(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
I.
On issue one, I concur.
II.
On issue two, I dissent. This is my position: Each and every case cited by the Chief Justice is not applicable to the facts of this case.
In this case, we must consider the (1) intent of the contracting parties regarding interest and (2) the dealings between the parties — not precedent in this Court where interest was imposed on a totally different set of facts.
Clearly, appellants are claiming that the trial court was clearly erroneous in failing to award prejudgment interest. But, just as clearly, appellants testified that there was no interest charge agreed to between the parties, as exemplified by the exhibits admitted into evidence, and that past practice between the parties demonstrated that interest was not charged.* See, Crown v. C.I.R., 585 F.2d 234, 240 (7th Cir.1978); *603Tate v. Ballard, 243 Minn. 353, 68 N.W.2d 261, 266 (1954) (general rule is that liability for interest is purely a matter of contract, requiring a promise to pay it); 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury, Consumer Credit § 9 (1982). Appellants cannot elevate their position above their own testimony. Klatt v. Continental Insurance Co., 409 N.W.2d 366, 370 (S.D.1987); Romey v. Landers, 392 N.W.2d 415, 421 (S.D.1986); Swee v. Myrl & Roy’s Paving, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 570, 571 (S.D.1979).
Trial court decided the interest issue right for the wrong reason. Seymour v. Western Dakota Vocational Technical Institute, 419 N.W.2d 206, 209 (S.D.1988); Owens v. City of Beresford, 201 N.W.2d 890, 893, 87 S.D. 8, 15, 60 A.L.R.3d 707 (1972).
Notwithstanding the footnote of Chief Justice Miller, I stand fast to my writing herein. I have read over this transcript and am totally convinced that the parties intended no interest be charged against or from one another. It makes no sense to me to impose a contract upon any individual who has not agreed to same. Why should the courts impose interest where the dealings of the parties has been expressly to the contrary? Chief Justice Miller cites the writing of Sabers, J., in Heer. This writer wrote Heer; not one Justice joined the writing of Sabers, J. The Court was composed of Wuest, C.J., Morgan, J., Henderson, J., Miller, J. and Sabers, J. In Heer, there was no testimony concerning the dealings of the parties which reflected that the parties did not charge interest. Heer is totally *603inapposite and the singular writing of Sabers, J., cited as authority, in this opinion, to impose interest on two parties, who never charged one another interest, is an academic affront to the law of interest. I respectfully suggest that the dissenter is not confused. My thesis is not that prejudgment interest never be granted; my thesis is that when the parties testify that in past practice, between the parties, on different accounts, that interest not be charged, that a court of law has no business imposing interest contrary to their express dealings. Who are we to make a contract, on interest, contrary to the dealings of the parties, as reflected by the exhibits and the testimony? There was no "contracted interest” here; rather, the bargaining was that there would be no "interest;” therefore, "prejudgment interest” cannot be imposed by the will of the court. There was a day, in this state, when Beka meant something. It was a solid case. It has been eroded by the holdings of this Court. The author relies upon Clements, handed down in 1991. I dissented in Clements expressing that Amert and Hageman had torn asunder the holding in Beka. I cited eight cases on interest in this Court in my Clements dissent. I note, in the present case, that S.D. Bldg. Auth., is cited for an award of prejudgment interest; perhaps the principle espoused in said case can be used for general authority on prejudgment interest in South Dakota; however, no prejudgment interest was awarded in that case. In S.D. Bldg. Auth., I specially concurred citing to the old Beka case. In said special concurrence, I referred to my special concurrence in Hageman. As I have repeatedly pointed out, no one should have to pay prejudgment interest when they have no idea of what they owe or have to pay because it is not "certain.” And "the right to recover” must be "vested” upon "a particular date.” No change in the law took place until new Justices came on this Court which carved up Beka and SDCL 21-1-11. With the oncoming of the new Justices, and the new decisions, the State Legislature enacted SDCL 21-1-13.1. As I read over that statute, it would appear that the Legislature took a conservative approach to interest and the imposition of prejudgment interest. The Legislature appeared to be disappointed with the advent of the new decisions on interest, which were brought about by a new composition of this Court. I agree that the new statute does not apply here. When the new dawn arises on the third historical phase of interest in South Dakota, and a new case arises under said case, the Legislative sun, shining brightly, has ordained for application: “Prejudgment interest on damages arising from a contract shall be at the contract rate, if so awarded in the contract; otherwise, if prejudgment interest is awarded, it shall be at the Category B rate specified in Section 54-3-16." However, the Legislature has limited, very sharply, prejudgment interest for it "... [interest] shall commence on the date specified in the verdict or decision and shall run to, and include, the date of the verdict. Or, if there is no verdict, the date the judgment is entered.” Come the dawn, when the cases come up under the new statute, the imposition of interest, almost willy-nilly, shall disappear under the sunshine of reality, and that old grand-daddy Beka, shall shine again, sprinkling the air particles with certainty, rather than uncertainty.