Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a medical malpractice count against defendant Dr. Bradford G. Capper.
*663On October 13, 1981, plaintiff filed this wrongful death action against defendant Sharlyn Kuzilla alleging that she negligently caused the death of plaintiff’s decedent and wife Judith Welke in an automobile crash occurring September 11, 1981. Defendant Dr. Capper owned the automobile driven by defendant Kuzilla. On August 30, 1983, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend to add several new tort theories and allegations of damages including a medical malpractice count against Dr. Capper.
In his proposed amended complaint regarding the medical malpractice count, plaintiff alleged that Dr. Capper was defendant Kuzilla’s treating physician prior to the accident. As such, Dr. Cap-per allegedly had a duty to protect the public and, in particular, plaintiff’s decedent from any imminent foreseeable danger posed by defendant Kuzilla. Dr. Capper allegedly breached this duty by prescribing many controlled substances to defendant Kuzilla without warning her of the drugs’ effects on her driving ability and by allowing her to drive his motor vehicle while she was under the influence of the drugs.
On September 9, 1983, the trial court heard arguments regarding the motion to amend the complaint limited to adding only the medical malpractice count because the period of limitations on that action was about to run. Defendant’s argument that amending to add a medical malpractice count a few months short of the discovery cut-off date (WCCR 301.3[c]) and so soon before mediation and trial would prejudice defendant convinced the court to deny the motion. Nevertheless, the trial court did not deny the motion to amend the complaint to add the medical malpractice count until it ascertained that plaintiff could still timely file a separate medical malpractice action against Dr. *664Capper. The trial court made arrangements for plaintiff to file the complaint on the date of hearing despite the fact that the clerk’s office was officially closed. Plaintiff did file the separate action on September 9, 1983.
In a subsequent order, the trial court granted plaintiff’s remaining motion for leave to amend the complaint. However, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to consolidate the medical malpractice action with this case. On March 15, 1984, the trial court ordered defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the medical malpractice action granted stating that plaintiff failed to state a claim, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), because this state does not recognize a third-party cause of action based upon a physician-patient relationship. Plaintiff also filed a separate claim of appeal from that order. (Docket No. 77810).
Plaintiff argues in this appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a medical malpractice count. Plaintiff argues that the little time left for discovery was not a sufficient reason alone to find the necessary prejudice to defendant to deny the motion. Plaintiff argues that defendant was already fully aware of the facts underlying the action.
Defendant argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because adding a medical malpractice claim would require Dr. Capper’s medical malpractice insurer to become involved and, most certainly, new counsel. Trial would have to be delayed to allow additional discovery, particularly deposition of expert witnesses. The original complaint did not act as notice to Dr. Capper’s malpractice carrier that it would need to prepare a defense despite the commonality of underlying facts. Defendant also argues, even though the trial *665court did not decide the motion for this reason, that plaintiff’s amendment would have been futile.
GCR 1963, 118.1 permits a party to amend its pleading by leave of court which "shall be freely given when justice so requires”. While the decision to grant or deny leave is within the discretion of the trial court, the decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. McCalla v Ellis, 129 Mich App 452, 457; 341 NW2d 525 (1983). This discretion is not unlimited.
" 'This language [that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires”] imposes a limitation on the discretion of the court necessitating a finding that justice would not be served by an amendment to pleadings. The allowance of an amendment is not an act of grace, but a right of a litigant who can show that an amendment will not work an injustice on the opposing party.’ Midura v Lincoln Consolidated Schools, 111 Mich App 558, 563; 314 NW2d 691 (1981).” McCalla, supra, p 457.
Such a motion should be granted absent undue delay, bad faith, a dilatory motive or when an amendment would be futile. Meyer v Hubbell, 117 Mich App 699, 705-706; 324 NW2d 139 (1982). Mere lateness in moving to amend is an insuflicent reason to deny the motion, absent unfair prejudice to the opposing party. Rubino v Sterling Heights, 94 Mich App 494, 499-500; 290 NW2d 43 (1979).
In this case, the trial court was faced with an uncomfortable dilemma. Although plaintiff’s motion to amend came late in the proceedings, a few months of discovery time was still available to defendant. However, the trial court recognized that adding a medical malpractice count was adding an entirely different theory of which defendant would not previously have had notice and, therefore, time to prepare. Defendant’s medical mal*666practice insurer would need to be notified and new counsel would probably be retained. Discovery would undoubtedly need to be extended by order. Even though plaintiff stated that he was willing to agree to an extension of discovery, the trial court could not guarantee that the Chief Judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court would grant such an extension. See WCCR 301.3(g)(1).
We find that because prejudice to defendant was possible, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for leave to amend to add the medical malpractice count. Nevertheless, we do so only given the special circumstances of this case, i.e., that the trial court compromised the interests of both parties by denying the motion but facilitated plaintiff’s filing of the medical malpractice action in a timely manner. By ruling in this manner, the trial court furthered the spirit of GCR 1963, 118.1, not by granting the motion for leave to amend, but by helping plaintiff preserve the cause of action he desired to add to the complaint. Thus, neither plaintiff nor defendant were ultimately prejudiced.
Because we affirm on the grounds given by the trial court, we need not address defendant’s argument that, alternatively, the trial court could have denied plaintiff’s motion because his medical malpractice claim would have been futile. We do, however, refer defendant to this Court’s recent decision in Duvall v Goldin, 139 Mich App 342; 362 NW2d 275 (1984).
Affirmed.
R. L. Tahvonen, J., concurred.