(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
The trial court found as a fact that plaintiffs decedent could not meet the "independent living” requirement for residence in Lurie Terrace, a senior citizen housing project in Ann Arbor. Although the evidence is conflicting, there was evidence to support the trial judge’s findings. In addition, the trial judge had opportunity to observe plaintiffs decedent and her condition and to form a judgment regarding this matter, together with credibility of the witnesses. I do not believe that his findings were clearly erroneous under GCR 1963, 517.1. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that some of the trial judge’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous.
I do not, however, agree with the trial court’s reasoning that those who are "elderly handicapped” can be prohibited from residing in housing other than that planned specifically for them. The handicappers statute1 provides:
"The opportunity to obtain * * * housing * * * without discrimination because of a handicap is guaranteed *816by this act and is a civil right.” MCL 37,1102; MSA 3.550(102).2
Another section of the handicappers statute provides:
"An owner * * * shall not, on the basis of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to acquire, rent, or maintain property or use by an individual of adaptive devices or aids:
"(a) Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a person.” MCL 37.1502; MSA 3.550(502).
Plaintiff argues that the independent living requirement, as applied in this case, constitutes a discrimination on the basis of a handicap, in violation of the requirements of the handicappers statute. I am inclined to agree and would hold that the interpretation of independent living employed by the trial court is in violation of the handicappers statute. Consequently, while I would be inclined to affirm the trial court’s findings with respect to the facts, I would agree with the majority in holding that plaintiffs decedent’s handicaps were not related to her ability to rent and maintain an apartment.3
In conclusion, I would concur in remanding on the basis indicated herein._
MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.
Subsequent to the trial in the present case, this section was amended by 1980 PA 478, effective January 20, 1981, which added the following language:
"(2) A person shall accommodate a handicapper for purposes of * * * housing unless the person demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.”
I would urge the Legislature to amend the handicappers statute to give special treatment to and, perhaps, allow exceptions for senior citizen housing and nursing homes.