Opinion by
Justice CUNNINGHAMConcurring in Result Only.
I concur with Justice Scott’s opinion in which he concurs in result only. I am also certain that Justice Scott joins me in commending the very well-written opinion of Justice Minton writing on behalf of the majority. Nor do I wish to disparage in any way the very ably stated dissents of Justices Abramson and Noble, whose opposing viewpoints I hold in high respect.
Unlike the reasoning of the majority, Justice Scott and I are both of the opinion that only parties to the marriage can challenge the presumption of legitimacy under KRS 406.011. We hold this view as being inherent with the long-standing legal status of marriage.
This case is about something much larger than statutory interpretation. This case is squarely about the legal status of marriage in the Commonwealth of Kentucky today.
Here, a married couple wishes to be left alone from the allegations of an interloper who wishes to assert a claim of fatherhood to a child born during the couple’s marriage — a marriage which remains intact at this writing.
While the legal status of marriage in this early 21st century appears to be on life support, it is not dead.
As I consider a claim made by an interloper to a marriage, I must pause to consider what rights, protections, benefits, and privileges the matrimonial covenant afford to those joined together in a relationship sanctioned by law. Beginning with the well-meaning legislation of no-fault divorce in 1972, the law has diluted the legal status of marriage. With the adoption of no-fault divorce, this grand historical contract has lost its consideration. Further, in Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422 (Ky.1992), the Court eliminated the tort of intentional interference with the marital relation, also known as alienation of affections. This was done with a bow to the modernistic notions of morality. The Court reasoned that the innocent spouse was barred by the infidelity of the errant spouse from obtaining redress. With the abolition of the tort of alienation of affections, the innocent victim of betrayal has been left without recourse against the interloping adulterer. But not for the decision of the majority here today, a married couple, bound together in one accord, would be left without any ability to defend their marital relationship from the attacks of a third party interloper.1 In Hoye, we struck the lance from the hands of the offended partner to the marriage. Shall we now, as the dissent would have us do, divest the hapless of their shield as well?
Exactly what does the term “marriage” mean today in Kentucky? Incredibly, we are offered little, if any, guidance when we turn to statutory law. KRS 402.005 defines it as “the civil status, condition or relation of one (1) man and one (1) woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon those whose *597association is founded on the distinction of sex.”
This statute, enacted in 1998, was the result of the legislature’s desire to outlaw marriage between members of the same sex. It was followed by a constitutional amendment adopting that public policy. While meeting that public policy purpose, it is otherwise totally without substance as far as defining marriage itself — except to say what it is not. The statutory scheme set out in KRS Chapter 402 is of a similar vein. It proclaims who may perform a valid marriage, and outlines the requirements for licensing. But license to do what? To marry. But what is marriage? Alas, we have come full circle once again and are left wanting for statutory light.
What constitutes “civil status” as mentioned in the statutory definition of marriage under KRS 402.005? What is a “condition or relation”? What are the “duties legally incumbent” upon the parties? More importantly, what does “united in law” mean? Where is the law defining those privileges, protections, and rights afforded a couple married under the statutory scheme set out in KRS Chapter 402? In short, this Court is cast upon a vast sea bereft of any statutory mooring.
Yet the making of a marriage is governed by lawful requirements that have a sealing affect upon this act of becoming “united in law.” KRS 402.050 states who may solemnize the marriage. The term “solemnize” is defined as “to enter into (a marriage, contract, etc.) by a formal act, usually before witnesses.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.2004). The statute states that marriage may be solemnized by the following: “ministers of the gospel or priests; justices and judges of the Court of Justice, county judges/executives, justices of the peace and fiscal court commissioners as authorized by the Governor or county judge/executive; and a religious society, if either party belongs to the society.” See KRS 402.050. Likewise, the statutory scheme sets out licensing requirements that must be met. See KRS 402.080 to KRS 402.110. Clearly then, legal formalities are required before the Commonwealth affords a couple the status of being “united in law.”
Yet, there is not any statutory guidance as to what “united in law” post ceremony means, nor is the definition of marriage expanded upon anywhere by legislative directive. Thus, absent any meaningful statutory direction, it falls upon the courts — in particular, this one — to determine what legal rights, protections, and immunities this ancient legal rite includes. For over one hundred years, this Court recognized that the marriage contract afforded either party redress from an interloper who invaded and disrupted the affectionate bond between the parties. Then, in one stroke of the pen, we abolished that right in Hoye. Here, we hold the line. We should state boldly that an interloper cannot simply ignore the existence of the marriage contract and assert a claim of fatherhood to a child born within the confines of the marital relationship. I conclude that the family court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim of a “stranger to the marriage” over the objection of the contracting pair.
The severely wounded institution of marriage in Kentucky surely protects the parties from unwanted interlopers claiming parenthood of a child conceived and born during their coverture. If not, then I am left to wonder if marriage has any legal meaning at all. I believe that it does.
We all agree that the overriding concern in this case is the welfare of the child. When considering the integrity of marriage, as we do here, we are not only dealing with this particular child, but with all children born to married couples. Marriage is an institutional umbrella under whose shade the protection, support, and *598nurturing of children looms vital. This critical protection extends to the children born of the marriage, if not of the bodies of the marriage.
In Hoye, part of the same reasoning for abolishing the tort of alienation of affections also serves as a reason to deny an interloper standing to sue a married couple for parental rights to a child born during the couple’s marriage. Said Justice Stephens, “Such suits invite abuse.... Not only is a defendant in these suits victim to vindictive or purely mercenary motives of the plaintiff, but such suits are likely to expose ‘minor children of the marriage to one of their parent’s extramarital activities, and may even require the children to testify to details of the family relationship in open court.’ ” 824 S.W.2d at 427.
Just as this Court held in Hoye that it had the authority to abolish the cause of action of alienation of affections absent statutory direction to the contrary, I submit that in light of the absence of statutory guidance as to the rights and protections of a duly married couple, this Court has full power to find compelling reasons to likewise protect those critical elements of the marriage contract.
This is not the first time this Court has been called upon to flesh out the legal parameters of marriage. In 1973, two women applied to the Jefferson County Court Clerk’s office for a marriage license. They were denied and their complaint ended up in this state’s highest court. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.1973). At that time, there was no statutory definition of marriage — not even the woefully ambiguous one we have today. Commissioner Vance, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated that Kentucky statutes did not include a definition of marriage, and therefore it had to be defined according to “common usage.” 501 S.W.2d at 589. In other words, marriage was what this Court said it was. And this Court said that marriage had to be between a man and a woman — twenty-five years before the legislature followed with codification of that rule.
Nine years before Hallahan, and without a statutory definition of marriage, the Court struck a significant blow for the protection of marriage in Board of Education of Harrodsburg v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky.1964). A sixteen-year-old student at Harrodsburg High School married and was promptly booted from school. She had violated a school board regulation requiring any student who married to withdraw from school, subject to being readmitted after one year with permission of the principal and under special conditions. This Court invalidated both the rule and the dismissal as being an arbitrary infringement upon the marriage contract. 383 S.W.2d at 680-81. In essence, it barred the interloping school board from “punishing” the young citizen for entering into a marriage covenant.
Also, it is clear to me that the purpose of the legislative scheme set out in KRS Chapter 406 was a means to compel parents to take care of their children. Adjudication of paternity is simply an essential prerequisite to the enforcement of that obligation. It was never intended to be a separate proceeding for a putative father to pursue other goals.
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Scott ably points to the litany of cases in other states which have held this view. Granted most, if not all, of those opinions are rooted in much stronger statutory authority than we have here. But the dearth of statutory treatment of the issue in this state only emphasizes the need for this Court to step into the void and give meaning to “united in law.” It is clear that in the absence of statutory treatment of the matter, we are acting within our authority *599when we limit standing to bring claims for paternity under the circumstances before this Court. The United States Supreme Court has provided a strong salute to this proposition. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), the Supreme Court of the United States confronted a factual situation very similar to the one we have before us. The nation’s highest court stated that the California statute, which created a “conclusive” presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is a child of the marriage, did not violate the substantive due process rights of the biological father who sought to demonstrate paternity. More pertinent to the question at hand, Justice Scalia noted that at the time of the opinion, four states had barred standing to interlopers to the marriage by judicial decisions rather than by statute. 491 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2343. Since that decision, in the absence of statutes directly or indirectly granting or limiting standing to dispute the presumption of legitimacy of children conceived or born during wedlock, some state courts have held that various persons lack standing to dispute the presumption of legitimacy of the children. Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Who May Dispute Presumption of Legitimacy of Child Conceived or Bom During Wedlock, 90 A.L.R.3d 1032 (1979).
There is certainly much logic in the excellent writing of the dissent of Justice Abramson. But this very important case goes well beyond the interpretations and nuances of existing writings of the legislature. By diverting our attention from what rights and protections a married couple has in this state, we turn the focus away from what, I believe, is the main issue. We are selling the pasture to buy the horse. The dissent gives no heed to what is at the center of this controversy— that is, the marriage contract to which the Appellants are parties, and all the rights, privileges, protections, and immunities attached to this long-standing legal arrangement.
Furthermore, I respectfully and strenuously take issue with two points stated by Justice Abramson. First, I reject the notion that a “marriage” ceased to exist when a “third party entered the picture.” To hold to this view would wreak havoc on the stability of what is considered to be the most endearing social contract of our civilization. Furthermore, Justice Abramson’s dissent suggests that, by our decision today, we are turning our backs upon a “biological truth” and denying truth its rightful place in our deliberations. I strongly disagree.
The truth is a child was born during a couple’s marriage. The truth is a third party claims parenthood of that child through an adulterous relationship with the child’s mother. The truth is the couple remains married and wishes to raise the child born during their marriage — a child legally presumed to be the husband’s under KRS 406.011 — without the interference of the interloper. This presumption is not new or unique to this case; it is applied equally to children born of marriages every day in the Commonwealth. After all, we have not reached the point where we require DNA-paternity testing on all children born in the Commonwealth. This is true because the legislature has adopted a public policy in the law that presumes a child born during a marriage is of that marriage. Further, this presumption is recognized as one of the strongest known to law. See Bartlett v. Com. ex. rel. Calloway, 705 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Ky.1986). Clearly then, the “truth” as to who the biological father may be — a most personal and intimate matter — is neither our right nor our responsibility to proclaim in these circumstances.
I recognize that to a large degree this writing seeks the ideal, and that the real *600state of matrimony in Kentucky — a state whose divorce rate is higher than the national average — falls way below the pedestal upon which I place it. But I also believe we are better off as a people following those standards we hold aloft, rather than those which we trample under foot. The facts of this case have presented a most difficult dilemma for this Court. We are sharply divided on an emotionally charged question. It is vital to recognize that all of these divergent views are being expressed from minds and hearts with the best intentions. And I, for one, recognize that there is no simple answer to what we all hope is a unique situation. But how unique it is, or how common it may become, depends much on what we say and do here today. As long as marriage is on the books, it must mean something. And what it means should be proclaimed by this Court in forceful terms, so that the people of Kentucky may circumscribe their behavior accordingly. We are in need of a bold declaration that the marriage circle, even one with an errant partner, will be invaded at one’s own legal risk.
It has been my sad discovery as a judge that in many of life’s baffling and painful problems there are no sure solutions, only less disastrous choices. Therefore, it would seem to me that if one accepts the inequities of our decision — which the dissent predicts as real possibilities — they pale in comparison to the disastrous precedent we will be setting if that viewpoint holds. It seems to me that the “broader community” spoken of by Justice Abram-son is best served in our society by holding fast and strengthening the mooring lines of marriage. The institution of marriage, slowly eroding from modern day notions of morality and personal freedoms, has for centuries been the anchor of the family unit. It has been the rock in the shadow of which children are born, shaded, protected, and nurtured. If children are born during the marriage, absent any abuse or neglect, they should stay within that marriage for as long as both partners wish to remain married, and for as long as the married couple wishes to nurture them. They should stay within the shadow of the rock.
Therefore, I join Justice Scott in concurring with the majority in its result only.
. Were we to decide this case differently, any married couple with children would be subject to such a claim. Standing could not be limited only to those who possess DNA-test results before filing. Further, it has been suggested that frivolous claims could be dealt with through CR 11 sanctions. The interloper, in order to defend an allegation that the claim was frivolous, would be allowed to present evidence of the extramarital affair and his basis for making the claim. In short, we would be back to the very evidence we did away with when no-fault divorce was adopted.