This is a wrongful death case brought by appellant, Martha Fountain, Administratrix of the Estate of Johnnie 0. Thompson, deceased. Ap-pellees, Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, and its employee, successfully moved to strike all claims for pecuniary benefits and mental anguish. Thompson was survived by his mother and several brothers and sisters. The principal ruling of the trial court here attacked is that the death of the mother, which shortly followed the fatal accident to her son, extinguished any possible recovery for mental anguish.
Johnnie 0. Thompson, 54 and single, was employed by Magnet Cove Barium Corporation. While unloading ore from a Rock Island car, he was struck by a metal crank attached to the car and alleged to be defective. The injury proved fatal. Suit was brought by the ad-ministratrix. The elements of damage alleged were: (1) pecuniary benefits for Thompson’s dependent mother and sister, ages 87 and 62 years, who lived in his household; (2) mental anguish suffered by the mother and sister, as well as other brothers and sisters not members of his household; and (3) expenditures by the estate.
The defendants moved to strike those elements of recovery described in (1) and (2) and alleged: (a) at the time of Thompson’s death, his mother was the only “heir and next of kin” within the meaning of the wrongful death statute; (b) that shortly after the fatal accident and before suit was filed, the mother died and her cause of action abated; (c) that Thompson did not stand in loco parentis to the mother and sister of his household; and (d) that the brothers and sisters were not entitled to recover for mental anguish. The trial court sustained the motion to strike and left only the claim for the benefit of the estate to be litigated.
First, we dispose of the contention of the admin-istratrix that pecuniary loss to, and mental anguish of, the mother are proper elements of recovery. Those rights abated with the death of the mother. Jenkins, Admr. v. Midland Valley R. R., 134 Ark. 1, 203 S. W. 1 (1918).
We next consider that point of the administratrix which, in substance, asks us to overrule, in part, Peugh v. Oliger, Admx., 233 Ark. 281, 345 S. W. 2d 610 (1961). With reference to recovery for mental anguish, Peugh holds recovery to be limited to the enumerated relatives who are also heirs at law.
Decisions from other jurisdictions are of no aid because their statutes allowing mental anguish are distinctly different from our Act 255 of 1957 (Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-906-10 [Repl. 1962]). The significant difference is that, for the most part, other statutes list the relatives in classes, with the priority of each class established. We do point out that our Act 255 was originally drafted by a committee of the Arkansas Bar Association and was adopted with some modification by the Legislature. There was available to that committee the statutes of those states which then allowed recovery for mental anguish. Nevertheless, the bar committee elected to place the beneficiaries in a single group. That fact is of some significance in determining legislative intent.
In analyzing Act 255 we find these three points persuasive :
(1) The Legislature listed all beneficiaries in a single group, specifying no priority of one beneficiary over the other.;
(2) The interpretation in Peugh v. Oliger does not allow all the named beneficiaries to recover for their mental anguish. That decision did treat a foster daughter as an heir at law for purposes of the mental anguish statute and permit her to recover. But in placing that daughter in the category of next of him, this court reversed a modest recovery for mental anguish awarded to a sister of the deceased. It was held that both could not recover. Mrs. Drake, the 71-year-old surviving sister of the deceased, according to the evidence, was so distraught that she required constant attention for a considerable time after the accident which was fatal to her only living sister. They had been close neighbors for forty years and saw each other almost daily. When they moved a short distance apart they saw each other weekly and talked on the telephone. The foster daughter had been married since 1934 and for several years immediately prior to her foster mother’s death the foster daughter lived 165 miles distant. We have no quarrel with the allowance to the foster daughter, although that recovery was permitted by a novel construction of the statute. However, we think an interpretation of Act 255 Avhich would deny recovery to Mrs. Drake is contrary to the intent of the Legislature. Her mental anguish could well have been as great, or greater, than that of the foster daughter.
The evidentiary situation just recited, as between Mrs. Drake and the foster daughter, leads us to a conclusion so well stated in 18 Ark. L. R. 166 (1964): “This provision has been narrowly construed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, however, so as to effectively prevent recovery for mental suffering in some cases. As a result, the mental anguish provision of the statute loses much of its vitality .... A more liberal approach to the wording of the statute would be consistent with the expressions of the legislature.”
(3) Finally, we are persuaded by the reasoning in the dissenting opinion. in Peugh and we hereby adopt that opinion bv reference.
Reversed and remanded.
Harris, C. J., and Fogleman, J., dissent.