(concurring in reversal). The sole purpose of this opinion is to set forth reasons why this case should not be remanded (as provided for in Justice Kavanagh’s opinion) with a grant of right to the parties to introduce “any additional testimony the parties may desire to present.”
A careful review of the record discloses that from the start to the finish plaintiffs and defendants have agreed that no factual question was in issue and the decision called for summary judgment.
Paragraph 8 of plaintiffs’ amended complaint reads:
“That plaintiffs are informed and believe that the remainder of the lots proposed to be created by said defendants Edward R. Enz and Robert E. Boyle or by said defendant Sunrise Shores, Inc., will have approximately 11,000 feet of frontage on channels to be created but will have no frontage on Gun lake and that the ownership of said lots carries with it no riparian rights to said lake and no right to use the surface and waters of said lake for recreational purposes but that it is nevertheless the intention and plan of said defendants Edward R. Enz and Robert E. Boyle and of said defendant Sunrise Shores, Inc., to dispose of said lots to persons who will expect to secure along with ownership of such lots a right to use the surface of said lake equally with plaintiffs and other persons having riparian rights to said lake.”
Defendants answer paragraph 8 by stating:
“In answer to paragraph (8) of said complaint, these defendants admit that the remaining lots in their proposed plat will have approximately 11,000 feet of frontage on channels now being created but *691will have no frontage on Gun lake, but deny that the ownership of said lots carry [sic] with it no riparian rights and no right to use surface waters of said lake for recreational purposes, admit that it is the intention of these defendants to dispose of said lots to persons who will expect to secure, along with such ownership, the right of access to said lake and the right to use the surface of the same equally with the plaintiffs and all other persons having riparian rights to said lake, as well as with the general public.”
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment alleged that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” and in the supporting affidavit to the motion for summary judgment defendants Robert E. Boyle and Edward R. Enz stated:
“That, for and on behalf of said corporation, the deponents are causing said property to be developed and platted substantially as indicated in the drawing attached to said complaint, that they propose to provide all lots abutting on Gun lake with such riparian rights as will permit the use and enjoyment of the waters of Gun lake for recreational purposes with appropriate means of ingress and egress therefor,
“That in order to effect the foregoing purpose the deponents are causing a canal to be dug substantially as indicated in said drawing, that said canal will occupy a parcel of land having approximately 80 feet of frontage on Gun lake and they are informed and believe that the riparian rights appurtenant to said parcel extend to every part thereof, that it is their intention to dedicate said canal, the land it ocr cupies, and the riparian rights appurtenant thereto to the common use and enjoyment of the owners of all lots not abutting on Gun lake, that they also intend to include with the conveyance of said lots, grants of appropriate riparian rights and easements so that the fee to each of said lots will carry with it not only such riparian rights as are necessary to per*692mit the use and enjoyment of the waters of Gun lake for recreational purposes hut also a definite means of ingress and egress to said lake for said purposes.”
Plaintiffs agreed with defendants that the pleadings brought before the court an issue which should be determined by summary judgment and filed their motion for summary judgment, alleging that to construct such a canal would be an invasion of the plaintiffs’ rights.
In granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated:
“To hold that the defendants may proceed with their project would be to say that they can change the entire character of the lake and it would seem that one of the obvious purposes of the owning of property on an inland lake is to enjoy the use thereof, regardless of whether or not used only for fishing, swimming, or bathing.”
The only reason advanced for a remand is that: “The trial court made no finding of fact as to the reasonableness of the use.”
The Court of Appeals found that the question of “reasonableness” was not before the court because the pleadings “did not frame that issue.”
All parties asked this Court for a final determination on the record submitted, as disclosed by their requests under the heading “Relief”:
“Appellants urge the Court to reverse the order of the Court of Appeals and to affirm the judgment for plaintiffs-appellants which was entered by the trial court.”
“Appellees urge the Court to affirm the order of the Court of Appeals directing the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the defendantsappellees,”
*693The attorney general as amicus curiae requests “that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and the decree of the Barry county circuit court be reinstated.”
We disagree with Justice Brennan’s affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ decision that defendants can by proper conveyance grant riparian rights to the canal lot owners. But, we agree with Justice Brennan that:
“To remand this cause to circuit court for trial upon factual issues never alleged by the parties or framed by the pleadings is to impose upon both plaintiffs and defendants an entirely new lawsuit, and one which neither side has asked for.”
For the reasons set forth in Justice Kavanagh’s opinion we reverse the Court of Appeals.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Reversed, costs to plaintiffs-appellants.
Dethmers, C. J., concurred with Kelly, J.