dissenting.
The majority holds “that it was error to admit proof of the misconduct for which the appellant’s probation was revoked.” The majority fails to recognize that the “proof of the misconduct” was in no greater detail than that contained in the motion to revoke probation. Since the motion to revoke probation was admissible, no harm was done to appellant.
Article 38.29, V.A.C.C.P., provides that a defendant may be impeached by evidence of a final conviction. A conviction is not final or otherwise admissible under Article 38.29 if the defendant has served out his probation. We have held that proof of a final conviction may include the indictment. Barnes v. State, 503 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). We have also held that the defense could not prevent proof of the prior conviction, including the indictment, by stipulating to the conviction. Barnes v. State, supra; Wright v. State, 364 S.W.2d 384 (Tex.Cr.App.1963).
In the instant case, Cross took the stand and subjected himself to impeachment through use of his prior conviction for burglary. The documentary proof of the conviction, whether in the form of the original judgment and order granting probation or in the form of the order revoking probation, would necessarily indicate that probation was granted and revoked. Thus the fact of Cross’ probation could be proved to show the finality of the burglary conviction. Since the indictment may be introduced as part of the proof of a conviction, there is no reason that the motion to revoke probation cannot be introduced as part of the proof that probation was revoked.
The motion to revoke probation introduced in this case contained the following details:
“ . . . did on the 4th day of July, 1971, violate the terms of said probation by making an assault upon Edmond Carroll, and by shooting the said Edmond Carroll with a gun, such shooting not being in his own necessary self-defense.”
The order revoking probation contained no additional facts. The prosecution, in cross-examining Cross on the incident, did not elicit any additional facts.
This writer agrees with the majority’s basic premise; the underlying details of the misconduct which forms the basis for either a conviction or probation revocation should not be admissible. However, the majority goes too far in applying this principle to the facts of this case. The State was entitled to prove Cross’ prior, final conviction. The documents proving the conviction indicate that his probation was revoked because of a shooting. Neither the motion to revoke nor the State’s cross-examination showed any additional details. Given these facts, no error is shown.