dissenting.
I agree with the majority that rule 3.08 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct does not require the disqualification of attorney Bernal in this case. However, I believe the trial court had an alternative ground for ordering Bernal out of the case.
The Rule 11 agreement wherein the Kugle law firm agreed to withdraw as the attorneys of record for the Acevedos can reasonably be interpreted to mean that lawyers subsequently hired by the law firm, like Bernal, would also be prohibited from participating in the case. And in the absence of any pleading or proof avoiding the effects of the Rule 11 agreement, the trial court was within its discretion to apply the agreement against Bernal. Simply because Judge Barrow stated an erroneous reason for disqualifying Ber-nal does not mean there was not another correct, although unarticulated, reason for doing so. Indeed, the ruling could have been made without articulating any reason at all.
Because I believe Judge Barrow acted within his discretion, I respectfully dissent.