(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree that at the time of decedent’s termination in May 1988 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (nrc) had not asserted exclusive authority over the criteria to be used to ascertain whether persons who abused alcohol were safety risks when employed at a nuclear facility. At that time, the nrc was involved in the process of evaluating programs to assess and respond to any safety risks posed by persons who had a history of being habitual and excessive users of alcohol without rehabilitation or who used alcohol at the work site.
In 1977 and again in 1984, the nrc, pursuant to its powers, proposed a rule that established a screening process to determine whether an individual should be given unescorted-access status before being permitted by a licensee or contractor to work at a protected area in a nuclear plant.1 It should be noted that the defendant’s use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory as part of its psychological evaluation plan to determine whether decedent qualified for unescorted-access status was consistent with the extensive screening process to detect alcohol abusers being considered by the nrc in its proposed authorized-access rule.
On August 5, 1982, the commission proposed a different rule to adopt a program to establish and implement controls designed to assure that personnel who had been granted unescorted-access status were not under the influence of drugs or alcohol or otherwise unfit for duty.2 On August 4, 1986, that proposed rule was withdrawn. In its stead, the nrc *144issued a policy statement3 declaring that nuclear power plant licensees would be expected, through their own initiative, to develop programs to determine fitness for duty that would make unacceptable the sale, use, or possession of alcohol or illegal drugs within protected areas and would prohibit personnel from being under the influence of drugs or alcohol so as to affect their ability to perform their duties in anyway related to safety. At a minimum, with respect to alcohol, the programs were to include a provision that the use of alcohol within the protected area would result in immediate revocation of access and possible discharge. In addition, they were to include effective monitoring and testing procedures to provide reasonable assurance that personnel with access to vital areas were fit for duty.
None of these actions indicate an intent by the nrc to preempt state laws protecting persons against discrimination in employment practices that are unrelated to that person’s ability to safely perform the duties of the job. Further, the purpose behind the state law is to protect the employee from discrimination, not to regulate nuclear safety. The state law does not have a direct and substantial effect on decisions concerning radiological safety levels made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities. English v General Electric Co, 495 US —; 110 S Ct 2270, 2275; 110 L Ed 2d 65 (1990); Ackison v Detroit Edison Co, 751 F Supp 1245 (ED Mich, 1990). Therefore, I concur that the plaintiff’s action is not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 USC 2011 et seq., or the Energy Reorganization Act 42 USC 5801 et seq.
I also agree with the majority that the plaintiff’s claim is not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 29 USC 185.
*145I am compelled to dissent, however, with respect to the majority’s resolution of the plaintiffs claims under the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hcra), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq. The decedent alleged two violations of the hcra in his complaint: (1) that he was terminated on the basis of a psychological examination that was not directly related to the requirements of his specific job, MCL 37.1202(l)(d), (e); MSA 3.550(202)(l)(d), (e), and (2) that he was terminated because of a perceived handicap, MCL 37.1202(l)(a), (b); MSA 3.550(202)(l)(a), (b).
While I agree that the plaintiff is entitled to resolve the factual issue with regard to whether the psychological examination used as a basis to terminate the decedent was related to the requirements of his job, I do not believe that plaintiff is entitled to pursue the claim of discrimination based upon a perceived handicap.
Plaintiff denies decedent had an alcohol problem. This Court has held that the Legislature’s definition of handicap does not include situations wherein no handicap exists, but others perceive a handicap. Sanchez v Lagoudakis, 184 Mich App 355; 457 NW2d 373 (1990).4
I would remand for further proceedings with respect to count I only._
For a history of the Access Authorization Program and the 1977 and 1984 proposed rules, see 42 Fed Reg 14,880 and 49 Fed Reg 30,726.
47 Fed Reg 33,980.
51 Fed Reg 27,872 and 51 Fed Reg 27,921.
I have previously taken a position to the contrary, but was unable to persuade the other members of the panel. Bay City Fire Dep’t v Dep’t of Civil Rights ex rel Roznowski, 182 Mich App 145; 451 NW2d 533 (1989). (Reilly, J., concurring.)