(dissenting).
I disagree with the majority that the release signed by plaintiff in this case should be construed as barring his claims brought under the Civil Rights Act. The document signed by plaintiff appears to be a form release which I believe was intended to release defendants from liability as it related to any of plaintiff’s claims which arose under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act. MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq.
As the majority points out, the wording of the release in this case is not as broad as that in Beardslee v Michigan Claim Services, Inc, 103 Mich App 480, 482; 302 NW2d 896 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 872 (1981). That release stated that the plaintiff was releasing the defendants "from any and all liabilities, causes of action, damages, claims, and demands, of whatsoever kind or nature, and particularly from any and all their *683actions and statements in the proceedings, investigation and disposition of any and all of my claims under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act.”
Had plaintiff in this case signed such a comprehensive release, I would have no difficulty concluding that plaintiffs claims alleging race discrimination were barred. However, I am particularly concerned when the scope of a release, which I believe is open to interpretation, is used to totally bar a potentially viable claim. The majority opinion states that a redemption agreement settling a workers’ compensation claim would not necessarily bar a subsequent civil rights claim. However, the common practice employed in the settlement of these claims, under the majority’s interpretation, would bar a plaintiffs civil rights claim. I think we can take judicial notice of the fact that release documents executed as part of a redemption agreement include both voluntary quit and waiver of seniority rights provisions. Therefore, in practical terms, any release document signed by a claimant in a workers’ compensation claim would include these provisions and thus bar unrelated claims as well. Therefore, I would demand more than the language used in this release to bar a claim under the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Grzebik v Kerr, 91 Mich App 482, 486; 283 NW2d 654 (1979).
Moreover, I am unconvinced that the case authority relied upon by the majority supports the conclusion that plaintiff has signed away his race discrimination claim. Specifically, this Court in the first Slayton case, Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 122 Mich App 411; 332 NW2d 498 (1983), did state that the plaintiff may have waived some of her claims against the defendant by executing the release. However, nowhere is the wording of the release signed by the plaintiff in that case mentioned in the opinion. We simply do not know how *684comprehensive of a release was executed in that case. In any event, the first Slayton case clearly held that a victim of discrimination may bring a civil suit to recover damages for any humiliation, embarrassment, outrage, disappointment, and other forms of mental anguish which flow from the discrimination injury. Such claims are not barred by the exclusive-remedy clause of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act because they are independent of any disability which might be compensable under the act. The Court stated:
These types of injuries are the kind that the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act was designed to protect against and to hold otherwise would undercut the legislative scheme to remedy discriminatory wrongs. [Id., p 417. Citations omitted.]
After remand, the plaintiff in Slayton was again before this Court in Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 144 Mich 535; 376 NW2d 664 (1985). In that case the plaintiff complained that the trial court erred in prohibiting her from recovering damages for emotional distress and physical pain and suffering arising out of her sex discrimination claim after the date she redeemed her workers’ compensation claim. In reversing the trial court, this Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to seek recovery for those damages, physical, mental or emotional, which she could prove were unrelated to the disability already compensated for by the redemption agreement. Slayton, supra, p 559.1 The same result should occur in this case. Without commenting on *685the potential merits of plaintiffs race discrimination claim, plaintiff should be able to seek recovery for those damages which can be proven to be unrelated to the disability for which he has already been compensated under the redemption agreement.
For the above reasons, I dissent and would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor and remand for further proceedings.
Interestingly, this second Slayton opinion was not relied upon by the federal court in its decision in Hill v Terminix International, Inc, 617 F Supp 1030 (ED Mich, 1985). In addition to the fact that the decision in Hill is not binding on this Court, since the decision omits the holding of the later Slayton case, I am not convinced that it should be used as authority in the instant case to support the conclusion that plaintiiFs race discrimination claim is barred.