(dissenting).
The trial court, the Court of Appeal,' and the majority of this court all have concluded that the plaintiff suffered a heart attack as a result of an accident within the contemplation of our Workmen’s Compensation law, and that he is totally and permanently disabled by heart disease from hard manual labor. The trial court found causal connection between the accident and the disability. The majority opinion would affirm the appellate court and deny a causal connection between the accident and the disability. ■ ■
I agree that the issue presented is, as stated by the majority, “ * * * whether there is any causal connection between the accident of June 1, 1965 and the disability of which plaintiff complains”. I differ with their conclusion that it is a question , of fact dependent upon the testimony of the doctors who examined and treated the plaintiff. It is my belief that all of the testimony supports a legal conclusion contrary to that reached by the majority, and for the purposes of this dissent I will accept the majority’s theory of which medical testimony is correct.
The majority cite Seals v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 151 So.2d 587 (La.App.3rd Cir.1963), cert. den. 244 La. 398, 152 So.2d 63, which the appellate court also relied upon *1127in arriving at its judgment. Factually that case is almost identical with the case presented to us. In each case the plaintiff was suffering from arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease when he experienced an attack of angina as a result of an accident. It has been reasoned in each case that the plaintiff failed to carry by a preponderance of the evidence his burden of proving that there was arterial or heart change after the accident or that the disease, arteriosclerosis, was caused or aggravated by the accident.
The medical testimony in this case as well as the reasoning of the court has been directed to a determination of whether the pre-existing disease has been aggravated or the affected organ changed by the accident. This is not the question which the theory of the Workmen’s Compensation Act requires us to answer. The query should be: Has the plaintiff’s physical condition been changed by reason of the accident so as to render him disabled and unfit for employment?
The trial judge reasoned from personal observation and lay testimony that there was in fact a physical change in the plaintiff, i. e., he is now pale, perspires heavily, and cannot tolerate heat. All of the medical testimony concludes that the second angina attack in the presence of arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease precludes plaintiff’s return to work.1 After the first attack the plaintiff had specific medical approval to return to work and was actually performing hard physical labor without any apparent symptoms of either disease or disability. Since all medical authorities would now refuse to allow the plaintiff to return to work following the second coronary, not only is it to be presumed but it must be deduced that the second attack produced some change in the body of the plaintiff. It must follow that there is a causal connection between the accident and the disability.
It was noted in the dissent in the Seals case, supra, that medical experts are unable to determine the cause, the time of onset, the rate of acceleration, or the reason for the progress of arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease. A plaintiff cannot be required to submit more proof than is here offered that he has suffered disability by reason of a causally connected accident when any additional proof must come from an inexact science whose practitioners admittedly are very unknowledgeable concerning the disabling cause.
Before the accident this plaintiff though suffering from arteriosclerotic cardiovascu*1129lar disease exhibited no disabling symptoms ■of that disease and was apparently in good health and able to respond to the physical demands of his employment. He was working with medical approval and with his employer’s full knowledge of the existing dormant disease. He has established an accident and his inability to return to work. Medical opinion which now requires the plaintiff to desist from work must therefore recognize a change in his physical condition because of the accident. I find that the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence the causal connection between the accident and the disability; indeed, I find it is impossible to conclude otherwise.
The Seals case and the majority here have narrowly defined and overnicely refined the issue. The legal criterion in compensation cases involving heart disease should be whether the accident caused a change in the employee’s physical condition which is disabling, and not whether the accident changed the diseased organ of the employee. The residual condition from an accidental injury which substantially increases the possibility of recurrence of a disabling or death-dealing episode is legally disabling and is compensable under our Workmen’s Compensation law.
The court should be concerned with the whole man and with the effect that an accident occurring during the course of employment has upon his earning ability. The court should not offer as alternatives to an accidentally injured employee the return to work at great risk or the dependency upon public support. Workmen’s compensation is a creation of the Legislature for the very purpose of localizing the economic responsibility in such situations.
I would specifically overrule Seals v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., supra, and I would award compensation benefits to this plaintiff. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
. As the Court of Appeal properly reasoned, even Dr. Craig’s suggestion that “plaintiff could be given a series of ‘graded exercises’ under a doctor’s close observation to determine how much physical exertion his heart would tolerate” has the legal effect of classifying the plaintiff as disabled until such tests could be completed.