dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
On July 16, 1986, NCR and Taylor Management Systems (TMS) entered into a software license agreement (the Agreement) which contained an arbitration clause. After the Green parties had filed this suit in the state courts of Texas, NCR brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, seeking an order compelling the Green parties to submit the claims in this case to arbitration in accordance with the license agreement. The Batton parties (Batton) then filed in this case their first amended plea in abatement and motion to stay action pending arbitration.
In the amended pleadings in our case, Batton prays “the Court stay further proceedings in this case pending completion of arbitration as provided in the Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Batton asked the court to stay proceedings because “[o]n May 16, 1990, NCR instituted suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, ... seeking an order compelling the Defendants to submit the claims in this case to arbitration as provided by the Agreement.” (Emphasis added.)
Examining the pleadings and recognizing that the motion was filed to protect arbitration proceedings involving the same parties, I dissent from the majority’s opinion. The majority chooses not to recognize the motion in our case as one to protect arbitra*931tion proceedings in progress because Bat-ton has not met the formal requirements of the Texas General Arbitration Act (TAA) and of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Robert V. Buck & Associates Architects, Inc., v. MHTA Partnership, 783 S.W.2d 822 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no writ), holds that an order staying arbitration proceedings is appealable under the TAA “or as an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction ” under section 51.-014 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. Buck, 783 S.W.2d at 822-23 (emphasis added). Ignoring the pending case in Ohio, which involves the same parties and issues and depends upon the license agreement obligating the parties to arbitrate, operates to foster a duplicity of actions.
The Agreement, a written contract, is the sine qua non of the Texas plaintiffs’ cause of action. Without the Agreement, the Green parties have no cause of action. The corporate parties agreed to a valid choice of law provision in their contract and determined that they would arbitrate in Dayton, Ohio, and that Ohio substantive law would apply. The Green parties now seek individually to recover damages from the NCR corporate officers, claiming that their (the Green parties’) rights under the license agreement have been damaged through fraudulent actions of the NCR corporate officers. The Green parties should not be able to sue Batton in the Texas court to circumvent the agreement they had previously made. By allowing the Green parties to litigate, this Court is allowing them to rely on the Agreement as the basis for a cause of action while disregarding the Agreement’s terms and its arbitration clause.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
One issue to be resolved is whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) pre-empts Texas law. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (West 1970 & Supp.1990). I conclude that allowing the Green parties to continue to litigate because Batton did not meet the formal requirements of the TAA and section 51.-014 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code is in conflict with the FAA. Bat-ton’s argument that the FAA applies is a compelling one in light of state and federal decisions. In refusing Batton’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds, this Court is denying Batton a federal right guaranteed him under the FAA. Section 15 of Title 9 provides for appeals from an order “refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). Denying Batton’s right to appeal and thus forcing him to litigate his claim in the state courts rather than proceeding to arbitration defeats the purpose of the FAA. Strict local rules of pleading should not be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal law. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298, 70 S.Ct. 105, 107-08, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949). The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated in the name of local practice. Brown, 338 U.S. at 299, 70 S.Ct. at 108 (citing Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24, 44 S.Ct. 13, 14, 68 L.Ed. 143 (1923)).
Section 2 of the FAA favors “arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (emphasis added). Section 3 of the FAA requires a court to stay proceedings where the issue is referable to arbitration upon application of one of the parties until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 9 U.S. C.A. § 3 (West 1970). The United States Supreme Court has not expressly held that section 3 is applicable in state court. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1254 n. 6, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989). However, state courts have almost unanimously recognized that the stay provision applies to suits in state as well as federal courts. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 n. 34, 103 S.Ct. at 942 *932n. 34. Accordingly, I would hold that the court below should have stayed proceedings until the matter had been arbitrated.
The federal policy does not favor arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules but simply ensures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate. Volt, 109 S.Ct. at 1250. Although the FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision and does not reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration, state law may be pre-empted if it actually conflicts with the federal law and is “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Volt, 109 S.Ct. at 1254-55; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 76 S.Ct. 273, 100 L.Ed. 199 passim (1956).
In Volt, the court held that California procedural laws would apply even though they would stay arbitration whereas the FAA would allow it to go forward. Volt, 109 S.Ct. at 1255. Applying the Texas procedural law to Batton’s case, however, is not analogous to the situation in the Volt case. In Volt, the parties “agreed to arbitrate in accordance with California law ” and the court looked at the “enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.” Volt, 109 S.Ct. at 1254 (emphasis added). Batton, however, agreed to arbitrate in accordance with the law of Ohio, not Texas, and to arbitrate in Dayton, Ohio. The Texas procedural laws do conflict with the federal law and its policy of favoring arbitration agreements.
The federal law should be looked to regarding this Court’s jurisdiction over Bat-ton’s appeal. Section 15 of the FAA allows an appeal from an order “refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp.1990). Accordingly, this Court should entertain Batton’s appeal from the state court’s order denying his stay pending arbitration. To do so causes parallel litigation to proceed in the state and federal courts unnecessarily. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.