(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and suggest that the majority has erroneously misread legislative intent.
The majority today holds that any person operating motorized equipment or a device which could be transported upon a highway may lose his or her license to drive an automobile, even though no such license is required for the equipment being operated, and even though the operation occurs solely on private property, not on a highway or road.
Our function is to determine whether application of the implied consent law to the facts of this case is consistent with the spirit and intent of the legislature. Di Re v. Central Livestock Order Buying Co., 246 Minn. 279, 286, 74 N.W.2d 518, 524 (1956). I believe the result reached by the majority is clearly inconsistent with legislative intent.
The underlying theory of “implied consent” is that by accepting a license to drive a motor vehicle, a person gives implied consent to test for the presence of chemicals. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(a) (1988). Where a license is not required to operate a vehicle, no consent can be implied. Consistent with this theory and intent, the legislature specifically rejected the loss of a driver’s license as a penalty for a snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle operator’s refusal to be tested for alcohol or for conviction of operating snowmobiles or all-terrain vehicles while under the influence of alcohol. Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 11 (1988). No driver’s license is required to operate the motorized equipment, and the legislature clearly indicated that loss of driving privileges shciuld not result from nondriving activity occurring off the public highways merely because the activity involved the use of alcohol.
An individual who refuses chemical testing arising from the operation of a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or motorboat while under the influence, or who is convicted of operating those devices while under the influence, loses the privilege of operating the same type of equipment for a period of time, but his or her driver’s license is unaffected. See Minn.Stat. §§ 84.-87, subd. 2b; 84.91, subd. 6; 84.911, subd. 2(a); 169.121, subd. 11; 361.12, subd. 6; *93361.121, subd. 2(a) (1988). The legislative intent is continuing and clear. A bulldozer is not a “motor vehicle” under the law.
We must construe the implied consent statutes to avoid reaching an absurd or unreasonable result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1988). This result is both. While snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles are more often operated on or near highways, and while motorboats are more likely to be surrounded by many other boats and operators, their operators are not subject to revocation of their driver’s licenses. Nonetheless, the majority here holds that a bulldozer operator must lose his or her driver’s license. In keeping with the intent of the legislature, I would hold that operation of a bulldozer on private land, for which no license or permit is required, does not jeopardize the individual’s driver’s license.
Excessive noise at nighttime is disturbing to a neighborhood; other ordinances cover such infractions.
Upholding this revocation would authorize police to rush into people’s yards or farms to test the alcohol consumption of an owner operating devices such as a riding lawnmower or snowblower, tiller or tractor, or farm machinery; this is inconsistent with the plain dictates of common sense.