CONCURRING OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
KELLER, Judge,concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, but write in response to Judge Baird’s dissenting opinion.
In Sterling v. State, 800 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), within three weeks of being sworn in, Judge Baird voted to grant the Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing even *949though he had not participated in the original decision handed down before he joined the Court. In the capital murder case of County v. State, 812 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), in the Opinion on Rehearing, Judge Baird concurred in the result — a result different from that reached on original submission before he joined the Court. In Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), in the Opinion on Rehearing, Judge Baird joined the majority in reaching a conclusion different from that reached on original submission before he joined the Court. And in Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) Judge Baird joined the Opinion on Rehearing, again with a result contrary to the result in the opinion on original submission handed down before he joined the Court. In County, Miller, and Montgomery, the opinion on rehearing not only changed the result of the opinion on original submission, but also reversed the conviction. I do not criticize Judge Baird for taking part in these cases; this Court has no rule or policy prohibiting such participation. I simply point out that when Judge Baird joined the Court, he had no objection to the practice which he condemns today.
Regarding the substance of his dissent, Judge Baird is right about one thing: the belief that might-makes-right is dangerous in a society governed by the rule of law. But in this case, his criticism would be more properly directed toward the former majority than toward the current majority. In the opinion on original submission, the former majority “torturfed] our own statutory scheme governing pretrial determinations,” and changed the law “without notice, without reason, without conscience, and without forethought.” Had the former majority adhered to the principles of judicial conservatism espoused in Judge Baird’s dissent, we would not today be in the position of correcting the error then committed.