dissenting. While strong arguments can be, and were, advanced that the decision in Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S. W. 2d 610, was not correct, I dissent from the action of the majority because I do not believe that previous decisions construing a statute should be so lig'htly overruled. The Peugli decision was made in March of 1961. The General Assembly has met in three regular sessions since that time without changing Act 255 of 1957 [Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-906-27-910 (Repl. 1962)], the statute allowing recovery for mental anguish in wrongful death cases. The construction of that statute by this court became a part of the law. In Merchants’ Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Gates, 180 Ark. 96, 21 S. W. 2d 406, this court said:
“When the court construed the Act of 1927 in question, such construction became as much a part of the statute as if written in it.”
Perhaps we can still have the necessary certainty, stability and predictability in our law without being shackled by an inflexible adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. But I submit that when a statute meant one thing yesterday, it should not mean something else today. The overruling of this statutory construction seems to me to be a vehicle of injustice rather than justice. Who can say how many claims for mental • anguish now recoverable under today’s definition have become barred by the statute of limitations while this case has been pending? How many hundreds of claimants have been advised by their attorneys that they had no claim for damages for mental anguish in wrongful death cases since March 1961? How many dozens of times have circuit judges directed verdicts of non-liability for mental anguish damages or refused to submit mental anguish as an element of damages in cases tried before them since the decision in the Peugh case? There should be enough certainty and predictability of judicial action that litigants, attorneys and judges can act with a reasonable degree of assurance that they can rely on clear precedent. The alternative would clog our judicial system with an insurmountable burden. For example, a litigant could only be sure he is barred from a recovery by pursuing a case to the court of last resort, an attorney could only indulge in rank speculation in advising- a client and a trial judge might well resort to a system of ad, hoc decisions applying the law as he might feel it ought to he in any particular case on any particular day.
Nothing has changed since March 20, 1961, the date of the prior decision, except the personnel of the court.
I repeat, we, as well as any trial court, or any litigant, should be bound by a definition of terms this court has given to the words of a statute, particularly when the law-making branch of the government has not attempted to correct or change that definition. Since the construction in Peugh v. Oliger, supra, became as much a part of the statute as if written into it, this court has acted legislatively in changing the meaning of its words.
I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.
I am authorized to state that Harris, C. J., joins in this dissent.