OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
PHILLIPS, Judge.A panel of this Court, in a decision which we are now asked by the State to reconsider, held that a jury does not have the authority under Article 42.12, V.A.C.C.P., to assess a defendant’s punishment at a term of confinement and a fine, with only the fine being probated.
In its motion for rehearing, the State relies on Section 1 of Article 42.12, supra, which provides in part:
*855It is the purpose of this Article to place wholly within the State courts of appropriate jurisdiction the responsibility for determining when the imposition of sentence in certain cases shall be suspended, the conditions of probation, and the supervision of probationers, in consonance with the powers assigned to the judicial branch of this government by the Constitution of Texas. . . . It is the final purpose of this Article to remove from existing statutes the limitations, other than questions of constitutionality, that have acted as barriers to effective systems of probations ... in the public interest.
This provision serves as a guide for the interpretation of the statute. It expresses the spirit of the statute, and does not permit us to ignore the plain implication of the statutory language. Other provisions of Article 42.12, supra, make it clear that a punishment of imprisonment may not be combined with a probated fine.
In Section 2 of the statute, “probation” is defined as “the release of a convicted defendant by a court under conditions imposed by the court for a specified period during which the imposition of sentence is suspended.” (Emphasis added) As was noted in the opinion on original submission, this definition implies that a defendant placed on probation shall be released from confinement. That is not the case if the defendant is confined for a term of years and at the same time is placed on probation with respect to his fine.
Section 3 of the statute provides in part that trial judges have the power to suspend the imposition of sentence and “place the defendant on probation or impose a fine applicable to the offense committed and also place the defendant on probation as hereinafter provided.” This language, which has been in the probation statute of this State since 1947, clearly distinguishes between an assessment of probation and an assessment of a fine.
Section 3a of the statute was amended in 1975 to provide in part that
When the jury recommends probation, it may also assess a fine applicable to the offense for which the defendant was convicted. .
The same distinction between the assessment of probation and the assessment of a fine is made here. This indicates that the Legislature did not contemplate that fines would be probated.
Section 3 states:
In all cases where the punishment is assessed by the Court it may fix the period of probation without regard to the term of punishment assessed, but in no event may the period of probation be greater than 10 years or less than the minimum prescribed for the offense for which the defendant was convicted. (Emphasis added)
This language indicates that probation is to be applied only to an assessment of punishment which includes a term of years. This excludes the probation of a fine by itself. See also Section 8(a) of the statute, which provides that if probation is revoked, the court may reduce “the term of imprisonment originally assessed” if it determines that it is in the best interests of society and the probationer.
At the time petitioner was sentenced Section 3a provided in relevant part:
Where there is a conviction in any court of this State and the punishment assessed by the jury shall not exceed ten years, the jury may recommend probation upon written sworn motion made therefor by the defendant, filed before the trial begins. ... In all eligible cases, probation shall be granted by the court, if the jury recommends it in their verdict .
The jury’s option was limited to either recommending or not recommending probation of the punishment which the jury decided to impose. See the opinion on original submission. For felonies, such punishment necessarily includes a term of imprisonment.
Finally, the 1975 amendment of Section 3a specifically gave the jury, like the judge, the power to assess a fine in addition to recommending that the defendant be placed on probation with respect to his imprisonment. The Legislature did not *856provide, and has not ever provided, that the jury or judge could do the converse, i. e., assess a term of imprisonment and probate the fine. It is a well-known rule of statutory construction in this State and elsewhere that the express mention or enumeration of one person, thing, consequence, or class is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. See 53 Tex.Jur.2d, Statutes, Section 142, pp. 205-207; Peterson v. Calvert, 473 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Civ.App.1971, writ ref’d). This rule has been pronounced a logical, sensible, and sound rule of statutory construction. See Carp v. Texas State Board of Examiners of Optometry, 401 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1966), aff’d, 412 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.1967); City of Dallas v. Yarbrough, 399 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Civ.App. 1966, no writ); Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923). In this case the Legislature’s specific instruction that the jury can assess a fine applicable to the offense when it recommends probation of the term of imprisonment implies that the jury cannot do the converse without express statutory authority.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion and the prior panel opinion we conclude that this case was properly decided on original submission. Article 42.12, § 1, supra, does not require a different result.
The State’s motion for rehearing is denied.