dissenting.
I dissent. This is not an appeal from the decision of the county court of a decision to permit renunciation under Section 30.1-10-01, N.D.C.C. Rather, as noted by the majority opinion, it is an appeal from a decision of the Department of Human Services to terminate Evelyn Olson’s medical assistance benefits because the Department considered Evelyn’s interest in her sister Ida’s estate an inchoate property right which it deemed to be an available resource to Evelyn disqualifying her under Section 50-24.-1-02(1), N.D.C.C., from receiving further medical benefits. Carol Nielsen, the conservator of her mother’s estate, was notified by Cass County Social Service Board that should Nielsen’s petition for renunciation be granted, Evelyn would be ineligible for further benefits until such time as she may have incurred medical expenses equaling her interest in Ida’s estate, some $23,000. Despite the notification, Nielsen, who would benefit personally by the renunciation of her mother’s interest for which she petitioned as conservator of her mother’s estate, pursued the petition and it was granted. As they had promised in an “Ad-*161vanee Notice” to Nielsen and a letter to her attorney, the Department disqualified Evelyn from further benefits until she incurred $23,000 in medical expenses.
The majority opinion gives only passing reference to Section 50-24.1-02(1), N.D. C.C., which provides that medical assistance may be paid for any person who either has income and resources insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical care and services and who has not “at any time before or after making application for medical assistance made an assignment or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering himself eligible for assistance under this chapter.” This statute has equal standing with Section 30.1-10-01, N.D.C.C., and the two must be construed together. The majority has failed to do this, stating only that subsections 1 and 3 of Section 30.1-10-01, “unambiguously provide that the effect of a renunciation is to treat the interest as though it never passed to the renouncing party, ...” Although the majority opinion cites authority in support of its contention, those cases involved only creditors of the person renouncing and did not consider the interpretation of two statutes such as are involved in the appeal before this court. I do not believe these cases are definitive of the issue before us on this appeal.
Although not specifically stated in the majority opinion, it is apparent to me that it gives a very broad construction to Section 30.1-10-01 and a very narrow construction to Section 50-24.1-02(1) by construing the term “assignment or transfer” as used in the latter statute to exclude a renunciation under the former statute. With all due respect to the Comment to the Uniform Probate Code quoted in the majority opinion, I submit that the juxtaposition of the two statutes involved in this appeal creates an ambiguity which we must reconcile giving due regard to the meaning and purpose of Section 50-24.1-02(1) as well as Section 30.1-10-01.
It is widely known that as a result of soaring medical costs, medical assistance for the needy has become a substantial, if not onerous, part of both Federal and State expenditures. There can be little doubt that the purpose of Section 50-24.1-02(1) was to require those who have assets available to them to pay for medical assistance to pay those costs from those assets in order that those who have no assets available may be provided for from the public fisc. It is apparent to me that the legislative intent in enacting Section 50-24.1-02(1) was to prevent a person from purposely becoming impoverished in order to obtain medical assistance at the taxpayers’ expense and to the benefit of the person’s relatives and heirs. The result reached by the majority opinion does violence to that purpose and intent. The result can justifiably be considered by the taxpayers as a “rip-off.”
There are several other rules of statutory construction which should be considered in resolving this issue. The provision in Section 50-24.1-02(1) relative to disqualification for benefits because of assignment or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering a person eligible for assistance was added to the statute in 1975. See 1975 N.D.Sess.Laws Ch. 447, sec. 1. Section 30.1-10-02(1) was enacted in 1973 as part of the Uniform Probate Code. See 1973 N.D.Sess.Laws, Ch. 257, sec. 1. If there is a conflict in statutes the later in enactment prevails. And if a general provision is in conflict with a special provision in another statute and the conflict is irreconcilable, the special provision prevails. Sec. 1-02-07, N.D.C.C. Section 50-24.1-02(1) is a special provision concerning medical assistance for needy persons whereas Section 30.1-10-01 is a part of the Uniform Probate Code which generally applies to all persons succeeding to an interest in property.
More important, the construction placed upon a statute by the agency charged with its administration is to be given weight and we have stated that this rule of construction is particularly true in those instances in which the Legislature has specifically required the agency to prepare guidelines to assist in following the provisions of the *162statute. Quarles v. McKenzie Public School Dist. No. 34, 325 N.W.2d 662 (N.D.1982). Here, the Department is required by statute to prepare guidelines to assist in the administration of the statute. Sec. 50-24.1-02(3), N.D.C.C. It considers Evelyn’s interest in Ida’s estate as a “resource” within the meaning of Section 50-25.1-02, N.D. C.C. That position is not at all unreasonable and should prevail under the circumstances of this case.
Finally, this court has held that if adherence to the strict letter of a statute would lead to injustice or absurdity, the spirit of the law prevails over the literal meaning of the particular language of the statute for the purpose of construing the statute to give effect to legislative intent. See, e.g., Loney v. Grass Lake Public Sch. Dist. No. 3, 322 N.W.2d 470 (N.D.1982). I believe the construction placed upon these statutes by the majority opinion to be a clear injustice.
The Department should not have to seek a written waiver of the right of renunciation in order that the effect of that statute be implemented. Furthermore, the Department did not attempt to recover benefits paid prior to the renunciation; it only disqualified Evelyn for benefits for a period of time subsequent to the renunciation after notice that it would do so if the renunciation were effected. I cannot see any substantial distinction between a waiver as a condition of receiving benefits initially and a notice that benefits will be discontinued subsequent to a renunciation.
We were told at oral argument, and the editorial comment so indicates, that Section 30.1-10-01 is designed to aid in postmortem planning and that renunciation may be made for a variety of reasons including carrying out the decedent’s wishes not expressed in a properly executed will. Such a reason cannot and should not be permitted to overcome the broad public policy set forth in Section 50-24.1-02(1). Although lawyers may be required to so advise their clients in order that the clients be fully informed, I am not yet willing to concede that our society, at least in North Dakota, is at a place where we should assume that decedents would cast their relatives on the welfare roles to reserve their estate for other family members.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court and affirm the decision of the Department of Human Services.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs.