concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur on all other grounds, I must respectfully dissent from my esteemed colleagues’ opinion requiring the Department of Corrections to promulgate the lethal injection protocol as an administrative regulation before proceeding with further executions.5 I dissent because the *494death penalty is not a private right or procedure available to the public and the procedures used by the Department of Corrections are statements of internal management pursuant to KRS 13A.010(2)(a).6 Therefore, this is not a matter which requires the promulgation of administrative regulations under Kentucky’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA).7
Currently, there are thirty-six inmates on death row in Kentucky.8 Thus, it is erroneous to say that lethal injection is a private right or procedure available to the public, when Kentucky’s “public” consists of more than 4.2 million people, none of whom could unilaterally choose for the Commonwealth of Kentucky to end their life by means of execution. Though the thirty-six individuals on death row may be executed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, it is not because they possess this right. Rather, even if a defendant refused to present mitigating evidence at trial and requested a sentence of death in his or her plea agreement, the trial court would not be obligated to impose such sentence. Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 177 (Ky.2007) (“Sentencing a defendant to death because the defendant volunteers to be executed is improper and is an abuse of discretion.”). No person, not even one convicted of a capital offense, has a “right” to the death penalty. As the death penalty is not a private right or procedure available to the public pursuant to a plain reading of KRS 13A.010(2)(a), the Department of Corrections should not be required to promulgate administrative regulations concerning lethal injection.
In addition, by requiring these regulations, the majority adds a new stratum to the already steep terrain which must be traversed before the Commonwealth can carry out an inmate’s death sentence. If a civil suit under Kentucky’s APA can be used to further delay executions time and time again, where will we find the end of such measures? A multitude of new appeals from this administrative process will now become the new “delay tool” in death penalty protests.
In Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311-12 (Tenn.2005), it was argued that the procedures which made up the lethal injection protocol constituted *495rules which had been adopted in violation of the state’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). The Tennessee Su- ' preme Court, however, held: “a ‘rule’ does not include ‘[statements concerning only the internal management of state government and not affecting private rights, privileges or procedures available to the public.’ ” Id. at 311 (citing Tenn.Code Ann. 4-5 — 102(10)(A)). Just as in Tennessee, the Kentucky lethal injection protocol is a matter of the internal management of the Department of Corrections which does not affect private rights or procedures available to the public pursuant to KRS 13A.010(2)(a). Rather, the lethal injection protocol fits neatly within the exception provided by the statute. Id.9
Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the Department of Corrections was not required to promulgate their lethal injection protocol before proceeding with executions, in spite of statutory authorization. Under the Tennessee lethal injection statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-23-114(c), the Department of Corrections was specifically authorized to promulgate the regulations necessary to implement the statute. The court held that the authority to make regulations regarding lethal injection is not tantamount to a requirement to do so. Kentucky’s lethal injection statute, KRS 431.220,10 provides no such direction to the Department of Corrections concerning the promulgation of regulations.
Furthermore, it is not certain that lethal injection will be the means of execution in the event that Appellants’ death sentences are carried out. While KRS 431.220 contains no directive requiring the Department of Corrections to promulgate regulations concerning lethal injection, it does contain another requirement: that any inmate sentenced to death prior to March 31, 1998 is to be given the choice between lethal injection and electrocution. KRS 431.220(l)(b). It is only after an inmate refuses to make this choice at least twenty (20) days before their execution is scheduled to take place that lethal injection is selected by default. Id. All three Appel-*496fonts in this case were sentenced to death before March 31, 1998 — therefore, it is not even certain any one of them will choose lethal injection as his method of execution. Since they can opt out of lethal injection if they so choose, we should not consider their claims that the Department of Corrections must promulgate the lethal injection protocol as an administrative regulation.
And, even if we were to postpone Appellant Moore’s execution until the Department of Corrections promulgates these regulations, the same should not be so for Appellants Baze and Bowling. As the majority held, their claims are barred by res judicata, or more particularly, the bar against splitting causes of action. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that the lethal injection protocol used by the Commonwealth of Kentucky does not violate their Eighth Amendment rights. See generally Baze, 217 S.W.3d 207; Baze, 553 U.S. 35, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420. Thus, since their action is barred, their judgment should not be stayed.
Moreover, taking the majority’s position to its ultimate conclusion, even though res judicata would bar Baze, Bowling, and Moore from bringing another appeal, any other inmate sentenced to death prior to March 31, 1998 could choose electrocution as the manner in which his death sentence is to be carried out, and then pursue lengthy and unnecessary appeals that would force the Department of Corrections to promulgate administrative, regulations regarding the procedures employed for electrocution. If this were to occur, under the majority’s reasoning, any inmate sentenced to death prior to March 31, 1998 (including the three Appellants in the case at bar) could opt for electrocution as their means of execution, and their sentences could not be carried out until the Department of Corrections promulgated such regulations.
Since 1911, the Commonwealth of Kentucky has used electrocution to carry out death sentences. Neither before nor after the adoption of Kentucky’s APA has the Department of Corrections promulgated administrative regulations regarding electrocution (as the majority is now requiring be adopted concerning lethal injection). While electrocution is still used in Kentucky, the circumstances under which it may be employed are very limited: an inmate sentenced to death prior to March 31,1998 would have to choose electrocution as the means by which his or her death sentence is to be carried out. It defies reason that a method of execution employed since 1911 in Kentucky and not used since 1997 would now — when it can be used in such limited circumstances — be the subject of newly-promulgated regulations.
While recognizing the seriousness of the execution of an inmate, the Department of Corrections, at some point, must be allowed to carry out the sentences through procedures that have already been approved by the highest Courts in both our State and our Nation.
Many years have gone by since these crimes deemed worthy of death have been committed: over thirty (30) years in the case of Appellant Moore, seventeen (17) years in the case of Appellant Baze, and nineteen (19) years in the case of Appellant Bowling. These cases cry out for closure. The families of the victims cry out for closure. The condemned are entitled to closure — not at their own hands, but at the hands of an appropriate judgment. Respect for our law erodes when timely punishment is not given its fair place upon the scales of justice.
It is for these reasons that I dissent from the majority’s opinion requiring the *497Kentucky Department of Corrections to promulgate the lethal injection protocol as an administrative regulation before conducting further executions.
CUNNINGHAM and VENTERS, JJ., join this opinion.
. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court recently approved the lethal in*494jection protocol at issue, holding that it did not violate the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment set forth in Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky.2006); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008). Since its review by the Unites States Supreme Court, the lethal injection protocol was used to carry out the execution of one inmate, Marco Chapman, on November 21, 2008.
.KRS 13A.010 reads, in pertinent part:
(2) “Administrative regulation” means each statement of general applicability promulgated by an Administrative body that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any administrative body. The term includes an existing administrative regulation, a new administrative regulation, an emergency administrative regulation, an administrative regulation in contemplation of a statute, the amendment or repeal of an existing administrative regulation, but does not include:
(a) Statements concerning only the internal management of an administrative body and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public ...
(emphasis added).
. KRS 13A.100 describes the matters for which administrative regulations must be promulgated. This statute is prefaced, however, with a statement which narrows its reach: "[s]ubjeci to limitations in applicable statutes. ...” KRS 13A.0I0(2) provides such limitations.
. Of the thirty-six death-row inmates, there are thirty-five males and one female.
. The majority attacks the relevancy of Ab-dur’Rahman for reasons that sixteen (16) months after its rendition, the governor of Tennessee made a political decision to revamp the execution procedures employed by the state. However, as previously stated, the decision here turns on whether lethal injection affects a right or procedure available to the public. That is the issue we were asked to address and which we have addressed. Political decisions are rightfully the province of the executive and legislative branches of government — not the judicial.
. KRS 431.220 reads:
(1)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, every death sentence shall be executed by continuous intravenous injection of a substance or combination of substances sufficient to cause death. The lethal injection shall continue until the prisoner is dead.
(b) Prisoners who receive a death sentence prior to March 31, 1998, shall choose the method of execution described in paragraph (a) of this subsection or the method of execution known as electrocution, which shall consist of passing through the prisoner’s body a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death as quickly as possible. The application of the current shall continue until the prisoner is dead. If the prisoner refuses to make a choice at least twenty (20) days before the scheduled execution, the method shall be by lethal injection.
(2) All executions of the death penalty by electrocution or lethal injection shall take place within the confines of the state penal institution designated by the Department of Corrections, and in an enclosure that will exclude public view thereof.
(3) No physician shall be involved in the conduct of an execution except to certify cause of death provided that the condemned is declared dead by another person.