(dissenting).
Since I can neither agree to, nor acquiesce in, the reversal of this cause, with deference, I feel compelled to give my reasons therefor.
It is elemental that a Chancellor’s finding of fact should be sustained on appeal, if supported by substantial evidence; and that such finding will not be set aside unless manifestly wrong.
When this rule is kept in mind, the decision of the learned Chancellor, as I see it, is impervious to change for at least two complementary reasons: (A) The deed to Pace constituted color of title; and (B) Appellees’ title was established by adverse possession.
On the first proposition, the deed from Carter to Pace conveyed and quitclaimed "all my right, title and interest in” the land in question. It did not purport to convey simply Carter’s "undivided” interest. There *390was uo limitation whatever on its face. The deed was in compliance with Section 846, Code of 1942.
In the case of Chapman v. Sims, 53 Miss. 154, this Court held that a quitclaim deed is' as effectual to convey title as one with general warranty; and that such deed does not deprive a claimant under it of the character of a bona fide purchaser. Of like effect are Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 21, 13 S. Ct. 426, 37 L. Ed. 350, and Perkins v. Wisner, 171 La. 898, 132 So. 493. See also Safford v. Stubbs, 117 Ill. 389, 7 N. E. 653, 655, where it was said that a quitclaim deed “can therefore be relied on as color of title.’’
That Pace was in good faith as to his ownership when he went into possession was amply sustained by the evidence. Such good faith meant simply that “the person honestly believes that he has acquired a good title, although, upon investigation, it proves otherwise”. 2 C. J. 201; 2 C. J. S., Adverse Possession, Sec. 170.
Under the above authorities, I think it is conclusive that Pace obtained color of title to this land.
On the second proposition, there was evidence before the Chancellor to show the following: (1) After Pace obtained his deed in 1929, he recorded it and went immediately into possession of the land; (2) He claimed it as his own, and recognized no other claimant; (3) When he found that it had been sold for the 1928 taxes, he redeemed it, and had it assessed to him for 1930; (4) He and his successors in title paid the taxes for eighteen years thereafter; (5) He cleared four or five acres, and cultivated this, together with two other patches; (6) He cut wood off of the land; (7) In 1934, he gave a deed of trust on it, which was paid off after his death; (8) He kept the rents and profits; (9) The general reputation in the community was that Pace owned it; and (10) The Horne heirs neither attempted to invade his possession, nor, in any way, questioned it over a period of 18 years.
Pace’s retention of rents and profits confounds the appellant’s claim. In the case of Iler v. Routh’s Heirs, *3913 How. 276, in holding that one co-tenant may oust another co-tenant, this Court said: “Any act of one joint tenant which is evidence of a claim of exclusive ownership, such as taking all the rents and profits to himself will constitute a disseisin.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Rickard v. Rickard, 13 Peck, Mass., 251.
Besides, the execution of the deed of trust was evidence of Pace’s adverse claim. Moore v. Collishaw, 10 Pa. 224; Leach v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 195.
In addition, while the cutting of timber or wood, and the payment of taxes do not, of themselves, constitute an ouster, they are evidence of such. Ewer v. Lovell, 9 Gray, Mass., 276; Peck v. Ward, 18 Pa. 506.
Moreover, this Court, in Native Lbr. Co. v. Elmer, 117 Miss. 720, 78 So. 703, 705, said: “Payment of taxes on land for 24 successive years by the party in possession was powerful evidence of the claim of right to the whole lot [and] it is some evidence that the possession was under a claim of right and was adverse. ’ ’
Since this was so-called wild land, and thus evidently not desirable for farming in its entirety, or for purposes of habitation, the Chancellor doubtless attached little significance to the absence of fences or houses. Besides, Pace’s home was on adjacent land. Hence, it seems to me that the evidence fully justified a finding by the Chancellor that Pace and his successors in title exercised all acts of ownership over the land of which it was susceptible.
On the contrary, shortly after the receipt of her patent from the Government, Sarah Horne moved off of this land, apparently abandoning it, and took up her abode in a distant county, where she died in 1910. While the ages of her children do not appear in the record, one of them, Jack Horne, on October 9, 1911, executed to B. F. Carter a warranty deed to an undivided one-fourth interest. Undoubtedly the other heirs must have known that they had some kind of claim thereto, but did not manifest any concern whatever about it. They neither *392made inquiry as to the payment of taxes, nor undertook to collect rents or profits. This utter lack of interest in, or concern about, the land continued uninterruptedly until - June 16, 1947, — 37 years. Not until after the appellees had cut and removed the timber, and only then, after the appellant had gone to three of them in the same distant county for the purpose of purchasing their interest, did they show any concern. It was at this juncture that these three executed to the appellant a deed and a conveyance of their claim for cutting and removing timber. They did not assert the fact of their interest in the court, for they were not even witnesses in this proceeding. This lack of -interest for 37 years, as I see it, brings them under the condemnation as pronounced by this Court in Boyd et al. v. Entrekin et al., Miss., 45 So. (2d) 848; and Alewine et al. v. Pitcock et al., Miss., 47 So. (2d) 147.
Except for the testimony of appellant himself, I have been unable to find anything in this record which differs factually from the overwhelming evidence of the appellees on the question of adverse possession. That testimony was as follows:
“Q. What sort of possession did John have? A. Well, he claimed it all the time that he was on there because he told me, he says, ‘The heirs is dead’, but he was mistaken. He said, well, that is what he had been informed, but the heirs were living.
“Q. And John claimed the whole thing? A. No, sir, he didn’t claim the whole thing no more than without they were dead, but if they were dead he claimed the whole thing.
“Q1. Well, he told you he claimed it, didn’t he? A. Well he told me if they was all dead he felt like it was his.” And at another place:
“Q. . . . Now, when you told him about the children being still living and that they had an interest in it, what did he say? A. He'said they told him they were all dead, that was his understanding.”
*393Ill the first breath, he testified that Pace had claimed the land because the heirs were dead, which would be evidence of Pace’s good faith, whereas he ended up by testifying that Pace, if the heirs were dead, felt like the land was his. Although appellant seemed to know that the heirs were not dead, he made no claim in his first statement that he informed Pace of this fact. Later in his testimony, his counsel, by a leading question, injected the fact that appellant had told Pace about the heirs.
In view of the vacillation of the appellant, his lack of corroboration, his pecuniary interest, and the fact that Pace was dead, how can we say that the Chancellor was manifestly wrong if he, perhaps, gave little weight to this evidence? There is no way for us to get a picture of his demeanor. Sometimes the demeanor of a witness before the trier of fact gives a wholly different effect from that revealed by the questions and answers in the cold record.
In view of what has been said above, it is obvious that I think the decree of the lower court ought to have been affirmed.
Besides, inasmuch as the warranty deed from Jack Horne to B. P. Carter conveyed a one-fourth interest, I cannot agree with the decision of this Court that the appellees have a one-fifth interest only in this land. There are two reasons for my opposition: (a) Under Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177, and the cases which follow it, the recordation of that deed was an act of ouster to the extent of a one-fourth interest; and (b) the reduction of interest is incompatible with, and contradictory to, Eastman, Gardiner & Company v. Hinton, 86 Miss. 604, 38 So. 779, 109 Am. St. Rep. 726.
Wherefore, I think the suggestion of error ought to be sustained.