I concur in the result reached by the Court solely for the reason that the rule in question, 1979 AC, R 791.4410, is well within the discretionary authority granted to the Director of the Department of Corrections by MCL 791.265a; MSA 28.2325(1).
I should like to be understood, however, as disassociating myself from the Court’s declaration that the correct standard for review of "the validity of the Department of Corrections’ rules and policy directives” is that announced in Chesapeake & Ohio R Co v Public Service Comm, 59 Mich App 88, 98-99; 228 NW2d 843 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 818 (1975), to wit:
"(1) whether the rule is within the matter covered by the enabling statute;
*109"(2) if so, whether it complies with the underlying legislative intent; and
"(3) if it meets the first two requirements, when [sic] it is neither arbitrary nor capricious.”
The pronouncement in Chesapeake & Ohio R Co, supra, that the foregoing "standards” govern the determination of the validity of rules promulgated by "an agency” is ipse dixit, unsupported by citation of authority in that case, and unnecessary to a decision in this one. It is dicta.
Finally, although I am satisfied that the Director of the Department of Corrections is authorized by the statute to bar the plaintiffs categorically from half-way house assignments, I do not regard the plaintiffs’ contrary argument that sections (5) and (6) of the statute declare the limits of that authority as being "absurd and unreasonable.”