¶ 74. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the due process personal jurisdiction prerequisite of "minimum contacts" with the forum state pursuant to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), is not applicable in termination of parental rights cases. Majority op., ¶ 37. The majority reaches this conclusion by characterizing termination of parental rights as a "status" determination not subject to "minimum contacts" personal jurisdiction requirements. Majority op., ¶ 40. The majority also concludes that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Wis. Stat. § 822.01-.25, read together with Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11), constitutes a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has no contacts with Wisconsin, provided that notice and an opportunity to be heard are afforded. Majority op., ¶¶ 37-40.
¶ 75. The majority places substantial emphasis on the interests and needs of the child, the parens patriae interests of the forum state, and the interest in avoiding the practical and very human problems associated with the "jurisdictional limbo" that can occur when biological parents reside in different states and grounds for termination of parental rights exist. Id. I agree that these are strong justifications for the jurisdictional rule the majority adopts. However, the majority has not evaluated these justifications against the interest that occupies the other side of the scale: a parent's fundamental and constitutionally protected interest in the parent-child relationship.
*253¶ 76. I recognize that the extreme facts of this case are not such as would induce a court to place much value on this particular non-resident father's rights or interests, particularly as against the compelling nature of this child's situation. But resolving the question of whether due process requires "minimum contacts" with the forum state before a non-resident's parental rights are terminated requires that we consider the fundamental nature and importance of parental rights in general, which the majority has not done. Resolving the jurisdictional question presented here also requires consideration of the United States Supreme Court precedent most closely on point, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), which the majority mentions only summarily, in response to this dissent.
¶ 77. The United States Supreme Court has "recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected." Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). Termination of parental rights implicates "a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). This fundamental liberty interest "does not evaporate simply because [parents] have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State." Id. "When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 753-54.
¶ 78. This court has characterized parental rights as among the most fundamental of human rights. Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶ 20, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W 2d 768. More specifically:
Terminations of parental rights affects some of parents' most fundamental human rights. T.M.F. v. *254Children's Serv. Soc'y, 112 Wis. 2d 180, 184, 332 N.W.2d 293 (1983). At stake for a parent [in a termination of parental rights action] is his or her "interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her child." Id. Further, the permanency of termination orders "work[s] a unique kind of deprivation. In contrast to matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances, termination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996)(citations and quotations omitted). For these reasons, "parental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action." Id.
Id.
¶ 79. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires "that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
¶ 80. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction [over non-resident defendants] must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny," that is, on the basis of the quality and quantity of the non-resident's contacts with the forum state. In a footnote, however, the Court said that it was not suggesting "that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard of fairness [in International Shoe]." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 n.30. The majority focuses its *255analysis on this footnote, and its reference to the so-called "status exception" to the "minimum contacts" personal jurisdiction requirement of International Shoe.
¶ 81. However, in a pr e-Shaffer case with important implications for the issue presented here, the Supreme Court held that a child custody decree against a non-resident parent with no presence in or contact with the forum state is not entitled to full faith and credit enforcement in another state. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The issue in May was stated as follows:
The question presented is whether, in a habeas corpus proceeding attacking the right of a mother to retain possession of her minor children, an Ohio court must give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody of the children to their father when that decree is obtained by the father in an ex parte divorce action in a Wisconsin court which had no personal jurisdiction over the mother. For the reasons hereafter stated, our answer is no.
Id. at 528-29.
¶ 82. The Court noted that its prior decisions in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), and Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948), had distinguished, for purposes of jurisdictional analysis, between a decree of divorce and the extinguishment of the right to support:
In Estin v. Estin, supra, and Kreiger v. Kreiger, supra, this Court upheld the validity of a Nevada divorce obtained ex parte by a husband, resident in Nevada, insofar as it dissolved the bonds of matrimony. At the same time, we held Nevada powerless to cut off, in that proceeding, a spouse's right to financial support under the prior decree of another state. In the instant case, we recognize that a mother's right to custody of her *256children is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right to alimony.
May, 345 U.S. at 533-34 (emphasis added.)
¶ 83. Noting that "[rjights far more precious to [the mother] than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of custody," the Court held that "where [a parent] is neither domiciled, resident nor present" in the forum state, that state may not "cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam." Id. at 533 (emphasis added). The majority in May also dismissed any argument based upon the "legal domicile" of the children (as opposed to their residence or presence): "We find it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile because, even if it be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their immediate possession." Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
¶ 84. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter characterized the decision of the Court as follows: "What is decided — the only thing the Court decides — is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Ohio, in disposing of the custody of children in Ohio, to accept, in the circumstances before us, the disposition made by Wisconsin." Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) Justice Frankfurter went on to explain his position:
Property, personal claims, and even the marriage status . .. generally give rise to interests different from those relevant to the discharge of a State's continuing responsibility to children within her borders. Children *257have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty toward children. ... [T]he child's welfare in a custody case has such a claim upon the State that its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility at another time. Reliance on opinions regarding out-of-State adjudications of property rights, personal claims or the marital status is bound to confuse analysis when a claim to the custody of children before the courts of one State is based on an award previously made by another State. Whatever light may be had from such opinions, they cannot give conclusive answers.
Id. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring.)
¶ 85. Despite these qualifications, Justice Frankfurter did not merely concur in the majority's result, but, rather, joined the majority opinion.1 Id. at 535. His separate opinion elaborates on the special nature of parental rights claims as distinct from property claims, personal claims, and claims pertaining to marital status.
¶ 86. Although May involved a collateral challenge to the personal jurisdictional underpinnings of a child custody decree under full faith and credit, rather than a direct jurisdictional challenge as in this case, it is nevertheless the Supreme Court's most closely applicable statement of the law on the personal jurisdiction question presented here.2 And although it was a cus*258tody dispute rather than an action to terminate parental rights, May's reasoning applies with even greater force in the context of termination of parental rights, in which much more than just custody is at stake. It is unusual, therefore, that the majority addresses May only summarily, in response to this dissent.
¶ 87. The Supreme Court has not revisited May, but it has not overruled or circumscribed its holding either, nor has the Court taken up the question of whether child custody or termination of parental rights cases fall within the status exception to International Shoe that was held in reserve by the footnote in Shaffer. The Court could have overruled or in some way addressed the continuing vitality oí May in its reference to the status exception in the Shaffer footnote, but it did not. We cannot, therefore, simply ignore May's conclusion about the jurisdictional validity of a child custody decree entered without personal jurisdiction over a non-resident parent.3
*259¶ 88. In its summary rejection of May, the majority implies that the case is no longer relevant in light of Shaffer. Majority op., ¶ 32. May, however, has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in a post-Shaffer termination of parental rights case, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("Here the State has sought not simply to infringe upon [the parental] interest but to end it. If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation.") (citing May, 345 U.S. at 533).
¶ 89. Following Lassiter, the Court decided San-tosky, which required the middle "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases. There, the Court held that "state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and [a] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause" and that "persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights" have a "critical need" for the procedural protections of the due process guarantee. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. The Court reiterated that termination of parental rights implicates a fundamental liberty interest, and noted that "[t]he fact that important liberty interests" of the child and the other parent may also be implicated "does not justify" a denial of constitutionally adequate procedures. Id. at 754 n.7.
¶ 90. Indeed, the majority recognizes that the Supreme Court "has made clear" that "subjects such as alimony and child support are not covered by the status exception." Majority op., ¶ 25 n.5 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1978)). May held that the right to custody of children is "a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as [the] right to *260alimony." May, 345 U.S. at 533-34. Termination of parental rights actions, therefore, cannot be covered by the status exception.
¶ 91. The majority asserts that "[m]ost courts that have considered the validity of jurisdiction under the UCCJA have determined that the status exception applies to child custody cases under the UCCJA, and that personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts is not required." Majority op., ¶ 30. This appears to be true for child custody cases, which those courts that have addressed the matter have quite readily characterized as pure status determinations for purposes of the Shaffer footnote.
¶ 92. The majority makes a similar assertion regarding personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in termination of parental rights cases, as distinct from child custody cases. Majority op., ¶ 32. In this area, however, the consensus, and proper analysis, are less clear. Five states — Alaska, Kansas, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah — have applied the status exception to conclude that "minimum contacts" were not necessary in termination of parental rights cases. S.B. v. State of Alaska, 61 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2002); In re M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316 (Kan. App. 1989); In re Adoption of Copeland, 43 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. App. 2000); In re M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App. 1980); D.A. v. State of Utah, 63 P.3d 607 (Utah 2002). Two states — New Mexico and Hawaii— have declined to adopt the status exception and have required "minimum contacts" for the establishment of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in termination of parental rights cases. Vernon R. v. Elizabeth V., 991 P.2d 986 (N.M. 1999) (leaving open the possibility of recognizing a UCCJA-based status exception in a custody or adoption-contemplation termination case); In the Interest of John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290 *261(Haw. 1996). Two additional states — Arizona and Montana — have asserted personal jurisdiction in the absence of "minimum contacts" without discussing the status exception. Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086 (Mont. 1979); In the Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action, 543 P.2d 454 (Ariz. 1975).
¶ 93. And although custody determinations might be more readily characterized as status determinations than parental rights terminations, at least two courts have cited May and concluded that child custody determinations require "minimum contacts" personal jurisdiction over a non-resident parent. In re Dean, 447 So.2d 733, 735 (Ala. 1984); Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-1126 (Ohio 1980).
¶ 94. I recognize that in the case of In the Interest of A.E.H., 161 Wis. 2d 277, 468 N.W.2d 190 (1991), this court stated that termination of parental rights cases constitute "custody determinations" within the meaning of the UCCJA. But A.E.H. addressed the question of a Wisconsin court's competency over a termination determination under the UCCJA vis-a-vis the court of another state; the case did not address the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-resident parents. Id. at 298-301. The court of appeals in Davidson v. Davidson, 169 Wis. 2d 546, 556, 485 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1992) held that in a child custody case under the UCCJA (not a parental rights termination case) due process is satisfied when "the out-of-state parent is given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the manner provided by the UCCJA." This, however, was a one-sentence conclusory holding without any analysis whatsoever.
¶ 95. In contrast, this court has concluded that in a paternity action, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant without sufficient mini*262mum contacts with the state violates due process. State ex rel. N.R.Z. v. G.L.C., 152 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 447 N.W.2d 533 (1989). Similarly, the court of appeals has held that the UCCJA does not supply a constitutionally sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a paternity action in the absence of "minimum contacts" with this state. Paula M.S. v. Neal A.R., 226 Wis. 2d 79, 88, 593 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1999). I do not see how due process— "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" —distinguishes between an action to establish paternity and an action to terminate paternity, except perhaps that the former may result in the imposition of financial obligations. Actions to terminate parental rights, no less than paternity actions, require more than mere notice and an opportunity to be heard before extra-territorial personal jurisdiction may be constitutionally asserted.
¶ 96. Given the fundamental and constitutionally protected nature of parental rights and the permanency of a termination adjudication, and with May as the Supreme Court's most relevant pronouncement on the issue, I cannot agree that the assertion of personal jurisdiction in this termination of parental rights case over a non-resident parent who has had no contact with Wisconsin is constitutionally permissible. While there may be instances of jurisdictional necessity in this context, such as an abandoned child whose biological parents cannot be located, this is not such a case, and we should leave such questions for a case that properly presents them. Majority op., ¶ 38.
¶ 97. Unlike a child custody determination, which can be modified, termination of parental rights is final, severs permanently all legal recognition of the parent-child relationship, and is therefore "among the *263most severe forms of state action." Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 20 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996)). Accordingly, the rights and interests at stake for the non-resident parent are at least as significant as those in an action to determine paternity (State ex rel. N.R.Z.), alimony, or child support (Kulko). I agree with the court of appeals that the personal jurisdictional requirement of "minimum contacts" under International Shoe is applicable here. See In re Termination of Parental Rights to Thomas J.R., 2002 WI App 56, 251 Wis. 2d 483, 640 N.W.2d 566.
¶ 98. Termination of Robert T.R.'s parental rights may indeed be in Thomas J.R.'s best interests, in order to clear the way for his adoption by his step-father. But before the merits of the question can be reached, there must be a constitutionally adequate basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over his non-resident father, and that is missing here. I would affirm the court of appeals.
In any event, one justice did not participate, so the case was decided on a 5-3 vote, not a mere plurality. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953).
The United States Supreme Court has also held that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction in an action for *258child support against a "nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within the State" violates due process if the non-resident parent has insufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 86 (1978). The Court's holding in Kulko was based on the long-standing rule "that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant," and that "personal jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant... [and] a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum." Id. at 91 (citations omitted). See also, majority op., ¶ 25 n.5.
May is cited but not discussed in Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97, a post-Shaffer case.