dissenting.
The majority errs in reversing this case because it overlooks the doctrine of curative admissibility.
The appellant testified that he picked up a 1977 grey Mercury Cougar from its owner, William Gray, in order to pick up some ice for Gray’s nightclub. A Texas Certificate of Title was introduced into evidence *603to this effect. Howard drove the car for a few minutes before Officers Holland and Harrison pulled the car over to the side of the road. He testified that he had been in the car for three minutes at most, that he had never seen those pill bottles before, and that he had no idea they were in the car. He then stated that they were not his pills, nor did he know to whom they belonged.
The admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal if the defendant testifies to the same facts. If a defendant admits or confirms the truth of the facts or evidence objected to, even while creating a defense based on those facts, the potential error is waived. The last and controlling case on the subject is Ehrman v. State, 580 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). See also Nelson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Corbell v. State, 508 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The defense was the lack of an affirmative link between the contraband and appellant’s control over the substance. It is un-controverted that appellant was in the car and that the pills were found at his feet. By testifying to these facts, appellant waived any objection he had to the pills’ admission into evidence.
The conviction should be affirmed.
Before the court en banc.