specially concurring.
Although I agree that there is a reasonable inference that the crime took place in Mercer County I do so on the basis of testimony not mentioned by the majority. Absent such testimony I would not join in affirming the judgment of conviction.
The majority relies on the written statement of the defendant. However, the majority unfairly characterizes the contents of that statement when it concludes that in the statement “Rasmussen simply wrote that, while he was working at the gas plant in Beulah (which is in Mercer County) he placed and accepted bets and passed the proceeds on to a man known as ‘Chief’.” In fact, all that statement says with regard to the location of the crime is:
“I, Mark Rasmussen was employed at the Gas Plant in Beulah, N.D. from June or July of 1983 — Feb. 1984. While working thier (sic) I meet (sic) a man named Chief.”
From these facts and the fact that Rasmussen ultimately placed bets with Chief the majority holds that a reasonable inference can be drawn that the gambling activity took place at work. I disagree.
The testimony of Gerald Anderson, who worked in Oliver County, established that all of Anderson’s contacts with the defendant were in Oliver County. He turned bets over to the defendant in Oliver County. He was paid by the defendant in Oliver County. He knew of no transactions conducted by the defendant in Mercer County and witnessed none. In my opinion this testimony belies any fairly drawn inference that the defendant conducted gambling activities in Mercer County. However, An*485derson also testified that he distributed line sheets to his fellow employees and friends at his work place as well as on his way home from work and at bars. It is this testimony which provides the evidentiary basis for a reasonable inference that the defendant also passed out line sheets at the plant where he worked in Mercer County in similar fashion to Anderson.
Absent such testimony the jury could only have speculated, not reasoned or inferred, that the betting transactions occurred at work and not at home, in bars, or any other place. For an inference, capable of sustaining a verdict, is a process of reasoning by which a permissible deduction of fact is logically and reasonably drawn by the jury from the facts already proved or admitted. Com. v. Whitman, 199 Pa.Super. 631, 186 A.2d 632 (1962); Thomas v. State, 363 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Cr.App.1978). Conversely, speculation is the art of theorizing about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient. Jaramillo v. United States, 357 F.Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y.1973). Obviously, mere speculation, surmise, guesswork, conjecture, or suspicion that an accused is guilty is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence and does not authorize a conviction. State v. Miller, 357 N.W.2d 225 (N.D.1984); State v. Holy Bull, 238 N.W.2d 52 (N.D.1975); Thomas v. State, supra; People v. Johnson, 43 Ill.App.3d 428, 2 Ill.Dec. 86, 356 N.E.2d 1373 (1976); United States v. Jones, 545 F.2d 1112 (8 Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 814, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977).
I must emphasize that the quantum of evidence in this case to support the necessary inference is barely sufficient and its sparseness troubles me. However I believe it provides a minimal basis for a fairly drawn inference which our law provides is sufficient to uphold a jury verdict on appeal. State v. Ohnstad, 359 N.W.2d 827 (N.D.1984).
I therefore concur in the ultimate decision reached by the majority.