dissenting.
In reaching its result, the majority has breached a number of statutory-construction thou-shalt-nots. I list the most obvious: Thou shalt not: (1) overlook the whole, of which the statute at issue is a part, or the purpose of the whole; (2) render meaningless any provision of a statute; (3) construe one section of a statute to implicitly repeal another; (4) construe a statute to create a conflict between its sections. NDCC §§ 1-02-38; 1-02-39. E.g., Westman v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 459 N.W.2d 540 (1990); Speedway, Inc. v. Job Service, 454 N.W.2d 526 (N.D.1990); Walsvik v. Brandel, 298 N.W.2d 375 (N.D.1980); State v. Mees, 272 N.W.2d 61 (N.D.1978). Because I favor a construction that would advance, not undermine, each of those canons of statutory construction, I respectfully dissent.
In Peterson v. McKenzie County School Dist. No. 1, 467 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1991), we construed a variety of statutes to allow a school board to transfer funds from its general fund to its building fund. Somehow, the majority tries to justify its unsound construction of section 57-19-06, NDCC, by relying on Peterson, which, of course, did not involve section 57-19-06, NDCC, at all and did not involve the question at issue here, whether there may be unrestricted use of special reserve funds.
Section 57-19-06 is found in a chapter that carefully authorizes, identifies and segregates special reserve funds. NDCC §§ 57-19-01, 57-19-02. Only certain kinds of funds may be deposited in a special reserve fund. NDCC § 57-19-03. Section 57-19-04 authorizes a tax levy, as well, to establish, maintain or replenish a special reserve fund and limits the levy to three mills. Furthermore, the special reserve fund is not to be considered in determining the budget or the amount to be levied for each school fiscal year. NDCC § 57-19-05. Finally, section 57-19-06 addresses “how and when” the special reserve fund is to be used. These statutes, and the chapter in which they are found, distinguish this case from Peterson.
In Peterson, we carefully noted that, unlike the use of general funds at issue in that case, the use of special funds was specifically restricted by a number of statutes. Peterson at 460. Section 57-19-06, NDCC, is one of those statutes that restricts the use of special funds. In removing that restriction, the majority has amended the statute to disarm subsection (1) and to implement a policy that is a dramatic departure from the legislature’s traditional careful and conservative treatment of special funds.
In support of its construction, the majority relies on, and draws selective inferences from, ambiguous legislative history. However, it is clear that even within the quoted legislative history sot out in the majority opinion, there are contrary inferences as well. For example, Senator Freborg believes that “the advantage of the amendment would be they only have to pay one-half of the money back.” Minutes of Senate Education Hearing April 15, 1987. So, too, I can find favorable inferences for my view from legislative history that is not set forth in the majority opinion. However, candor impels the conclusion that the legis*243lative history is so rife with competing inferences that one can find some semblance of support for any position! I, therefore, place no confidence whatsoever in the legislative history and deem it wholly unhelpful.
Instead, I rely on sections 1-02-39 and 1-02-38, NDCC, and, in particular, look to the purpose of the statute and the chapter in which it is codified, the consequences of a particular construction and the need to give meaning and effect to every part of the statute. Looking then, in that fashion, at section 57-19-06, NDCC, subsection (1) tells us when special funds may be used. “Whenever collections from the taxes levied for the current budget are insufficient to meet the requirements of the budget for teachers salaries, heat, light, and fuel ...,” special reserve funds may be used. As a corollary of that statutory pronouncement, special funds cannot be used if there are sufficient general funds for teachers’ salaries and utilities.
Subsection (2) was added to section 57-19-06, NDCC, in 1987. A statutory amendment is generally presumed to change existing law. John Morrell & Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 460 N.W.2d 141 (S.D.1990). Section 57-19-06, NDCC, in its pre-1987 life, made no provision for less than full repayment of borrowed funds to the special reserve fund. Subsection (2) now tells us that borrowed special funds need only be half repaid. Thus, subsection (2) eases the financial burden of struggling school districts by requiring only half repayment, rather than full repayment, of borrowed special reserve funds. Subsection (2), on its face or otherwise, does not remove the threshold conditions of borrowing special funds that there be insufficient general fund moneys to meet salaries, heat, light and fuel expenses. By ruling that subsection (2) does eliminate those requirements, the majority has effectively repealed section 57-19-06(1), NDCC. Yet, repeals by implication certainly are not favored and to overcome the presumption against an implied repeal, it must be shown that there is an irreconcilable conflict between two provisions. E.g., Walsvik v. Brandel, supra. But, construing the two subsections as I propose, harmonizes them and avoids conflict. It also gives each meaning and recognizes that the law neither does nor requires idle acts. See County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc., 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1985).
We should construe the language of subsection (1) to establish the conditions precedent for a transfer of special reserve funds, and subsection (2) to establish the terms of repayment of borrowed special reserve funds. So construed, both subsections are harmonized, both are given meaning and effect, both are read as a whole, and both are energized to promote the legislature’s intent to protect the special reserve fund’s purpose while alleviating the financial problems of school boards. That way, special funds will be used for teachers salaries and utilities, not for other purposes which the legislature has deemed less critical.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and so I dissent.