(dissenting).
DISSENT
I respectfully dissent. Given the nature and degree of Crandall’s misconduct, I conclude that the disciplinary sanction we are imposing lacks proportionality when compared with the sanctions we have imposed in other cases. See, e.g., In re Edinger, 700 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. July 28, 2005). Edinger and Crandall were heard the same day and are being released simultaneously. In Edinger, we imposed a sanction identical to the one we are imposing here. But the nature and degree of misconduct in these two cases is .different; therefore, the sanctions should be different.
In my dissent in In re Edinger, I asserted that Edinger’s suspension should be increased from three months to four months. In turn, I would decrease the *773length of time after which Crandall may-seek reinstatement from three months to two months. While the difference in the length of the suspension in these two cases may appear slight and even insignificant to. some, it is not. One or two months in the practice of law for someone who depends on his law practice for his livelihood is very significant, a fact of which we should never lose sight. Moreover, the difference in the length of the two suspensions recognizes that there should be a difference in the two sanctions if we hope to maintain proportionality in the sanctions we impose.
The happenstance that the professional misconduct cases of Edinger and Crandall were heard and conferenced on the same day gives us a good opportunity to compare the two lawyers’ misconduct and impose sanctions that are in proportion to that misconduct. The Director recommended that we impose a minimum six-month suspension in each case; instead, we have imposed three-month suspensions. Neither the Director’s recommendations nor the sanctions properly account for the difference in the nature and degree of misconduct.
I conclude that Edinger’s misconduct is the more serious of the two. In Edinger’s case, in order to conceal the misuse of his. trust account, he engaged in a very pronounced pattern of repeated misrepresentations when he falsified documents requested by the Director. Edinger also repeatedly failed to cooperate with the Director. The Director first received notice of possible problems with Edinger’s trust account in January 2002. It was not until early 2004 that Edinger, after repeated requests, provided most, but not all, of the documentation requested by the Director. Further, it was only later in 2004 that Edinger acknowledged that he had falsified documents he had provided to the Director.
Crandall’s disciplinary action is the result of his neglect of client matters, failure to communicate with clients, failure to expedite litigation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Crandall’s misconduct, like Edinger’s misuse of his trust account, is serious. Crandall’s misconduct involved neglect of three client matters in federal court, most of which appears to have occurred during part of 2003, As the result of his neglect, Cran-dall paid federal court fees and sanctions in excess of $30,000. Crandall’s lack of cooperation with the Director, extended from Aprii 1, 2004, until the fall of 2004, during which time he did communicate with the Director, including a meeting with the.Director on July 8. However, unlike Edinger, Crandall does have a history of prior discipline — a 2001 admonition for failure to communicate with a client.
A failure to cooperate with an investigation by the Director is serious misconduct. It increases the time, staffing, and cost of enforcing the Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility. The majority correctly points out that lack of cooperation “impedes the .investigation, adds to the burden on the Director’s staff, prevents the Director from responding to the complaining party, and frequently precludes the development of a record that explains why the misconduct occurred and how the attorney intends to prevent it in the future.” ‘
Edinger’s extended period of noncooperation and his intentional falsification of information significantly distinguish his misconduct from Crandall’s. ■ Although it is difficult to understand Edinger’s falsification of information and lack of cooperation, it must be emphasized that he acted with intent to deceive and then thwarted the Director’s efforts to deal with his misconduct. Such behavior strikes at the heart of the trust and integrity we expect *774of persons admitted to the practice of law. Thus, Edinger’s misconduct merits a more severe sanction than Crandall’s.
I believe it is important to add a comment about the federal court sanctions imposed upon Crandall. The federal court temporarily suspended Crandall from practicing before that court and imposed fees and sanctions of more than $30,000, which Crandall has paid. Crandall wants us to treat the federal sanctions and his payment of all monies due as mitigating factors. We should not do so because our disciplinary sanctions and those of the federal court have different ends. Thus, payment of federal sanctions does not and should not mitigate what we do. That said, I add that, on the other hand, a purposeful failure to comply with or ignore the federal court’s sanctions may be viewed as an aggravating factor.
I would suspend Crandall from the practice of law with the condition that he may seek reinstatement after two months from the date of this order.