(dissenting). This is a multiple plaintiffs, drug injury, liability action. On September 17, 1974, this suit was commenced by several plaintiffs seeking individual recovery. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the numerous drug manufacturer defendants, jointly or collectively on an industry-wide basis termed "enterprise liability”, had been negligent in their testing of a drug called *78DES (synthetic estrogen, etc.), had promoted and distributed DES for the use of pregnant women with knowledge, or imputed knowledge by some of the defendants of its dangerous qualities, and had failed to warn the consumers of the dangerous side effects.
Plaintiffs claim to have been injured at conception or birth as a result of their respective mothers having ingested DES acquired under the generic drug marketing system in which defendants participated.
Plaintiffs alleged:
a. That all of the defendants named herein have manufactured pharmaceutical preparations containing dienestrol, diethylstilbestrol and diethylstilbestrol diproprionate, from the late 1940’s through the early 1960’s and promoted them with the intention that these drugs be prescribed by the medical profession for the purpose of preserving and/or saving the lives of the unborn children (fetuses) of the pregnant mothers to whom the drugs were administered.
b. That all of the female plaintiffs named herein were in the fetal stage when their mothers took the drug.
c. That all of the defendants actively promoted these drug preparations to the medical profession and in so doing represented to the medical profession that these drugs were both safe and effective in preserving the lives of the unborn children (the plaintiffs) of the mothers to whom the drugs were administered.
d. That in fact, there was no reasonable basis for claiming that these drug preparations were effective in preventing miscarriage of unborn children.
e. That the defendants named herein constitute all of the known manufacturers of stilbene deriva*79tives who promoted, in Michigan, said drugs to the medical profession for use in pregnancy during the period in controversy: to wit, 1947 to 1964.
f. That the promotion of the stilbene derivatives for use in pregnancy by one or more of the defendants named herein caused the injuries suffered by each of the plaintiffs.
g. That some of the plaintiffs will be unable to identify the specific defendant that manufactured the injury-producing drug.
Plaintiffs further alleged that all defendants participated in a generic promotional scheme which has effectively concealed, in many cases, the identity of any specific manufacturer, and that the defendants are jointly and severally responsible as they caused the injuries alleged in this complaint so all defendants are hereby joined as indispensable parties to this lawsuit.
The plaintiffs claim that two decades, more or less, have elapsed since ingestation of the drugs, that records have been lost, and that justice requires, because they are innocent parties, the shifting of the burden of proof to defendants as to those matters which are more available to the guilty defendants as a group of manufacturers jointly interested or participating in promotion and sale of the generic drug than to plaintiffs.
Eventually, by pleadings and by stipulation between counsel, the many plaintiffs were listed and divided into two classes: The first, those who believed they could identify the defendants responsible; and, the second, those plaintiffs who admitted they could not so identify any specific defendant responsible.
On December 23, 1974, the defendants moved for summary judgment as against the second class of plaintiffs on the basis that plaintiffs failed to state *80a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the defendants contended that:
I. Partial summary judgment should be granted pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1) as to all plaintiffs who alleged they were unable to identify the manufacturer of the drug, because those plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
II. Partial summary judgment should be granted pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1) as to all plaintiffs on plaintiffs’ allegation of collective industry-wide liability, since that claim attempted to circumvent the essential "manufacturer identification” element required for products liability actions and is not a cause of action cognizable under the law of Michigan.
The trial court, on March 10, 1975, dismissed the defendants’ motion, without prejudice, concluding that, in view of the enormity and complexity of the cases, the plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity for further discovery. Further discovery depositions were taken.
Thereafter, on February 1, 1977, the defendants filed their second motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that summary judgment should be granted against all plaintiffs who were still unable to identify the manufacturer of the drug which causes their injury and contending that the plaintiffs’ so-called "collective liability theory” did not state a cause of action cognizable under the laws of Michigan. The motion also asserted that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact showing, or tending to show, that defendants engaged in a conspiracy or unlawful concert of action. This motion was supported by the affidavit of Dr. Jerome M. Maas.
Dr. Maas, a former employee of the defendant *81Eli Lilly and Company, stated that during the relevant years of 1950-1964 over 300 manufacturers of the four types of synthetic estrogen involved in this suit were listed in standard medical references as offering these drugs for sale to pharmacies.
Plaintiffs introduced affidavits of pharmacists Howard Mordue and Louis M. Weiss, who stated that the listed defendants were prominent among those whose products were used to fill prescriptions for DES in Michigan during the period in question.
On May 16, 1977, the trial court issued its opinion. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs who could not identify the manufacturer on the ground that they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be based. The trial court also granted summary judgment as to all plaintiffs on the claim based on the so-called "collective liability” theory. On August 25, 1977, a final order granting the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment was entered.1
*82On October 6, 1977, both the plaintiffs and the defendants filed separate bypass applications with the Michigan Supreme Court, which were denied. One hundred eighty-two plaintiffs now have appealed as of right.
The issues involved are these: (I) Where certain of the plaintiffs are unable to identify the particular tortfeasor(s) responsible for the injury of each plaintiff, does Michigan law allow the plaintiffs to maintain their products liability action by shifting the burden of proof (called burden of uncertainty) to the defendants? (II) Are the defendants jointly liable under a theory called "group enterprise liability” or "collective group liability” for negligently marketing an unsafe drug without adequate *83testing, if they acted in concert to market and promote the use of DES in Michigan for use during pregnancy?
I would hold that the trial court was correct in its decision. In this case, the plaintiffs are requesting three drastic major changes in Michigan law which are fallacious in theory, wrong in law, and constitute uncalled-for judicial legislation. These changes should be addressed to legislative action, not the appellate courts.
I
Where certain of the plaintiffs are unable to identify the particular tortfeasor(s) responsible for the injury of each plaintiff, does Michigan law allow the plaintiffs to maintain their products liability action by shifting the burden of proof (called burden of uncertainty) to the defendants?
Plaintiffs contend: that the drug companies promoted DES by directing their advertising and promotional efforts at the doctors and pharamacists rather than at the ultimate consumers; that DES was sold as a generic drug so the choice of manufacturer resided with the pharmacist; that even the pharmacists may have been unaware of the identity of the actual manufacturer, since drugs could be labeled with the name of the re-packager or distributor; that even those pharmacists who knew the identity of the manufacturer no longer have records of the drugs dispensed to the plaintiffs’ mothers; that such marketing system was far different from that usually present in a products liability action which appeals to the ultimate consumer rather than to intermediaries; and that this justifies shifting the "burden of uncertainty” to the tortfeasors.
*84Plaintiffs argue: that where uncertainty exists as to the amount of damages or the individual responsibility of each tortfeasor, the risk of uncertainty shifts to the defendant, especially where his wrong has helped engender the confusion; that this doctrine of shifting the risk of uncertainty has been used in anti-trust litigation, in multiple automobile collisions, in hunting accident cases, and in air and water pollution cases; that it is unfair to let the wrongdoers go free just because the injured party cannot prove the specific share of harm done by each of them; and that case law requires shifting the burden even where there is no "conscious concert” of action on the part of the tortfeasors if the injured parties cannot sustain the burden of proof.
Defendants contend: that the trial court correctly decided the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to those plaintiffs who were unable to identify the alleged injury-causing drug or its manufacturer; that it is fundamental in any Michigan products liability suit that the plaintiff be able to identify the particular product involved and the manufacturer or seller of this product; and that a plaintiff must prove a defect, negligence or a warranty breach attributable to at least one or more specific manufacturers and causal connection between that defect, negligence or breach of warranty and the injury or damage of which he complains in order to recover from the manufacturer or a group of manufacturers of the defective product.
Plaintiffs’ contentions are untenable because:
First, they call for strict liability in product liability cases, namely, without proof of fault, which is not now Michigan law.
Second, they call for group liability of parties *85who are unrelated except by their enterprise, business, or profession, but who are not necessarily joint tortfeasors, without proof of fault. This is not Michigan law.
Third, they call for a reversal of many well established decisions of Michigan’s tort law presently requiring: (a) identification of the defendant (b) proof of tortious activity or behavior by the defendant and (c) proof of a causal connection resulting in damages.
It should always be remembered that stability of law is a basic, precious judicial necessity, without which confusion reigns. Judicial legislation exceeds judicial authority and does great injury to our "separation of powers” doctrine.
As to the plaintiffs’ contentions, I conclude as follows: There are only two theories of recovery for product liability which are recognized in Michigan: negligence and warranty. Johnson v Chrysler Corp, 74 Mich App 532; 254 NW2d 569 (1977), lv den 400 Mich 861 (1977). Strict liability is not recognized. Plaintiff must prove that the defendant has supplied a defective product, and that this defect has caused injury to the plaintiff.
Regardless of the theory upon which liability is predicated, whether negligence or breach of warranty, there must first be proof that the defendant produced, manufactured, sold, or was in some way responsible for the product. The matter of identification is inherent in every products liability action. 51 ALR3d 1344, 1349.
In a similar case, Gray v United States, 445 F Supp 337, 338 (SD Texas, 1978), the plaintiff sued Eli Lilly and Company and the government for her injuries caused by the DES ingested by her mother during pregnancy. The Texas district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defen*86dant drug company because the plaintiff was unable to identify the manufacturer of the DES taken by her mother.
In Summers v Tice, 33 Cal 2d 80; 199 P2d 1; 5 ALR2d 91 (1948), the plaintiff was struck in the eye by a shotgun pellet when two defendants almost simultaneously fired their guns in his direction. The firing of the guns was tortious. There was no evidence as to which defendant fired the shot which injured the plaintiff. There, the Court decided that the defendants should not be exonerated from liability for their negligence, whether it was deemed that they acted independently or in concert. The Court held that under the circumstances presented, the defendants were jointly and severally liable, and the burden of proof shifted to each of the defendants to absolve himself of liability, so the plaintiff was relieved of the duty of apportioning his injury to either one of the defendants.
In Meier v Holt, 347 Mich 430; 80 NW2d 207 (1956), the plaintiff automobile driver could not prove which portion of his injury was caused by each of the two defendants’ automobiles and the Court stated that the burden of apportioning the damages should be shifted to the defendants.
In these two cases, the plaintiff’s injury was caused by one of several persons, the plaintiff was unable to identify by any available method which defendant caused the injury, but the plaintiff established that all defendants were at fault. Rather than deny him recovery altogether due to the uncertainty of the situation, the Court held that it was more equitable to let the defendants bear the "burden of the uncertainty”, rather than preclude an innocent plaintiff from a recovery. A similar conclusion was reached in the collision case of *87Maddux v Donaldson, 362 Mich 425; 108 NW2d 33 (1961).
In Oakwood Homeowners Assn, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 77 Mich App 197; 258 NW2d 475 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 847 (1978), an air pollution case where it was proven that one or more of the defendants caused the pollution but where the plaintiffs did not prove injury and liability as to specific tortfeasors, it was held that the law shifts to defendants the burden of proof as to which tortfeasors were responsible and to what degree, after proof of liability by plaintiffs.
However, these cases which shift the burden of proof to the defendant do not involve the problem of identifying the party who is liable, but rather, they involve the apportionment of damages after liability is proven. Each defendant in those Michigan cases did some wrongful act toward the plaintiffs so liability was first determined. The defendants had the burden only of proving the speciñc proportion of the injury damages for which they were liable. The courts decided that it would be easier and more equitable, after liability has been proven, for the defendants to determine their own degree of culpability, rather than to deny the plaintiff a recovery. This is the law in Michigan.
In the case at bar, the basic issue has to do with establishing liability by identifying the particular wrongdoer(s), rather than with apportioning the damages among the tortfeasors. None of these Michigan cases has shifted the burden of proving "some” negligence to some of the defendants. The only "shifting” allowed has been with respect to apportionment of damages after negligence has been proven.
The only possible Michigan support for shifting of the burden of proof is the language of Snider v *88Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc, 42 Mich App 708, 718; 202 NW2d 727 (1972):
"True, the burden of proving which of two possible wrongdoers is responsible is generally assigned to the plaintiff. The courts have, however, shown a willingness to consider special circumstances when allocating the burden of proof. This accords with the general view that the placing of that burden is 'merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations’.”
However, this language was merely dicta.
The Michigan case law is clear that plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant was the manufacturer, 2) that the product was defective, and 3) that injury resulted therefrom. Smith v ER Squibb & Sons, Inc, 69 Mich App 375; 245 NW2d 52 (1976), Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85; 133 NW2d 129 (1965), Cova v Harley Davidson Motor Co, 26 Mich App 602; 182 NW2d 800 (1970).
Michigan case law as to successive or near simultaneous tortfeasors is that each tortfeasor is responsible for his own wrong, taking the injured person as found. However, when proof of harm is uncertain, the defendants are both liable jointly and severally for the total wrong unless the jury finds otherwise based upon the proofs. Snider, supra, Meier v Holt, supra, Maddux v Donaldson, supra.
All Michigan cases require plaintiffs to provq liability.
Restatement, Torts 2d, § 876, p 315 states:
"For harm resulting to a third person from tjip tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
*89"(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or
"(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
"(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”
I conclude the shifting of proofs is only as to degree or percent of damages, after, and only after, liability of at least one defendant acting in concert has been proven.
II
Are the defendants jointly liable under a theory called "group enterprise liability” or "collective group liability” for negligently marketing an unsafe drug without adequate testing, if they acted in concert to market and promote the use of DES in Michigan for use during pregnancy?
Appellants argue that Michigan should adopt the "enterprise liability” theory to hold the entire group of defendants who marketed DES without adequate testing liable for the injuries caused by the drugs without proof of fault of any one defendant. This doctrine, which was recognized in a series of blasting cap cases, does not require proof of a formal joint venture or a conspiracy. Joint control may be established by proof of an explicit agreement, by proof of parallel behavior supporting an inference of a tacit agreement or cooperation, or by proof of independent adherence to an industry-wide standard or custom. The difficulty with this enterprise liability theory lies in the lack of proof of real responsibility of at least one party *90defendant. Some liability of one defendant must precede drawing in others. For instance, if none is identified, why should we not conclude none are liable? Further, to shift proof of damages to defendants requires proof of some liability, and this means identification of at least one party at fault; otherwise, proof of damage becomes the substitute for proof of liability. When no one defendant-manufacturer can be identified, the existence of industry-wide standards or practices may not be substituted to support a finding of fault. The concept of "enterprise liability”, although not essentially different from that of Summers v Tice, supra, is a broader remedy than simply shifting the burden of uncertainty of damage allocation to ascertained tortfeasors. We cannot promiscuously make an entire industry liable without some liability being first established against someone.
There is no Michigan precedent to support the plaintiffs’ theory of joint or collective industry-wide liability. The activities alleged by the plaintiffs in their fourteenth amended complaint fall short of setting forth a cause of action for conspiracy, and plaintiffs’ counsel indicated during oral argument that the conspiracy claims had been abandoned. Any concerted action alleged by the plaintiffs was only undertaken by defendants pursuant to the mandate and requirements of Federal law and FDA procedures. Any company which manufactures DES must use the same formula and official name or be subject to penalties under 21 USC 352(e).
In the case at bar, identification information certainly did exist at one time, and its present unavailability is not due to any action by the defendants herein; but rather, the unavailability of that information is due to the passage of time. *91To accept the plaintiffs’ theory of enterprise liability would result in a penalty for conduct which was undertaken in compliance with the Federal laws concerning prescription drugs.
The "strict liability” rule is not recognized in Michigan. Instead, liability must be shown to arise from warranty, express or implied, or from negligence.
Michigan law does not support "collective liability.” The fact of injury alone does not establish a legal duty by society, running to the injured party, to provide compensation. Every injury is not legally compensable. Injury alone does not justify imposing liability on one manufacturer for injuries caused by another manufacturer of the same or similar product.
Even where there is an otherwise constitutionally sound policy established legislatively, like no-fault insurance, the constitutional validity fails unless there is reasonableness and insurable or actionable protection available to the group. There must be some fault directly proven against the manufacturer, or some activity done or position taken to create liability, even through a member of a group.
To say it another way, absent legislative action and legal responsibility springing therefrom, one may not be obligated for the fault of a fellow lawyer, or doctor, or engineer, or a drug manufacturer. Both due process and equal protection so protects all of us. The collective liability theory violates due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. The courts cannot create a remedy which is in violation of constitutional law.
The naked application of the collective liability theory would result in a taking of the property of *92all of the defendants in order to pay for harm , which may have been caused by the conduct of only one of the defendants or even by one who is not a party to this lawsuit, over whom the defendants have no control or with whom they have no meaningful contact. Due process requires that a state action which deprives a person of his property must have a rational basis, it must not be arbitrary. Naked application of collective liability, by relieving the plaintiffs of the burden of proving that these defendants or certain specific defendants caused or participated in causing the harm, would also deny to certain of the defendants equal protection.
The trial court’s grant of summary judgment should be affirmed in favor of all non-identified defendants as against those plaintiffs who have alleged that they cannot identify the manufacturer of the drug which allegedly caused their injury.
The trial court properly interpreted Michigan products liability law, properly declined to adopt the "enterprise liability” theory and properly dismissed the suits by the plaintiffs who could not specifically identify the responsible pharmaceutical defendant.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
The trial court’s opinion, upon which the final order was based, provided:
"[Plaintiffs seek to hold the ** * * defendants * * * responsible * * * on a theory identified alternatively as 'joint liability theory’ or 'enterprise liability theory’, 'synthetic drug industry liability theory’, or 'industry wide liability theory’. * * * [T]he basis and concept for recovery is predicated upon the notion that all manufacturers, * * * involved here, must share equally the burden of defense and the payment of any recovery made in damages.
"The Court * * * [holds] that plaintiffs have failed as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
* * [I]t is necessary to show that * * * the defendant actually manufactured, compounded, or sold the drug or medicine in question. Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Drug or Medicine Sold, 72 ALR2d 301, 338 (1961).
" '* * * [T]here must first be proof that the defendant produced, manufactured, sold, or was in some way responsible for the product, *82and this rule is supported in all of the cases examined in this annotation. Annotation, Products Liability: Necessity and Sufficiency of Identification of Defendant as Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 51 ALR3d 1344, 1349 (1973).
" '* * * 1 Hursh & Bailey, American Law of Products Liability 2d, § 1:41 (1974); accord, 63 Am Jur 2d, Products Liability, § 5, at 12.
" '* * * Wetzel v Eaton Corp, 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973); Symons v Mueller Co, 526 F2d 13 (10th Cir. 1975).
" 'In Michigan, it is clear that a products liability plaintiff must identify the product allegedly causing injury and attribute that product to the defendant manufacturer. Smith v E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc, 69 Mich App 375, 245 NW2d 52 (1976); Losinski v Ford Motor Co, 43 Mich App 114, 118, 204 NW2d 40 [49], 52 (1972); Cova v Harley Davidson Motor Co, 26 Mich App 602, 609, 182 NW2d 800, 804 (1970). In Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, 375 Mich 85, 133 NW2d 129 (1965), the court summarized the "identification” requirement as follows:
"' "[A] plaintiff * * * must prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal connection between that defect and the injury or damage of which he complains. When able to do that, then and only then may he recover against the manufacturer of the defective product.” 375 Mich., at 99, 133 NW2d, at 135.’
"Pursuant to Michigan law, * * * the failure and inability of those plaintiffs to so identify the manufacturer and to identify the alleged injury-causing product means that those plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted within the meaning of Michigan GCR 117.2(1).”