(concurring). The issue is whether a person’s flight, in and of itself, on observing law enforcement officers or a squad car— that is "police avoidance behavior” alone — justifies an investigative stop. The majority opinion states that the validity of an investigative stop depends on the circumstances of the flight.
In this case, the circumstances of the flight were the time (2:00 A.M.) and the defendant’s "running through yards and jumping fences.” Majority opinion at page 834. The majority recognizes that no other circumstances were present in this case; the stabbing report and the purported warrants were not implicated in the stop in this case.
Accepting State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983), in which Chief Justice Beilfuss, Justice Heffernan and I dissented, as the law of the state and this case as a natural outgrowth of Williamson, I conclude that the implication of this case is that flight in and of itself justifies a stop for investigation. I would prefer that the majority state this implication as a clear and simple rule for the benefit of law enforcement officers who are called upon to make investigative stops and for the benefit of the circuit courts and courts of appeal who must review the validity of the stops. Framing the rule in terms of the totality of the circumstances of the flight, as the majority does, without an analysis of the nature of the circumstances that may or may not justify a stop, is not helpful to law enforcement officers and the courts. For the reasons set forth, I concur.