(concurring}. I fully endorse Judge
Cavanagh’s conclusion that both recent Supreme Court authority and due regard for the effective administration of our system of criminal justice set definite limits on the power of circuit judges to control prosecutorial decision making.
I also agree with Judge Burns’ view that the trial judge cannot properly accept a plea to the charge of attempted felonious assault since, as Judge Burns points out, there is no such crime. See People v Genes, 58 Mich App 108; 227 NW2d 241 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Bronson, J.).
If the trial judge had denied the prosecutor’s motion to add a count because the crime charged in that count did not exist, then I would readily *152affirm. However, the trial judge gave no reason for his decision. There is every indication from the record that he did not deny the motion to add a count for the right reason — that the prosecutor was abusing his discretion in charging defendant with a nonexistent crime — but rather that he agreed with the police officer and the complaining witness that defendant should be tried for the more serious offense. Such an exercise of judicial power, as Judge Cavanagh so ably points out, is an unacceptable intrusion into the executive sphere of government.
It is equally important that the trial judge provide the prosecutor with the reasons underlying his decision. Had the trial judge indicated that he felt he had the authority to require defendant to stand trial on the original charge, the prosecutor might well have then and there presented the relevant authorities and convinced the trial judge that he could not exercise such judicial power. On the other hand, had the prosecutor been made aware of the fact that the count he proposed to add was unacceptable, he may well have substituted a different charge which would have suited everyone. In any event, given the absence of any reason for the denial of the motion in this case, I vote to remand.
On remand, the prosecutor should refrain from moving to add charges to the information which do not exist. Even those members of this Court who dispute my view that one cannot plead guilty to a nonexistent offense agree that the practice should not be encouraged. People v Larkins, 59 Mich App 199; 299 NW2d 378 (1975). The prosecutor has at his disposal an impressive array of bargainable items, People v Hubbard, 57 Mich App 542; 226 NW2d 557 (1975). Resorting to crime fabrication is unnecessary.