(dissenting). Respectfully, I dissent.
In People v Mitchell, 102 Mich App 554, 557; 302 NW2d 230 (1980), this Court held, "We hold that, where consecutive and/or mandatory sentencing is ordered by statute, the defendant must be informed of that fact so that he has full knowledge of the true minimum time he will serve by pleading guilty.”
In this case, defendant was not informed of the mandatory nature of the felony-firearm sentence nor of the fact that this sentence would be required to be served consecutively to his sentence for the 1978 breaking and entering conviction and his three other guilty plea convictions in this case. Therefore, on the authority of Mitchell, defendant’s guilty pleas should be vacated and this cause remanded for further proceedings.
The attempt by the majority to distinguish Mitchell simply is unpersuasive. The factual differences between Mitchell and this case, that the majority finds to be important, were not relied *704upon by the Mitchell Court nor deemed significant enough to form the basis of its holding. The rule of Mitchell is that where consecutive and/or mandatory sentencing is ordered by statute, a defendant must be informed of that fact. The majority attempts to alter this plain rule into a rule that would provide only that a defendant must not be materially misinformed about the sentencing consequences of his plea. This is not the holding of Mitchell.
I dissent and would vacate defendant’s pleas and remand for further proceedings.