquiring state of mind which will follow the trail indicated by the main part of the title into the body of the act.” 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 212, p. 350.
The extent to which a person is expected to inquire and investigate is indicated by Young v. Greene County, 342 Mo. 1105, 119 S.W.2d 369, 372-373[3], which considered the constitutionality under Art. Ill, § 23, of a statute fixing the salaries of county judges. The new law substituted salary in lieu of certain other fees, allowances and compensation. The bill referred to the statute to be amended and' the new statute by section number, but mistakenly said the section was in Article 6 instead of Article 5. The court held that a person of average intelligence by “looking through the statutes” would be able to find the section and denied the claim of unconstitutionality as being hypertechnical.
On principle, In re Tarkio-Squaw Levee District of Holt County, Mo., 319 S.W.2d 660, is very similar to the instant case. There the bill, Laws 1947, p. 226, referred to the old and new sections by number and the title stated in substance that the sections related “to the organization and functioning of levee districts by Circuit-Courts”. Nevertheless, the new section 12510 RSMo 1939, added a proviso, not in the old one, authorizing the board of supervisors to cooperate with federal agencies, accept grants in aid and to “give such-assurances as may be required to obtain the construction of the works and improvements”. The court held that the-reference to the statute to be amended by-section number was sufficient and that the-new proviso which made the federal agency the dominant actor in the reclamation-project did not render the act unconstitutional, stating, 319 S.W.2d at page 665 “The amendment was germane to the subject matter contained in the title to the-original act authorizing the organization-of levee districts which was 'An Act providing for the organization of levee districts by the owners in any contiguous body-of land situate in one or more counties in this state and bordering on, situate near- or subject to overflow by the rivers of this, state, to prevent and to protect such lands-from such overflows.’ Laws 1887, p. 208.’”
To hold that § 165.833 is “wholly foreign^ to the title and subject matter of the Act”' is to adopt an unwarranted strictness of construction which thwarts the will of the legislature and unnecessarily hinders and. impedes our public educational institutions in bringing higher education to various sections of the state, a program that-has been far advanced in other states. L would hold the entire Junior College Districts Act, including § 165.833, to be constitutional.
*879Holding § 165.833 entirely void, of course, precludes school districts and junior college districts from contracting directly with each other with respect to real estate which a school district does not need and which it wishes to transfer to a junior college district of which it is a constituent part.
I seriously doubt if the court can declare a portion of an act unconstitutional and let the remainder stand where the attack is based on Art. Ill, § 23. This is especially true where the act is held to -contain more than one subject. Art. Ill, § 23, prohibits the entire act if it contains more than one subject and the court can hardly be justified in choosing from the act the subject which, if submitted alone, the legislature would have enacted. To a lesser degree, perhaps, the same is true of .a defective title. The title might in certain cases give a better clue as to the legislative intent but still the constitutional provision says “No bill” shall have a title that does not clearly express its contents. The ■severability statute, § 1.140, would not prevail over the constitutional mandate. This is wholly unlike a situation where the constitutional prohibition is not directed fo the entire act and is found to inhere only in an unneeded portion. It may be that the authority to acquire real estate at less than its value in the open market for business or residential purposes was .a potent factor in the passage of the bill.
Since the majority opinion holds there •is no valid basis for the proposed conveyance, I can see no need for its discussing adequacy of consideration, but since it has done so, I will advert to that topic briefly. If § 165.833 is constitutional, then I think it is entirely within the competence of the 'board of education of the school district .and the board of curators of the University to make a contract that benefits the cause •of education. That is their statutory duty and there is no reason to suspect that either is seeking a financial advantage to the detriment of the other. A reading of the record demonstrates that the proposed junior college is mutually advantageous and that the consideration flowing to the school district is not entirely expressed in dollars presently passing. This sort of endeavor is of equal or greater importance than an industrial development project which the general assembly has authorized communities to sponsor. Sections 71.-790-71.850, RSMo Cum.Supp.1961, V.A.M. S.; State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Holman, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 946. Absent a charge of fraud or positive wrongdoing, the court should summarily dismiss a contention like this one.
Further on this score I do not think that the majority opinion is justified in its apparent concern that the University is not sufficiently bound to perform its part of the bargain in view of its constitutional and statutory duties, the reservations in the proposed deed and the facts stipulated.
The respondent further contends that school property not needed by the school district can only be sold by advertising and at a public sale in accordance with the provisions of § 165.370. Section 165.-370 is general in nature which applies when the school district is making an absolute conveyance to private persons for business or residential purposes. Section 165.833 is a specific section designed to cover situations when the conveyance is made to another public institution for the purpose of offering education beyond grade twelve. This new section being a specific section and the more recent enactment would control over the general provision.
In my opinion the respondent’s objections to signing the deed are without merit. I would order the peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.